# TURKEY PIC

## 1NC’s

### 1NC---No Kickout

#### The United States federal government should increase its security cooperation with

Albania

Belgium

Bulgaria

Canada

Croatia

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Montenegro

Netherlands

North Macedonia

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

United Kingdom

#### in the area of [insert plan mechanism]

#### The counterplan competes. The plan increases security cooperation with all of NATO, the counterplan only works with discrete parts

For reference, the resolution says “**the** North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.]

Supreme Court of Kentucky 3 (“Kotila v. Commonwealth,” 2000-SC-0341-MR, Lexis)//BB

Whether a conviction under this statute requires possession of all (as opposed to any) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture [\*\*24] methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of statutory construction. First, we examine the language of the statute, itself. United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000) HN9 ("The starting point in a statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself."). Obviously, the multiple manufacturing methods and the availability of a broad range of readily available chemicals and equipment necessary for each manufacturing process militates against itemizing within the statute all of the possible chemical and equipment combinations by which methamphetamine could be manufactured. Nevertheless, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not read "[p]ossesses chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses some of the chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses any of the chemicals or equipment." It reads "[p]ossesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine." The presence of the article "the" is significant because, grammatically speaking, possession of some but not all of the chemicals or equipment does not satisfy the statutory language.

FN 10

In the context of statutory construction, "the" is used as a function word before a plural noun denoting a group to indicate reference to the group as a whole. In decisions spanning three different centuries, the appellate courts of Kentucky have found use of the word "the" to have a significant effect upon meaning. Courts are directed by the general assembly to construe Kentucky statutes according to the common and approved usage of language. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.080(4). More like this Headnote

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FN 11

The Kentucky Supreme Court construes the phrase "the chemicals or equipment" as used in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 218A.1432(1)(b) to mean all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. More like this Headnote

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#### The counterplan solves. It has 29 NATO states jointly cooperate. Excluding Turkey PICs out of the spoiler.

Bandow 21, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Eight reasons why the U.S. should ditch Turkey as a military partner,” Responsible Statecraft, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/11/23/eight-reasons-why-the-u-s-should-ditch-turkey-as-a-military-partner/)//BB>

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transformed his country and its relationship with America — but not for the better. President Donald Trump’s personal ties to Erdogan may have disguised the widening divergence in interests, but a chasm has now truly opened between the two governments, requiring a much tougher approach toward Ankara than in the past. The Republic of Turkey grew out of the ramshackle Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the end of World War I. Ankara joined NATO in 1952, controlling access to the Black Sea and serving as the alliance’s southeast foundation. The Pentagon was always Ankara’s strongest booster, since Incirlik and Izmir Air Bases extended Washington’s military reach in the Middle East. Turkey also was presented as a model of Islamic democracy, despite the military’s ruthless intervention in the illiberal political system, staging soft and hard coups, and invading the Republic of Cyprus in 1974. For America, the Cold War was more important than human rights. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002 election and began to transform Turkey. After a decade of modest reform and good press, Erdogan turned Turkey in an authoritarian, corrupt, and Islamist direction. Repression accelerated after a failed coup in July 2016, months before Trump was elected, provided Erdogan with a Turkish version of the Reichstag fire. Freedom House rates Turkey as not free, reporting that the government “has pursued a dramatic and wide-ranging crackdown on perceived opponents” since that attempted coup event. Based on scant evidence, Erdogan accused the Hizmet movement’s Fethullah Gulen of being behind the putsch. He has tried, but so far unsuccessfully, to have Gulen extradited from his exile in Pennsylvania. Erdogan then turned his country into a prison state. Even the slightest connection — teaching at a Hizmet school, or using a bank owned by a Hizmet member — resulted in dismissal, arrest, and/or imprisonment. Journalists and opposition politicians remain frequent targets, especially when Erdogan’s poll ratings dip. Reported Freedom House: Opposition gains and economic troubles “have given the government new incentives to suppress dissent and limit public discourse.” Moreover, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly at odds with U.S. policy. The challenge is not that Erdogan is taking independent positions, but rather is actively undermining U.S. policies. Among the problem areas: One: Treating another NATO ally, Greece, and a European Union member, Cyprus, as adversaries. Unhappy over Greece’s possession of islands near Turkey’s coast, Ankara refuses to recognize Greek airspace and territorial waters, leading to dangerous military confrontations. The Erdogan government continues to resist efforts to end the partition of Cyprus and interfere with efforts by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus to develop nearby hydrocarbons. Some observers fear a Turkish-Greco war. Two: Forging a military relationship with Russia. Ankara purchased Moscow’s S-400 air defense system, resulting in Turkey’s ouster from the F-35 program. The Erdogan government plans to buy additional S-400 missiles. Turkey also has reached accommodations with Moscow involving Syria and other regional issues, though the two governments’ alignment is not perfect. Erdogan has negatively contrasted his relationship with President Joe Biden to that with Putin. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the German Marshall Fund opined that Erdogan seeks “a counterbalancing alliance with Russia against the US.” If Ankara was forced to choose between NATO and Russia in a conflict, the allies could not be confident that Turkey would fulfill its alliance commitments. Three: Adopting an expansive, neo-Ottoman maritime doctrine known as Blue Homeland, which seeks to dominate the Mediterranean. Once stuck at the policymaking fringe, this strategy envisions controlling waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. Clashes over contending territorial claims have increased chances of violent confrontation. Ankara’s desire to strengthen its maritime position spurred its intervention in Libya’s civil war. Four: Arming Azerbaijan and encouraging it to restart hostilities with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The result was a bitter fight and abundant war crimes. There were unverified claims that Ankara shot down an Armenian aircraft and deployed Syrian mercenaries on Azerbaijan’s behalf. A side impact was to deepen Russia’s role. Five: Intervening in Libya’s civil war. Ankara backed the Islamist Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, violating the United Nations weapons embargo. Turkish vessels confronted French and German ships tasked with preventing arms smuggling. In return the Tripoli authorities accepted a maritime boundary agreement privileging Ankara in waters also claimed by Greece and Cyprus. Six: Treating the Islamic State and other radical groups operating in Syria as co-belligerents if not allies. Ankara brazenly facilitated ISIS border crossings and oil sales; charges of corruption tainted Erdogan’s family. Even Vice President Joe Biden inconveniently acknowledged Ankara’s role. Seven: Targeting the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units, or YPG, in Syria. The Erdogan government twice invaded Syrian Kurdish territory, utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons and employing jihadist forces previously active elsewhere in Syria. Amnesty International cited “a shameful disregard for civilian life, carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians, during the offensive into northeast Syria.” The YPG was Washington’s main ally fighting ISIS on the ground, yet Ankara is threatening to invade again. Eight: Using Syrian fighters as mercenaries via private military companies, in particular, the SADAT International Defense Consultancy, to meddle in conflicts abroad, including Libya and the Caucasus. These forces are essentially accountable to no one. Despite this terrible record, Ankara’s ambassador to the US, Hasan Murat Mercan, recently argued that “Turkey stands as a reliable ally that can deliver at the moment of crisis — a friend in need.” However, policy differences have been exacerbated by Erdogan’s personal hostility. He recently went before the Turkish National Assembly to denounce “those who ignored our country in the region for years — and confronted us with maps and demands that would imprison us into our coasts — irst tried the language of threat and blackmail after the steps we took.” Moreover, Erdogan’s ambitions have grown increasingly radical. As he told the National Assembly: “There is no chance left for this distorted order, in which the entire globe is encumbered by a handful of greedy people, to continue to exist the way it currently does.” There was little doubt about who he meant. The greater his domestic political problems, the more aggressive his foreign policy is likely to become. Which is dangerous to the US. In 2015 the Erdogan government recklessly downed a Russian warplane that briefly entered Turkish airspace. Had Russia’s Vladimir Putin responded with force America and Europe could have ended up at war. Today Moscow’s and Ankara’s respective proxies, the Syrian government, and Idlib-area insurgents, also could spark a conflict. So could Ankara’s increasingly aggressive activities elsewhere — North Africa, Mediterranean, Mideast, and Central Asia — which often are at variance with NATO’s interest. Turkey’s band of American friends is diminishing. Some are stuck in the past, remembering the ally Ankara once was. Other analysts prefer to wait for Erdogan’s passage across the River Styx, given rumors about his health. However, in two decades he would still be younger than Joe Biden. The political waters at home have grown rougher, but so far he has surmounted every challenge with increasing force. Nor would a new president and parliamentary majority necessarily transform Ankara’s policies. Turkish public opinion is nationalistic, conspiracy-minded, and ever more hostile toward the U.S. Indeed, a recent poll found that six of ten Turks viewed America as the greatest threat to Turkey, compared to just 19 percent who fingered Russia. Today Ankara could not enter the transatlantic alliance. Washington should minimize its reliance on Turkey and the latter’s threat to U.S. interests. The U.S. should remove its nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base, and downgrade use of the facility, access to which remains under Erdogan’s erratic control. If Washington intervened in the Mideast less often, the base would matter less. In any case, there are alternatives: In response to Ankara’s policies U.S.-Greek military ties have recently expanded. The Pentagon should limit arm sales, building on the F-35 sales ban. Finally, the Biden administration should begin NATO discussions on options ranging from limiting Turkey’s role in decision-making to ousting Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago Erdogan admitted: “I cannot say that a healthy process is running in Turkish-American ties.” Yet Washington’s policy reflects the continuing illusion that Turkey remains a loyal and reliable U.S. ally, European partner, and NATO member. None of these are true. A change in policy is long overdue.

### 1NC---No Kickout + HR Cred

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Estonia

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Lithuania

Luxembourg

Montenegro

Netherlands

North Macedonia

Norway

Poland

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Spain

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Finally, the Biden administration should begin NATO discussions on options ranging from limiting Turkey’s role in decision-making to ousting Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago Erdogan admitted: “I cannot say that a healthy process is running in Turkish-American ties.” Yet Washington’s policy reflects the continuing illusion that Turkey remains a loyal and reliable U.S. ally, European partner, and NATO member. None of these are true. A change in policy is long overdue.

#### The plan’s treatment of Turkey as an ally-among-equals wrecks US human rights credibility. CP solves it by isolating Erdogan

Rossomondo 6-10-2022, Researcher on Defense Policy and Intelligence (John, “NATO Must Confront Turkey’s Human-Rights Abuses,” *Epoch Times*, <https://www.theepochtimes.com/nato-must-confront-turkeys-human-rights-abuses_4522853.html?welcomeuser=1)//BB>

“He is mainly interested in this elections in 2023, and he will not go far because of the reconciliation between him and the Turkish deep state, which resulted in rapprochement with most of the countries of the region and the West,” al-Labwani told me. NATO’s Turkey problem is one of its own creation. The alliance worried more about using Turkey as a foil against Russia, particularly following the 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, than Turkey’s nefarious actions. It needs Turkish support to keep the strategic Bosporus strait closed under the 1936 Montreux Convention and keep the Russian Black Sea Fleet bottled up in the Black Sea. NATO looked the other way while Erdoğan purged the Turkish armed forces of pro-NATO secularist officers and replaced them with Islamist and ultra-nationalists over the past decade. Erdoğan abolished critical media just like Vladimir Putin. Our NATO ally supports the SADAT paramilitary organization that spreads jihadism across the Islamic world, not unlike Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group that acts on behalf of Putin’s interests. It militarily threatens neighboring fellow NATO member Greece and has repeatedly invaded Syria. Blinken warned Turkey against further military operations in Syria on June 1. Kurdish activists accuse Ankara of systematic ethnic cleansing. Turkish agents have abducted followers of exiled Turkish Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen from around the world and brought them back to Turkey in the wake of the July 2016 “false-flag” coup attempt. Gülen and his followers have been strong opponents of Erdoğan’s policies. Erdoğan has played both sides of the fence with Russia for the past decade. On one side there was the Turkey that shot down a Russian jet in 2015 and sold Ukraine the Bayraktar drones manufactured by a company owned by Erdoğan’s son-in-law. On the other hand, you had the Turkey that went out of its way to annoy its NATO partners by purchasing the formidable Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. The alliance helped enable the development of the current impasse by turning a blind eye to Turkey’s covert backing of ISIS and al-Qaida jihadists that necessitated the use of Kurdish fighters to push back ISIS. Turkish National Intelligence (MIT) helped tens of thousands of al-Qaida and later ISIS jihadists cross its territory to fight in Syria and also trained them. NATO also helped create the refugee flow from Syria by arming and supporting the uprising against Assad starting in 2011. NATO aircraft reportedly ferried Libyan arms to Turkey from Libya starting in late 2011 with covert support from the Obama administration. “Turkey’s antidemocratic nature isn’t just a bad look for an alliance that claims to be grounded in democratic principles. It also undermines NATO’s security. Turkey wields its veto within the alliance like a cudgel, slamming its allies on unrelated issues to punish it for not validating Erdoğan’s obsession with punishing the Kurds. Erdoğan is in it for what Erdoğan wants — and that frequently doesn’t align with the alliance’s interest and security,” former U.S. diplomat Elizabeth Shackelford wrote in the Chicago Tribune. The alliance’s charter makes it impossible for it to suspend or expel a member; consequently, Erdoğan believes he can act with impunity and hold the alliance hostage. Kurdish activist Hadi Elis accuses NATO of being anti-Kurdish. “[It] acts in accordance with Turkish policies against Iraqi and Syrian Kurds,” Elis told me. “[The] Western coalition … started putting distance between themselves and Kurds, because Turkey was using all trade and other ties to give them hard times. No one wanted to confront Turkey’s anti-Kurdish policies.” It’s time the alliance took a stand against Turkey’s bad behavior, especially now that the Turks are threatening their third invasion of Syria in eight years. The West has relied on Syria’s PKK-linked People’s Defense Units (YPG in Kurdish) to keep ISIS in check. The YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) warn that ISIS is coming back in Syria, and a Turkish invasion would only destabilize and oppress the Kurds and Syriac Christians who live in the proposed buffer area along Turkey’s border with Syria. The commander of Kurdish forces said he would turn to the Assad regime should Turkey invade. “The justifications for appeasing Erdogan have never served NATO well, and made it more difficult to constrain other rogue actors and to retain credibility on human rights,” Tsukerman said.

#### The impact is global WMD conflict

Burke-White 4, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge (William, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation,” *The Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 17)//BB

For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of human rights and the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without exception, each administration has treated the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human rights at the expense of national security or protect national security while overlooking international human rights. While U.S. policymakers have been motivated at times by human rights concerns, such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For example, President Bush’s 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks of a “commitment to protecting basic human rights.” In the same document, President Bush makes it clear that “defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”1 This subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and national security as correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of human rights around the world would make the United States safer and more secure. The United States needs to restructure its foreign policy accordingly. This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [\*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

### 1NC---With Kickout

#### The United States federal government should increase its security cooperation with

Albania

Belgium

Bulgaria

Canada

Croatia

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Montenegro

Netherlands

North Macedonia

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

United Kingdom

#### in the area of [insert plan mechanism] because only those states’ practices align with the fundamental expectations of the institutional charter.

#### The counterplan competes. The plan increases security cooperation with all of NATO, the counterplan only works with discrete parts

For reference, the resolution says “**the** North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.]

Supreme Court of Kentucky 3 (“Kotila v. Commonwealth,” 2000-SC-0341-MR, Lexis)//BB

Whether a conviction under this statute requires possession of all (as opposed to any) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture [\*\*24] methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of statutory construction. First, we examine the language of the statute, itself. United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000) HN9 ("The starting point in a statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself."). Obviously, the multiple manufacturing methods and the availability of a broad range of readily available chemicals and equipment necessary for each manufacturing process militates against itemizing within the statute all of the possible chemical and equipment combinations by which methamphetamine could be manufactured. Nevertheless, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not read "[p]ossesses chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses some of the chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses any of the chemicals or equipment." It reads "[p]ossesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine." The presence of the article "the" is significant because, grammatically speaking, possession of some but not all of the chemicals or equipment does not satisfy the statutory language.

FN 10

In the context of statutory construction, "the" is used as a function word before a plural noun denoting a group to indicate reference to the group as a whole. In decisions spanning three different centuries, the appellate courts of Kentucky have found use of the word "the" to have a significant effect upon meaning. Courts are directed by the general assembly to construe Kentucky statutes according to the common and approved usage of language. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.080(4). More like this Headnote

End FN 10

"The" is "[u]sed as [\*\*25] a function word before a plural noun denoting a group to indicate reference to the group as a whole." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2369 (1993). In decisions spanning three different centuries, the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have found use of the word "the" to have a significant effect upon meaning. See Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 717, 719-20 (2000) ("[U]se of the definite article 'the' indicates that the statute refers to the entire body and not to discrete parts or components. . . ."); Cardwell v. Haycraft, Ky., 268 S.W.2d 916, 918 (1954) (the trial court's contributory negligence instruction was erroneous in that it contained the definite article "the" before the words "proximate cause" and "such language indicates that 'the sole' rather than 'a contributing' cause was meant."); Schardein v. Harrison, 230 Ky. 1, 18 S.W.2d 316, 319 (1929) ("[I]f the makers of the Constitution had intended to qualify the word 'office' [in Ky. Const. § 161] they would have inserted the definite article 'the' before 'office.'") (quotation omitted); Sheriff of Fayette v. Buckner, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 126, 128 (1822) [\*\*26] (holding that legislative act referencing "the clerk of the court" intended a particular clerk of court referenced elsewhere in the legislation). For similar interpretations by other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 466 Mich. 142, 644 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Mich. 2002); Patricca v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 527 Pa. 267, 590 A.2d 744, 751 (Pa. 1991); McClanahan v. Woodward Constr. Co., 77 Wyo. 362, 316 P.2d 337, 341-42 (Wyo. 1957); Williams v. McComb, 38 NC. (3 Ired. Eq.) 450 (1844) ("[G]rammatically speaking, 'The,' is a definite article before nouns, which are specific or understood, and is used to limit or determine their extent."). We are directed by the General Assembly to construe our statutes "according to the common and approved usage of language." KRS 446.080(4). Following that directive,

FN 11

The Kentucky Supreme Court construes the phrase "the chemicals or equipment" as used in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § Ky. Rev. Stat. § 218A.1432(1)(b) to mean all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. More like this Headnote

End FN 11

we construe "the chemicals or equipment" to mean all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.

#### The counterplan solves. It has 29 NATO states jointly cooperate. Excluding Turkey PICs out of the spoiler.

Bandow 21, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Eight reasons why the U.S. should ditch Turkey as a military partner,” Responsible Statecraft, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/11/23/eight-reasons-why-the-u-s-should-ditch-turkey-as-a-military-partner/)//BB>

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transformed his country and its relationship with America — but not for the better. President Donald Trump’s personal ties to Erdogan may have disguised the widening divergence in interests, but a chasm has now truly opened between the two governments, requiring a much tougher approach toward Ankara than in the past. The Republic of Turkey grew out of the ramshackle Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the end of World War I. Ankara joined NATO in 1952, controlling access to the Black Sea and serving as the alliance’s southeast foundation. The Pentagon was always Ankara’s strongest booster, since Incirlik and Izmir Air Bases extended Washington’s military reach in the Middle East. Turkey also was presented as a model of Islamic democracy, despite the military’s ruthless intervention in the illiberal political system, staging soft and hard coups, and invading the Republic of Cyprus in 1974. For America, the Cold War was more important than human rights. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002 election and began to transform Turkey. After a decade of modest reform and good press, Erdogan turned Turkey in an authoritarian, corrupt, and Islamist direction. Repression accelerated after a failed coup in July 2016, months before Trump was elected, provided Erdogan with a Turkish version of the Reichstag fire. Freedom House rates Turkey as not free, reporting that the government “has pursued a dramatic and wide-ranging crackdown on perceived opponents” since that attempted coup event. Based on scant evidence, Erdogan accused the Hizmet movement’s Fethullah Gulen of being behind the putsch. He has tried, but so far unsuccessfully, to have Gulen extradited from his exile in Pennsylvania. Erdogan then turned his country into a prison state. Even the slightest connection — teaching at a Hizmet school, or using a bank owned by a Hizmet member — resulted in dismissal, arrest, and/or imprisonment. Journalists and opposition politicians remain frequent targets, especially when Erdogan’s poll ratings dip. Reported Freedom House: Opposition gains and economic troubles “have given the government new incentives to suppress dissent and limit public discourse.” Moreover, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly at odds with U.S. policy. The challenge is not that Erdogan is taking independent positions, but rather is actively undermining U.S. policies. Among the problem areas: One: Treating another NATO ally, Greece, and a European Union member, Cyprus, as adversaries. Unhappy over Greece’s possession of islands near Turkey’s coast, Ankara refuses to recognize Greek airspace and territorial waters, leading to dangerous military confrontations. The Erdogan government continues to resist efforts to end the partition of Cyprus and interfere with efforts by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus to develop nearby hydrocarbons. Some observers fear a Turkish-Greco war. Two: Forging a military relationship with Russia. Ankara purchased Moscow’s S-400 air defense system, resulting in Turkey’s ouster from the F-35 program. The Erdogan government plans to buy additional S-400 missiles. Turkey also has reached accommodations with Moscow involving Syria and other regional issues, though the two governments’ alignment is not perfect. Erdogan has negatively contrasted his relationship with President Joe Biden to that with Putin. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the German Marshall Fund opined that Erdogan seeks “a counterbalancing alliance with Russia against the US.” If Ankara was forced to choose between NATO and Russia in a conflict, the allies could not be confident that Turkey would fulfill its alliance commitments. Three: Adopting an expansive, neo-Ottoman maritime doctrine known as Blue Homeland, which seeks to dominate the Mediterranean. Once stuck at the policymaking fringe, this strategy envisions controlling waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. Clashes over contending territorial claims have increased chances of violent confrontation. Ankara’s desire to strengthen its maritime position spurred its intervention in Libya’s civil war. Four: Arming Azerbaijan and encouraging it to restart hostilities with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The result was a bitter fight and abundant war crimes. There were unverified claims that Ankara shot down an Armenian aircraft and deployed Syrian mercenaries on Azerbaijan’s behalf. A side impact was to deepen Russia’s role. Five: Intervening in Libya’s civil war. Ankara backed the Islamist Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, violating the United Nations weapons embargo. Turkish vessels confronted French and German ships tasked with preventing arms smuggling. In return the Tripoli authorities accepted a maritime boundary agreement privileging Ankara in waters also claimed by Greece and Cyprus. Six: Treating the Islamic State and other radical groups operating in Syria as co-belligerents if not allies. Ankara brazenly facilitated ISIS border crossings and oil sales; charges of corruption tainted Erdogan’s family. Even Vice President Joe Biden inconveniently acknowledged Ankara’s role. Seven: Targeting the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units, or YPG, in Syria. The Erdogan government twice invaded Syrian Kurdish territory, utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons and employing jihadist forces previously active elsewhere in Syria. Amnesty International cited “a shameful disregard for civilian life, carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians, during the offensive into northeast Syria.” The YPG was Washington’s main ally fighting ISIS on the ground, yet Ankara is threatening to invade again. Eight: Using Syrian fighters as mercenaries via private military companies, in particular, the SADAT International Defense Consultancy, to meddle in conflicts abroad, including Libya and the Caucasus. These forces are essentially accountable to no one. Despite this terrible record, Ankara’s ambassador to the US, Hasan Murat Mercan, recently argued that “Turkey stands as a reliable ally that can deliver at the moment of crisis — a friend in need.” However, policy differences have been exacerbated by Erdogan’s personal hostility. He recently went before the Turkish National Assembly to denounce “those who ignored our country in the region for years — and confronted us with maps and demands that would imprison us into our coasts — irst tried the language of threat and blackmail after the steps we took.” Moreover, Erdogan’s ambitions have grown increasingly radical. As he told the National Assembly: “There is no chance left for this distorted order, in which the entire globe is encumbered by a handful of greedy people, to continue to exist the way it currently does.” There was little doubt about who he meant. The greater his domestic political problems, the more aggressive his foreign policy is likely to become. Which is dangerous to the US. In 2015 the Erdogan government recklessly downed a Russian warplane that briefly entered Turkish airspace. Had Russia’s Vladimir Putin responded with force America and Europe could have ended up at war. Today Moscow’s and Ankara’s respective proxies, the Syrian government, and Idlib-area insurgents, also could spark a conflict. So could Ankara’s increasingly aggressive activities elsewhere — North Africa, Mediterranean, Mideast, and Central Asia — which often are at variance with NATO’s interest. Turkey’s band of American friends is diminishing. Some are stuck in the past, remembering the ally Ankara once was. Other analysts prefer to wait for Erdogan’s passage across the River Styx, given rumors about his health. However, in two decades he would still be younger than Joe Biden. The political waters at home have grown rougher, but so far he has surmounted every challenge with increasing force. Nor would a new president and parliamentary majority necessarily transform Ankara’s policies. Turkish public opinion is nationalistic, conspiracy-minded, and ever more hostile toward the U.S. Indeed, a recent poll found that six of ten Turks viewed America as the greatest threat to Turkey, compared to just 19 percent who fingered Russia. Today Ankara could not enter the transatlantic alliance. Washington should minimize its reliance on Turkey and the latter’s threat to U.S. interests. The U.S. should remove its nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base, and downgrade use of the facility, access to which remains under Erdogan’s erratic control. If Washington intervened in the Mideast less often, the base would matter less. In any case, there are alternatives: In response to Ankara’s policies U.S.-Greek military ties have recently expanded. The Pentagon should limit arm sales, building on the F-35 sales ban. Finally, the Biden administration should begin NATO discussions on options ranging from limiting Turkey’s role in decision-making to ousting Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago Erdogan admitted: “I cannot say that a healthy process is running in Turkish-American ties.” Yet Washington’s policy reflects the continuing illusion that Turkey remains a loyal and reliable U.S. ally, European partner, and NATO member. None of these are true. A change in policy is long overdue.

#### Implicitly identifying Turkey as in material breach ends Turkey’s membership in NATO either through Turkish withdrawal or formal exclusion. Key to Sweden and Finland membership.

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Partnerships, among people and nations, have a wide range of possible meanings and scope. But alliances are formal agreements that indicate a specific kind of commitment, such as marriage. An alliance is a promise between nations to support and defend each other, in good times and bad, sickness and health, or more specifically, peace time or war.

Alliances shouldn’t be entered into casually, but they shouldn’t be unalterable either. If an alliance becomes an obstacle to a nation’s ability to secure its needs, the standards and path for getting out should be clear and reasonable. This brings me to Turkey. As any real friend to NATO would, I have to ask: is Turkey today really the Turkey you were drawn to as a partner 70 years ago? I fear you and Turkey have grown apart, most recently with its threat to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. I worry the growing differences are becoming irreconcilable. In the early NATO days, Turkey was sitting on the border of the Soviet Union. When stopping Soviet expansion was NATO’s primary purpose, Turkey’s geography might have been compelling enough to overcome other shortcomings. This was easy to do, too, given Turkey’s potential at the time. It seemed to be moving firmly toward a Western identity and embracing liberal, democratic values that NATO saw within itself. As often happens in relationships, that promise didn’t turn out, and Turkey saw coups and unrest in the coming decades. In 2002, the West thought this time could be different, with the democratic election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), but the commitment to democracy still wasn’t real, and Turkey took a hard turn toward illiberal, authoritarian rule. Turkey’s antidemocratic nature isn’t just a bad look for an alliance that claims to be grounded in democratic principles. It also undermines NATO’s security. Turkey wields its veto within the alliance like a cudgel, slamming its allies on unrelated issues to punish it for not validating Erdogan’s obsession with punishing the Kurds. Erdogan is in it for what Erdogan wants — and that frequently doesn’t align with the alliance’s interest and security. While they clash on several issues, Erdogan is still close to Putin, as he tries to play both sides. Turkey’s purchase of Russian missile defense systems in 2019 was a slap in NATO’s face and direct violation of U.S. sanctions. Can Turkey still be trusted with NATO’s weapons systems, or does Turkey’s snug relationship with Russia risk the compromise of classified NATO weapons system information? NATO, you can do better. Finland and Sweden are courting you, after all. Like Turkey, they have capable, professional militaries and strategic geography, but they also share your values, such as democracy and the rule of law. You’re not likely to catch Finland or Sweden imprisoning political opponents or threatening journalists. And Erdogan’s objection to the accession of Finland and Sweden raises the question of whose side Erdogan is on at all. Other NATO members have long tired of Turkey’s duplicity and games. This isn’t the first time booting Turkey out of the alliance has been a topic of debate. The possibility was raised after Erdogan’s harsh crackdown in 2016 following a failed coup attempt, as well after Turkey invaded northeastern Syria in 2019. But since NATO has no mechanism for suspending or expelling an ally, a path out isn’t clear. If the rest of the alliance finds that Turkey has consistently violated NATO principles, they can unanimously agree to withdraw Article 5 protections from Turkey, effectively suspending its participation and any assistance it receives from NATO. This is probably the closest to divorce it can get, but even this determination would require a clear-eyed assessment of the benefits Turkey brings to the table and the risks too. Perhaps Turkey would agree to a no-fault divorce — it can always choose to withdraw. If not, marriage counseling might be in order. No ally is the perfect ally, and no spouse the perfect spouse. Some manner of compromise and understanding is always necessary. It’s ultimately up to NATO to decide whether Turkey is worth the formal defense commitment, but it’s a decision they should feel empowered to make rather than accept the alliance as is. Periodically reconsidering the value and legitimacy of these commitments isn’t unreasonable. In fact, it’s one marker of a healthy relationship.

#### The addition of Sweden and Finland improves burden sharing, bolsters deterrence of Russia, and is makes the Asia pivot tenable.

John R. Deni 22. Research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. "NATO Should Admit Finland and Sweden ASAP." Wall Street Journal. 5-8-2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-should-admit-finland-and-sweden-asap-ally-border-russia-ukraine-war-article-five-11652036687. accessed 6-22-2022 //ART

Membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO reinforces each of these imperatives. Both are members of America’s largest trade and investment partner, the EU. Sweden has the ninth-largest economy in the 27-member EU, Finland the 15th. Both are home to advanced manufacturing and vibrant tech startup communities

Finland and Sweden are among the world’s most robust democracies. The greatest threat to freedom in Europe today is Russia, which has invaded neighboring democracies like Ukraine and Georgia and made efforts to undermine democracy across the Continent. Given their proximity to this threat, Finland and Sweden clearly understand this.

Their perspectives are especially important as the alliance is revising its strategy and debating whether and how to privilege collective defense relative to its other two core tasks—cooperative security and crisis management. It’s also important given debates over where NATO should focus its efforts between the multi-faceted Russian threat on the one hand and the challenges posed by terrorists and nonstate actors on the other. Finnish and Swedish membership in the alliance should strengthen NATO’s determination to prioritize the Russian threat. This will likely be welcomed by Washington, given its focus on strategic competition with Russia (and China).

When it comes to burden-sharing, Finland and Sweden have already proved themselves up to the task. If they join the alliance, it will mark the first time since Spain’s 1986 accession that NATO will expand to countries that likely will be net contributors to security. Both countries decided to increase defense spending recently, despite the challenges created by the pandemic-induced recession.

Both Finland and Sweden have small but advanced professional military forces. Finland has a land-centric military force, including a national conscription system that can generate a force of 216,000 troops. Sweden’s force is somewhat smaller, but it recently reinstituted national conscription to strengthen its military capacity, and it plans on expanding Swedish force structure. Both countries contribute to the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force, a multinational force capable of conducting a variety of missions. They also both participated in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and Sweden took part in NATO’s mission to protect civilians in Libya.

Given their capabilities and track record of participation in multinational military missions, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO would likely lead to improved trans-Atlantic burden-sharing. This is especially important as the U.S. increases its efforts in the Indo-Pacific theater.

#### Asia pivot solves a laundry list of impacts---climate change, water, food, disasters, pandemics, instability, etc.

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In pushing the case for the US pivot to Asia, one of the underlying catalysts was the increasing relevance of Asia to America. Approximately 28 per cent of American goods and services are exported to Asia; some 32 per cent of jobs are generated through these exports and close to 40 Asian states account for 30 per cent of their exports to the US. USA remains the favored destination for Asian students and tourists who contribute about US $70 billion to the US economy annually. Strategically, Asian geopolitics is more complex than Cold War dynamics. It involves complex political and economic forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), East Asian Summit (EAS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on the one hand, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) competing for favorable trade parameters on the other. Ideological positions are not as rigid as witnessed during the Cold War. Consequently, Asian geopolitics is not a zero-sum game and is dominated by economic interdependencies and trade considerations but is also glued together by a common recognition that whilst economic rivalries may exist, security threats emanating from terror and calamities require coordinated and consultative approaches for their resolution. To that end, the US had to contend with the core issue of diplomatically containing regional space, nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the absence of a NATO or Warsaw Pact arrangement in Asia and the primacy of trade and economics over security and sovereignty considerations. The peripheral but important issues of unsustainable growth of Asian economies impacting climate change, water, food, natural disasters, pandemic diseases such as the avian flu, and contesting freedom of US Pivot to Asia navigation in international waters may promote regional instability, and fierce nationalism.

## SOLVENCY

### S---General---Top-Shelf

**Turkey spoils everything. NATO should craft policies that exclude them.**

**Ghosh 6/20 —** Bobby Ghosh is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering foreign affairs. Previously, he was editor in chief at Hindustan Times, managing editor at Quartz and international editor at Time. Bobby Ghosh, " US Should Brace for More Pushback From Erdogan," Washington Post, 6-20-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-should-brace-for-more-pushback-from-erdogan/2022/06/17/88e89f1e-ee03-11ec-9f90-79df1fb28296\_story.html, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK

Turkey’s allies and rivals, along with Turks themselves, might want to buckle up for **12 months of turbulence.** The US and Europe should brace **themselves for even more mudslinging and contrariness** from Erdogan at a time **when they need his cooperation** in containing Russian adventurism. Ornery in the best of times, Erdogan has grown **even more quarrelsome with the West** as he has become **politically vulnerable at home.** His fortunes are now at their lowest ebb since he first took the reins in Ankara in 2003. He and his party have slipped in opinion polls over the past couple of years, as Turkey’s economy has been hammered by a combination of the pandemic and the president’s economic policies. Although the lira has tanked and inflation has soared, Erdogan has stubbornly resisted calls to raise interest rates. “Turkey is again stuck in a vicious cycle. High inflation causes the lira to weaken, which results in even higher inflation” said Ziad Daoud, chief emerging markets economist at Bloomberg Economics. “Lifting interest rates would break this cycle, but that’s unlikely to happen.” With little prospect of an economic turnaround in time for the vote, the president must **find other ways to make his case for re-election**. All the early signs are that he will dip into the **old populist’s playbook**, appealing to ethno-nationalism at home and **raising alarms about foreign enemies** — real and imagined. Some **of his favorite bogeymen are now** out of bounds: Turkey’s economic troubles have forced Erdogan to **make nice with the Gulf Arab states** he used to pillory, to popular acclaim. He can’t very well portray the ruling families of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as perfidious reactionaries **while pleading with them for** investment and trade **deals**. Erdogan has also **softened his rhetoric against Israel**, thanks in no small part to a friendship he has struck with President Isaac Herzog. This leaves him with one familiar fall guy: **the West**. He has already begun to **ratchet up his rhetoric against the US and Europe.** In a carefully choreographed meeting with young Turks last week, he denounced the West as **mendacious and untrustworthy**. He has lashed out at another old bugbear, demanding that Greece **demilitarize islands in the Aegean Sea**, adding that he was “not joking.” In the months ahead, expect Erdogan to **build on the general themes of Western duplicitousness** and to double down on his conspiracy theory that Turkey’s woes are the result of a deliberate campaign by “global barons of politics and money.” Turks groaning under the twin burdens of inflation and currency depreciation will be encouraged **to blame the US** and the Europe **rather than their president.** In addition to using progressively more astringent rhetoric, the president will be **less cooperative in his dealings with the West**. **We’re already seeing this in** his refusal to budge on **NATO** expansion: By framing his objection to Sweden and Finland as a matter of national security (he accuses them of harboring Kurdish terrorists) Erdogan is **exaggerating the threat** as well as portraying his recalcitrance as **patriotic resistance** **in the face of foreign bullying**. There is no point in **expecting reasonableness from any politician** who has their **back to the wall,** and certainly not from one who has decided **intransigence is in his best interest**. As frustrating as it will be for President Biden and European leaders, they should recognize where Erdogan is coming from, and act accordingly. Threats won’t work since they will only play into his narrative of heroic defiance. Their best bet might be to signal to him that if Turkey won’t join the consensus, **they will devise workarounds**. **This may require the NATO powers to build a separate** security **architecture** for Sweden and Finland outside the alliance — at least until next summer, when they will either be dealing with a new Turkish president or with a victorious Erdogan who no longer needs them as bogeymen.

#### Strengthening partnerships with non-Turkey members effectively sidelines Turkey

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The recent guilty plea by Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, and the indictment of Trump campaign officials Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, should highlight the fact that violators of the Foreign Agents Registration Act have reached the highest levels of government. 1 Flynn’s long delay in registering as a foreign agent is particularly problematic in view of his lobbying efforts on behalf of the Turkish government. 2 As detailed below, Turkey is no longer reliably aligned with US and NATO interests, despite being a military partner of the US as well as a member of NATO. Indeed, Turkey now appears to be more firmly aligned with Russia than with the US or NATO. Turkey’s penetration into our political system is therefore of significant concern from the standpoint of national security. This paper will argue that Turkey has become a threat to US and NATO security, and that this fact has not resulted in the policy shift it merits. Notably, US strategy regarding Turkey is nowhere to be found within the White House National Security Strategy document, suggesting that the current Administration is insufficiently attuned to the risks of our present alliance with Turkey. 3 This paper will propose several policy adjustments warranted by Turkey’s shifting orientation towards Russian interests. I. Introduction On December 2, 2017, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis told reporters that as the war against ISIS enters its final stages, US strategy would move towards holding territory instead of arming Syrian Kurdish fighters.4 This statement came a week after US President Donald Trump informed Turkish President Recep Erdoğan in a phone call of “pending adjustments to the military support provided to our partners on the ground in Syria,” a reference to Kurdish fighters that have been working in tandem with the US military in Syria.5 This abrupt about-face in American policy, which includes the recouping of weapons and vehicles from Kurdish militias, is an imprudent attempt at détente by the Trump administration towards the Turkish government.6 Erdoğan is a vociferous critic of American support for the Kurds in Syria. This issue, among others, has strained US-Turkish relations. For the US, the diplomatic crisis with Turkey is a matter of critical national security, given our intelligence and military collaboration with Turkish forces. In July 2017, the Turkish state-run news organization, Anadolu, revealed the location of 10 US bases and outposts in northern Syria.7 In late August 2017, US troops stationed in northern Syria came under direct fire from Turkish- backed forces.8 In December 2017, Turkey finalized the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (hereinafter “NATO” or the “Alliance”) historical adversary.9 These are but a few recent examples of increasingly overtly hostile acts taken by Turkey against NATO and the United States, actions that suggest a growing alliance between Turkey and the Kremlin, and a lack of commitment to democratic ideals. Erdoğan once revealed his attitude towards democracy by remarking, “Democracy is like a bus, when you arrive at your destination, you step off.”10 Turkey possesses a formidable military and a robust economy. NATO’s only Muslim-majority state, Turkey serves as NATO’s bridge to the Middle East, sharing as it does a border with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Turkey also helps to stem the tide of migration into Europe. It is in Russia’s interest to drive a wedge between NATO and Turkey, both to diminish NATO and to bring Turkey increasingly within Russia’s sphere of influence. Turkish recalcitrance towards contributing forces and capacities to NATO operations may reflect an enhanced Turkish-Russian relationship. Strengthening bilateral relationships with other NATO nations as well as pursuing a multilateral NATO approach towards Turkey, in a judicious combination of “carrots and sticks,” appears to be the optimal path moving forward for the US.

### S---Turkey Spoiler

#### Absent exclusion, Turkey spoils “security cooperation”

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Foreign and Defense Policy: From “Zero Problems” to “Precious Loneliness”

The AKP has moved away from the strategy of its first years in power, which gave priority to European integration, good relations with the United States, and the leveraging of Turkey’s economic strength and Ottoman heritage to build good relations with all its neighbors—a policy that was dubbed “zero problems.” Erdoğan is now pursuing a realist balancing strategy in foreign affairs, seeking to leave open options that will best advance his consolidation of power and Turkish national interests. Erdoğan’s often provocative actions and rhetoric that express his disappointment with Europe, the United States, and Israel have further strained relations with these longtime allies. Erdoğan is more focused on building the country’s stature in the Islamic world and forging new ties with Russia and China. He has not given up on the West but appears to hope that he can elicit favorable policy changes from allies and partners by demonstrating that he has options. Up until U.S. President Donald Trump announced his decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem in December 2017, Turkish officials expressed hopes that Trump would bring a fresh start in relations with Washington, and Erdoğan has been using his budding relationship with French President Emmanuel Macron to bring a reset in relations with the EU.

Turkish leaders have tried to forge wary partnerships with historic rivals Russia and Iran, particularly as these two gained control over the end game in the Syrian civil war since 2015. Differences with Iraq, many Gulf states, and Egypt over the AKP’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, policies in the wake of the Arab Spring, and stance on Qatar have seemed to diminish the stature in the Arab world that Turkey had around 2010. As policy differences with nearly all its neighbors and allies have mounted, leaders of the AKP and the MHP have argued that Turkey must be more self-reliant in protecting its interests and accept a “precious loneliness” in taking principled stands to defend its values and national interests. The AKP’s foreign policy continues to reflect an anticolonial nationalism borne of this period and a suspicion of globalization and foreign influence widespread in all segments of Turkish society. Polls conducted in November 2017 indicated that more than 84 percent of Turks overall agree at least somewhat that global economic and political elites have too much power over Turkey and should be resisted, and 83 percent of respondents stated that they hold unfavorable views of the Unites States.2 If a viable opposition leader or coalition were to emerge in Turkey and dislodge Erdoğan and the AKP from power after 2023, one could expect a more conciliatory approach from Turkey, because the three leading opposition par- ties in the 2018 elections ran on platforms calling for revitalizing relations with NATO allies and the EU. Nevertheless, deep public suspicion of the United States and Europe would constrain the pace and scope of a future rapprochement.

Continuation of current trends over the next five to ten years likely will lead to Turkish foreign and defense policies that are contrary, in varying degrees, to the interests of the United States and other NATO allies and that undermine long-standing aspects of defense and security cooperation. This situation warrants a fundamental reassessment of U.S. and European strategy toward Turkey, preparations for disruptive developments in all aspects of relations, and initiatives that could maintain cooperation on abiding mutual interests over the next decade and help restore long-standing ties if these trends are reversed.

#### Ex ante exclusion is the only solvent approach. Turkey spoils all NATO business.

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The warships were escorting a vessel suspected of smuggling weapons into Libya, violating a United Nations arms embargo. Challenged by a French naval frigate, the warships went to battle alert. Outnumbered and outgunned, the French frigate withdrew.

But this mid-June naval showdown in the Mediterranean was not a confrontation of enemies. The antagonists were France and Turkey, fellow members of NATO, sworn to protect one another.

A similarly hostile encounter between Turkey and a fellow NATO member happened just two weeks ago, when Turkish warplanes buzzed an area near the Greek island of Rhodes after Greek warships went on alert over Turkey’s intent to drill for undersea natural gas there.

Turkey — increasingly assertive, ambitious and authoritarian — has become “the elephant in the room” for NATO, European diplomats say. But it is a matter, they say, that few want to discuss.

A NATO member since 1952, Turkey is too big, powerful and strategically important — it is the crossroads of Europe and Asia — to allow an open confrontation, alliance officials suggest.

Turkey has dismissed any criticism of its behavior as unjustified. But some NATO ambassadors believe that Turkey now represents an open challenge to the group’s democratic values and its collective defense.

A more aggressive, nationalist and religious Turkey is increasingly at odds with its Western allies over Libya, Syria, Iraq, Russia and the energy resources of the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s tilt toward strongman rule after 17 years with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the helm also has unsettled other NATO members.

“It’s getting hard to describe Turkey as an ally of the U.S.,” said Philip H. Gordon, a foreign policy adviser and former assistant secretary of state who dealt with Turkey during the Obama administration.

Despite that, Turkey is getting a kind of free pass, analysts say, its path having been cleared by a lack of consistent U.S. leadership, exacerbated by President Trump’s contempt for NATO and his clear admiration for Mr. Erdogan.

“You can’t say what U.S. policy on Turkey is, and you can’t even see where Trump is,” Mr. Gordon said. “It’s a big dilemma for U.S. policy, where we seem to disagree strategically on nearly every issue.”

Those strategic divides are proliferating. They include Turkey’s support for different armed groups in Syria; its 2019 purchase of a sophisticated Russian antiaircraft system over fierce objections by the United States and other NATO members; its violation of the arms embargo in Libya; its aggressive drilling in the eastern Mediterranean; its constant demonization of Israel; and its increasing use of state-sponsored disinformation.

But NATO officials’ general meekness in standing up to Turkey has not helped, analysts say, pointing to the group’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, whose job is to keep the 30-nation alliance together, but who is considered excessively tolerant of both American and Turkish misbehavior.

The last serious discussion of Turkey’s policies among NATO ambassadors was late last year, despite the purchase of the antiaircraft system, the S-400.

Other countries, like Hungary and Poland, also fall short on the values scale, argued Nicholas Burns, a former NATO ambassador now at Harvard. But only Turkey blocks key alliance business.

NATO operates by consensus, so Turkish objections can stall nearly any policy, and its diplomats are both diligent and knowledgeable, “on top of every ball,” as one NATO official said. France has also used its effective veto to pursue national interests, but never to undermine collective defense, NATO ambassadors say. But Turkey has blocked NATO partnerships for countries it dislikes, like Israel, Armenia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

More seriously, for many months Turkey blocked a NATO plan for the defense of Poland and the Baltic nations, which all border Russia. And Turkey wanted NATO to list various armed Kurdish groups, which have fought for their independence, as terrorist groups — something that NATO does not do.

Some of these same Kurdish groups are also Washington’s best allies in its fight against Islamic State and Al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.

A deal was supposedly worked out at the last NATO summit meeting in December in London, but Turkey created bureaucratic complications, and it was only in late June that Turkey relented — after considerable pressure from official Washington, which has lost patience with Mr. Erdogan and is infuriated by his insistence on buying the S-400.

**Turkey wrecks everything NATO does**

Leonardo Jacopo Maria **Mazzucco 22,** Researcher in the Strategic Studies Department at TRENDS, Research & Advisory, MA degree in Comparative International Relations from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, “Turkey’s delicate balancing act: Mediating between the West, Russia, and Ukraine”, Trend Research, 6-17-2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/turkeys-delicate-balancing-act-mediating-between-the-west-russia-and-ukraine///SJ

Spoilers **Trust-deficit** within the Western camp In the early stages of the Ukraine-Russia war, NATO praised Turkey’s attempts to mediate the conflict and sent messages of appreciation to President Erdoğan.[57] However, the widespread consensus supporting Ankara started to wane following Turkey’s veto of Sweden and Finland’s membership bids for NATO. After a short-lived thaw in relations, the current impasse seems to have brought the **Atlantic Alliance** back into the cold. The first round of bilateral meetings held in an attempt to clear the air between Turkey and the two **Scandinavian countries** were inconclusive.[58] Ankara’s outright hostility toward Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids rests on the two Nordic countries’ semi-overt sympathy to exiled exponents of AKP’s historical nemesis, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Gülen movement.[59] Although Sweden and Finland approved legislations declaring the Kurdish guerrilla group a terrorist organization, the two countries – but especially Sweden – have historically expressed interest in the Kurdish movement’s political ambitions.[60] Stockholm and Helsinki are refusing to extradite to Ankara those charged with terrorism offences or thought to be linked to Fethullah Gülen,[61] which has led to tensions soaring on minor issues. The election of a former Iranian Kurdish peshmerga, Amineh Kakabaveh, as a member of parliament in Sweden, and the media coverage of a PKK affiliate, Salih Muslim, by Swedish state television channel SVT, are but two examples.[62] Turkey has legitimate security concerns regarding the military activities linked to the PKK and considers the separatist group a primary threat to its national security.[63] In an op-ed published by The Economist, President Erdoğan maintained that Ankara is ready to enter into genuine negotiations on condition that the Nordic candidate countries are willing “to curb the activities of all terrorist organizations and extradite the members of these organizations.”[64] However, Ankara’s **steadfast opposition** has been met with **discontent** rather than solidarity from its NATO allies, who perceive Turkey’s posture as uncooperative and **provocative** in a moment of extreme vulnerability for the Atlantic Alliance. Should Turkey **continue to veto** Sweden and Finland’s bid for Nato membership, the stalemate will likely **nurture frustration** and fuel mistrust among **other NATO members**. With Ankara **pulling the brakes** on the recently resumed bilateral talks with Greece[65] while **unveiling** a new **military offensive** in northern Syria,[66] **tensions are likely to soar** again within NATO. If **the above dynamics** are not handled deftly, the temporary cold could drive a **major wedge** between Turkey and the other members of the Atlantic Alliance. Needless to say, such a fractured Western camp significantly waters down the chance of a successful Turkey-led mediation.

### S---Cohesion

#### Punishing Turkey causes other allies to fear being singled-out. Causes buy-in for alliance initiatives.

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In addition, policymakers should not limit their expectations for positive change only to potential liberalizing actions by the partner government. They should also ask whether greater attention from the United States on democracy issues helps bolster the will and steadfastness of embattled leaders in civil society or the political opposition of the country in question. A common mistake is to think of the push on democracy and rights issues with a problematic security partner only in terms of effects on the government. But other parts of the political and civic communities are highly important and reactive to external signals. However, U.S. policymakers need to be careful of crossing the line between support and perceived (or real) interference in a foreign country’s domestic politics. For example, pushing the government hard on maintaining electoral integrity may be more effective than expressing direct support for opposition forces. U.S. officials should also evaluate the regional and global signaling effects of stepping engagement up on democracy with a particular country. Speaking out on democracy challenges in India, for example, may have positive signaling effects on other countries in South Asia given India’ s heft in the region; so, too, may raising these issues with Turkey signal what is in store if other NATO allies, like Hungary and Poland, continue down the path of democratic backsliding. There are often wider benefits to engaging on democracy and human rights, so policymakers should avoid the tendency to think of responses to the democracy-security dilemma in a particular country as relating only to that country.

#### Making the US support seem somewhat conditional paradoxically improves allied buy-in

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Because alliance membership is a club good, not a pure public good, worries about being excluded from the security benefits of an alliance can incentivize a state to try to shore up the alliance by sending a costly signal of their commitment to their alliance partners. “Today, we should expect the European allies to find that the best way to strengthen (or avoid weakening) their bonds with the United States is to contribute to out-of-area operations like ISAF. According to this line of reasoning, the allies who put the highest premium on NATO’s traditional products should be the ones—together with the United States—shouldering the heaviest burdens in Afghanistan” (Ringsmose 2010, 331). Yet the Afghanistan case demonstrates this is not just a story about club goods in formal alliances, but security cooperation more generally. States may use war efforts as a signal of their willingness to accept large costs in the hopes that this will improve their relationship with the coalition leader in the future. States use conflicts that are not of immediate strategic importance to— hopefully—gain the attention and respect of important international players. Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions. States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.

### S---Russian Espionage

#### Including Turkey means Russia gets full access to every element of the plan

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The cooperation between the two countries appears paradoxical only if their relationship is viewed against the backdrop of their past rivalry, and trust is thought necessary to sustainable relations. Turkey and Russia’s ability to cooperate without a relationship of trust suggests that the trust factor is overestimated. According to Russian foreign policy expert Timofei Bordachev, Moscow’s military superiority enables it to regard Ankara as something like a “good enemy”. Nevertheless, both sides also have other good reasons to persist in ignoring their history of animosity.

Since relations were normalized in 2016, too much has been at stake for either side to jeopardize the cooperation. In Syria, Moscow and Ankara are dependent on each other for preserving vital interests: in Russia’s case, preventing regime change and in Turkey’s, containing the Kurdish push for autonomy. On a bilateral level their mutual dependence is maintained through strategic projects like Akkuyu, TurkStream and S-400. An important aspect of TurkishRussian relations since the 2016 normalization is thus their expansion into areas with structural components. “No longer do construction, tourism, textiles, and fruit or vegetables define Turkish-Russian economic ties,” says Galip Dalay. “Instead, cooperation has shifted to strategic industries that create long-lasting mutual dependencies”.

When examining Turkish-Russian relations, then, we should focus not on the form, but on the substance of their interdependence. This has two implications for the West. First, personal relations between the Turkish and Russian presidents should not be overestimated. Western political circles should be prepared for the possibility of continuity in the respective foreign policies of Ankara and Moscow beyond the incumbent presidents’ terms of office. A change of leadership need not mean a change in foreign policy, either in Turkey or in Russia.

Secondly, the nature of the current Turkish-Russian partnership should not be underestimated. The relationship is often dismissed as purely transactional, but in fact it is precisely this transactional aspect that must be taken seriously: the transactional dynamics of the partnership, defined as an interested negotiation process aimed at mutually beneficial interaction, allow Turkey and Russia not only to upgrade their bilateral relations, but to enter into a regional cooperation that is unparalleled in the history of the countries’ relationship.

Although a major component of Turkish-Russian interaction, the Astana format alone does not make the partnership in Syria unique. The most important aspect of Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria is the strong bond resulting from their mutual involvement; it allows both Ankara and Moscow to combat what they perceive as existential threats to their countries. In this way, the potential for confrontation or cooperation inherent in the Syrian conflicts has nothing to do with the countries’ past rivalry, and everything to do with their current priorities. Similarly, it doesn’t matter what side of the conflict Russia and Turkey are on; what counts are their motives.

This extraordinary interdependence, meanwhile, increases the likelihood that Ankara and Moscow will go on to cooperate in other regional conflicts in which they are on opposing sides. If we compare the level of Turkish-Russian cooperation before and after the Syrian conflict, we find that not only have bilateral relations considerably improved, but there is a significant difference in the “export” of their regional interaction. Turkey and Russia recently expanded their regional agenda for the next two years. It now reaches well beyond Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria and Libya to take in the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean including Cyprus, and the Black Sea including Ukraine. This new expanded agenda contrasts starkly with the pre-crisis agenda of 2015 when there was a much lower level of cooperation. In 2010, for example, Moscow offered Turkey the chance to cooperate with Russia in the Middle East. At that time the Turkish leadership’s shared regional agenda was limited to the Caucasus and the Balkans, because it believed it could operate better in the Middle East without Russia. These regional dynamics in Turkish-Russian relations show once again that first, the relationship between Ankara and Moscow is not shaped by ancient rivalry‚ but by the question how and to what extent they respect each other’s interests. And secondly, there is a reciprocal effect between the level of their bilateral relations and their ability and readiness to consult on regional challenges.

#### Turkey leaks anything important to Russia

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB

Lastly, Turkey has been flirting with Russia – which remains NATO’s main security concern – to the point of buying its S-400 air-defense system. This represents a major break from the Alliance and raises a myriad of operational issues because the platform is not interoperable with Western hardware. In response, the US has expelled Turkey from the F-35 program, also due to the risk that by operating both systems, Turkey could leak important information on NATO aircraft to the Russians. It is also possible that Washington will introduce economic sanctions against Ankara under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.

### S---Deterrence/Warfighting

#### Turkey is just a liability---they can’t add to NATO war-fighting

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Erdoğan’s purge gutted the Turkish military, which is a concern for NATO as Turkey has the second largest armed forces in the organization.94 Dismissing thousands of officers, pilots, and other critical and knowledgeable members of the Turkish military is a loss for NATO, especially because they are being replaced with individuals with far less experience. NATO’s top commander in Europe, Joseph Scaparrotti, underscored this point when he spoke of the Turkish military’s “degradation.”95 Scaparrotti stated: “Those are ones that have spent a career now and have a great deal of experience… I think it will take some time for them to overcome that.”96 One exiled officer echoed Scaparrotti’s sentiment when he told CNN: “To be very blunt over here, (the) Turkish military... have lost their war-fighting capability to a great extent.”97

### AT Unanimity Key

#### Including Turkey means other actors bow-out of NATO initiatives

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As tensions grow, a key risk for NATO relates to the crisis’ potential to hamper its cohesion and ability to act decisively, as the alliance relies on the principle of consensus to successfully operate. Every major NATO decision embodies the collective will of all allies and results, therefore, from a complex but fragile process of negotiation wherein nations are invited to compromise on matters of mutual interest. The inevitable drawback to this is that every ally possesses a de facto right to veto any NATO issue if its demands are not met, which they may be incentivized to use as leverage to pursue national interests. The same can be said of the European Union, which operates on unanimity and where Cyprus recently made headlines for blocking sanctions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, insisting on the imposition of E.U. measures on Turkey for its energy exploration in Mediterranean waters. The European Union was criticized for failing to agree on timely sanctions.

Unlike the European Union, NATO consultations are held behind closed doors, and disagreements largely avoid public scrutiny. In principle, however, any nation’s objections could stall key alliance policy or business. Last year, leaks revealed that Turkey had threatened on the eve of a NATO summit to block a key defense plan to protect the Baltic states and Poland against Russian aggression unless NATO backed its own recognition of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units militia as terrorists. Likewise, for years, Turkey had vetoed NATO cooperation with neutral Austria under its partnership program in response to Vienna’s calls for the European Union to halt membership talks with Ankara. Though in both cases deals were eventually reached to break the deadlock, and though such negotiation tactics are not uncommon, these incidents highlight a mounting climate of uncooperativeness and unwillingness to compromise between allies, making interaction increasingly difficult.

As Ankara grows more defiant, NATO members are indeed finding it difficult to reign in their southeastern ally. With the 2011 Arab Spring and its aftermath, the rapid deterioration of Turkey’s regional and domestic security environments has coincided with a growing perception that its Western allies are not giving enough credence to its core security interests. The stalled European Union membership project, together with America’s disengagement from the Middle East, support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units militia, and persistent refusal to extradite cleric Fethullah Gülen, the presumed mastermind of the failed 2016 coup attempt, have all contributed to strengthening the conviction that Turkish security interests are likely best served through autonomous action — and not by relying on a suspicious and divided West. This impression is reinforced by Europe’s vocal criticism of Erdoğan’s concentration of executive power, and by the country’s worsening economic and social woes.

Overall, these factors have eroded NATO’s credibility and influence over Ankara, just as the latter has become more conscious of its own considerable leverage over Europe due to its key role in Syria, which NATO sees as the defense of its southern frontier, and in easing the pressure to accommodate large arrivals of refugees on European shores. The former is linked to Turkey’s vetoing of NATO’s defense plan for Poland and the Baltics, which aimed at compelling NATO to provide greater support in Turkey’s defense of the alliance’s southern flank — something Ankara has demanded for years. Likewise, Turkey’s handling of its four million-strong refugee population, the largest in the world, has contributed to Ankara’s influence over Brussels through its instrumentalization of fears that it would “open the gates” to Europe for migrants and refugees, which Erdoğan announced earlier this year in violation of a 2016 E.U.-Turkish agreement. Given its shrewd sense that the tables have turned, Ankara has lost many incentives to cooperate. Of course, one key risk is that Turkey’s bold strategy backfires and leads to a fresh round of retaliatory measures such as collective sanctions or cutbacks in E.U. funds, with damaging effects on Turkey’s weakening economy.

For NATO, another conceivable consequence lays in the reinforcement of calls for greater European “strategic autonomy” in the realms of defense and security, with potentially harmful repercussions on the future of the transatlantic community. Against a backdrop of deteriorating Euro-Atlantic relations, several leaders have begun to publicly question the relevance and effectiveness of NATO as an organization. A staunch advocate of the “strategic autonomy” concept, Macron reacted to the clash with Turkey over the arms embargo on Libya by reiterating his assertion that NATO was “brain dead” for being unable to temper Turkish adventurism. In a recent interview, Armenian President Armen Sarkissian echoed these remarks by putting at stake NATO’s credibility over the organization’s seeming inability to influence its member’s involvement in the Caucasus. Were NATO to become increasingly paralyzed[limited] by souring internal relations, doubts about the effectiveness and reliability of the organization could further incentivize E.U. countries into acting beyond the NATO framework. Regrettably, this could result in accelerating E.U. states’ ostracizing of Ankara, while persuading some allies into seeking additional bilateral arrangements as more reliable forms of security guarantees.

#### France will leave NATO if Turkey is appeased

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French President Emmanuel Macron created a stir last November when he said that NATO is experiencing a “brain death.” This single comment created a flurry of reactions as Member States attempted to justify the existence of NATO. Macron’s comments must be taken seriously when we consider that France in 1959 withdrew its Mediterranean Fleet from NATO command and in 1966 the French military left NATO’s integrated military command and demanded all foreign NATO soldiers to leave France. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk attempted to guilt the highly independent French President Charles de Gaulle for his decision to kick out foreign soldiers by asking if “the bodies of American soldiers in France’s cemeteries” who died in the two world wars also had to leave.

It was the Anglo-American hegemony that de Gaulle resisted, and it can be argued that Macron is attempting to re-establish France’s independence after former French President Nicolas Sarkozy reintegrated France into NATO in 2009. A clear indicator that Macron is following in the steps of de Gaulle is when he furthered the former president’s famous phrase that Europe stretches “from Lisbon to the Urals” in Russia by saying Europe’s territory stretches all the way to Vladivostok near the Chinese and North Korean borders.

However, Macron’s stinging attacks against NATO did not end with that single comment from November 2019. Last week Macron said that the Franco-Turkish naval incident was “one of the most beautiful demonstrations that there is a brain death” of NATO. A Turkish warship harassed a French navy vessel participating in a NATO mission, prompting France’s defence ministry to say that

“this is an extremely aggressive act that is unacceptable by an ally against a NATO ship. We consider this an extremely grave matter. We cannot accept that an ally behaves this way, that it does this against a NATO ship, under NATO command, carrying out a NATO mission.”

NATO is certainly “brain dead” as it primarily exists to pressurize Russia despite the collapse of the Soviet Union nearly three decades ago. To justify its existence, it has gone on campaigns of aggression by destroying Yugoslavia and Libya, and supporting reactionary forces like jihadist groups in Syria. It is now strongly suggested that France wants to embark on an independent path, especially as a lack of comradery is found within the Alliance.

Turkey, leveraging its large military, geostrategic positioning on the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and controlling the Straits into the Black Sea, is attempting to balance its relations with NATO and Russia to pursue its own ambition to dominant the entire region, including the Eastern Mediterranean. Moscow wants to strengthen relations with Turkey knowing it will antagonize NATO, while NATO continues to tolerate Turkey’s unilateral and aggressive actions. NATO’s tolerance to Turkish aggression is so high that it is always silent on Turkey’s daily violations of Greek maritime and airspace, despite Greece being a fellow NATO member.

The Turkish aggression against France in the Mediterranean a few weeks ago was one that could not be ignored. As Greece is not as geostrategically important to NATO in comparison to Turkey, aggression against it is always ignored and tolerated by NATO. However, Turkish aggression against a nuclear power like France was never going to be sidelined and ignored. Ankara made a blunder thinking that the same aggression it does against Greece would be tolerated by France.

As Turkey is propping up and protecting the Muslim Brotherhood Government of National Accords based in the Libyan capital of Tripoli and their jihadist allies, France is backing its rival, the Libyan National Army. This has been another cause of division between France and Turkey, prompting Macron to say yesterday:

“I think this is a historic and criminal responsibility for someone who claims to be a member of NATO.”

He made the comments after holding talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, considered Turkey’s closest ally in Europe. He added that Turkey’s conduct in Libya is “unacceptable to us” and that Ankara needs to “urgently clarify” its stance.

Macron is not hiding his contempt for the Turkish government and NATO at all. He is also the only major Western leader that is open to friendly relations with Russia. France is now pushing for a “European Army” outside of NATO. As the Alliance continues to tolerate Turkey’s aggressive actions in the Mediterranean, this could push France further away from NATO, an interesting turn of events considering the past two years there were endless speculations that it was Turkey being pushed away from NATO over its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile defense system.

NATO’s continued appeasement of Turkish aggression that even threatens Member States could be the very catalyst that will see France once again leave the Alliance. Although a Pew survey from February found that only 37% of Greeks were favorable towards NATO, the second lowest surveyed, the Greek political elite will continue to be subservient to NATO, counter to Greece’s own interests and defense concerns. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that Greece would leave NATO. The same survey found that only 49% of French people were favorable towards NATO, which surely has dropped even further after Macron’s most recent statements and Turkish actions against the French Navy. Effectively, as NATO continues to appease Turkish aggression against even fellow Member States, the Alliance is only pushing France out as Macron sets himself up to be the Charles de Gaulle of the 21st century.

### AT CP Hurts US-Turkey Relations

#### Turkey-US relations are impossible

Dalay 21, research director @ Brookings (Galip, “US-Turkey relations will remain crisis-ridden for a long time to come,” *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/29/us-turkey-relations-will-remain-crisis-ridden-for-a-long-time-to-come/)//BB>

At this stage, there is limited room for progress on the above-mentioned five main areas of contention in relations. A mutually acceptable formula on the S-400 systems is unlikely to be found anytime soon, and this issue is set to become a long-lasting irritant in the relationship. On the Eastern Mediterranean, at best, the crisis can be refrozen, which means launching bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece and both sides refraining from sending ships into contested waters for exploration. Plus, on the Eastern Mediterranean, we are likely to see more policy coordination between the U.S. and Europe. The future of Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian Kurds is intimately linked with the future of the ruling coalition in Turkey, and political developments inside Turkey. As long as Erdoğan’s coalition with the far-right MHP remains in place, the prospect for a policy recalibration is limited. And the Biden administration will likely be more vocal on high-profile, politically-motivated cases such as against the former co-chairman of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş, philanthropist Osman Kavala, and novelist Ahmet Altan. Similarly, the Halkbank case will continue to cast a shadow over bilateral ties. All these feuds will make crisis a permanent fixture of U.S.-Turkey relations.

#### Turkey won’t recommit to the NATO alliance

Erdemir 12-3-2021, \*Turkey Program Board of Advisors, \*\*Sinan Ciddi, Nonresident Senior Fellow, \*\*\*John Hardie, Research Manager and Senior Research Analyst (Aykan, Collusion or Collision?, *FDD*, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/12/03/collusion-or-collision/)//BB

In Washington, some still believe Ankara remains a bulwark against Russian expansionism on NATO’s southeastern flank.11 While areas of fruitful cooperation with Turkey do still exist, this report demonstrates that under Erdogan, Turkey’s drift from the West and tilt toward Russia reflect a fundamental transformation of Ankara’s foreign and security policy. Just as Moscow and Ankara will not soon become stalwart allies, Erdogan’s Turkey is equally unlikely to be a steadfast member of the Western alliance. Rather, Ankara likely will aim to leverage the two camps against one another. Washington and its transatlantic allies therefore must take urgent and coordinated action to clarify their strategy toward Turkey. The West should pursue cooperation with Turkey where interests align, such as countering Russia in the Black Sea region and promoting alternatives to Russian energy supplies. But the West should also seek to contain challenges from Turkey by imposing firm consequences for further aligning with Russia or otherwise undermining NATO, while providing incentives if Ankara does the right thing.

### AT Other Countries Spoil

#### Links to the aff

#### They’re just building on Turkey’s playbook

Basu ’5-18 — Zachary; national security reporter at Axios. "Strongmen spoilers in Turkey and Hungary threaten Western unity"; *Axios*; https://www.axios.com/2022/05/18/turkey- NATO-finland-sweden-hungary-russia; //CYang

Why it matters: Critics have accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of employing a "hostage-taking" tactic also practiced by Hungary, which for weeks has been singlehandedly blocking the European Union from imposing an embargo on Russian oil.

The outsized influence of single-member states in the EU and NATO has drawn increased scrutiny in recent years, especially as both Hungary and Turkey have drifted toward authoritarianism and strengthened their ties with Russia.

Their resistance to two critical Western priorities risks undermining the united front that leaders like President Biden have touted as key to effectively responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Driving the news: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who has said he is "very confident" all NATO allies will ultimately approve Sweden and Finland's applications, will meet on Wednesday with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

Çavuşoğlu said Sunday that in exchange for Turkey lifting its opposition, Sweden and Finland must end their alleged support for Kurdish groups that Turkey views as terrorists and a top national security threat.

Turkey is also expected to use its leverage to seek bilateral concessions from the U.S., including speeding up the potential sale of F-16 fighter jets.

Between the liens: Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, director of the German Marshall Fund's office in Ankara, told Axios that Erdoğan "saw an opportunity to extract some benefits both for Turkey and for his own political standing" ahead of a crucial election next year.

Erdoğan believes he's "more or less free to do whatever he wants," Ünlühisarcıklı said.

He argued it's hard to stand up to Erdogan on this issue, given the high stakes of Sweden and Finland's NATO applications, and the unique role Turkey is playing in Ukraine as both a mediator in peace talks and supplier of highly effective drones.

Critics, meanwhile, say the stunt could set a precedent for other NATO leaders to essentially seek bribes in moments of crisis — with some going as far as to call Turkey a "Trojan horse" within the Western alliance.

## COMPETITION/THEORY

### AT Perm Do Both

#### The permutation includes Turkey. That’s a legal requirement based on the phrase “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”

\*\*\*\*Explain link to DA

\*\*\*\*Explain spoiler/ turns solvency

### AT Perm Do CP---“The”

#### The only possible interpretation of “the” is all, not some nor any

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 15 (“Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC,” File Name: 15a0087p.06, Lexis)//BB

Turning from "authorized by law," we find another reason to disqualify special counsel as officers under the plain meaning of the Dictionary Act. Mainly, that

Headnote 13

Special counsel do not perform "the duties" of any office. The use of the definite article preceding both "duties" and "office" in the definition in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.S. § 1, restricts the court's interpretation of that language. The word "the" frequently (but not always) indicates a particular thing. It can also be used to refer to something generically, as may be the case with "the office." By way of example, officers include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office in question--which could be the (Ohio) Office of Attorney General or some other public office. However, the word "the" that precedes "duties" has only one sensible construction--that it refers to a specific thing--all duties associated with the office in question. It would be unreasonable to construe "the," in that instance, to mean "a," "some" or "any." It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs interpretation of texts. More like this Headnote

#### “The” NATO means the group as a whole

United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 2003 (“Vlt Corp. v. Lambda Elecs.,” 01-CV-10957-PBS, Lexis)//BB

1. It Depends On What the Word "The" Means

The first skirmish involves the word "the." The claim language states "circuitry for recycling the magnetizing energy stored in said transformer to reset it." (Emphasis added). Lambda asserts that the word "the" means all of the magnetizing energy in the transformer. Vicor contends that the claim allows for the possibility that some of the energy may be recycled [\*\*10] to reset the core while other energy is delivered to the load. In other words, it argues that the word "the" can mean "some of the," and explains that the word "the" was used to distinguish "the magnetizing" energy from the more general term "energy" that is used earlier in the preamble. Nice linguistic jousting, but the use of the word "magnetizing" alone would have been an adequate adjective to single out the kind of energy intended for recycling. If only some of the transformer's energy needed to be recycled, the word "the" would not have been used.

Lambda's argument that the word "the" connotes all the magnetizing energy is persuasive because it gives ordinary and common sense effect to the word "the" in the claim language. See Merriam-Webster's [\*352] Collegiate Dictionary 1221 (10th ed. 1993) (giving one definition of "the" as: "used as a function word before a noun . . . to indicate reference to a group as a whole"). This claim thus describes an invention that recycles all of the magnetizing energy to reset the transformer core.

#### It denotes the entire group

Supreme Court of Wisconsin 53 (“De Witte v. Kearney & Trecker Corp.,” No Number in Original, Lexis)//BB

In the instant case the words used in the letter are "the small group of officers of the EIU." The complaint states that for the entire period of time referred to in the letter, the four plaintiffs were the officers of the EIU. Four persons would certainly constitute a "small group" and the use of the word "the" denotes the entire group or all the officers. The persons who received the letter are all members of the union of which plaintiffs were the officers and it may be [\*\*\*9] presumed they knew who their officers were. Under such [\*138] circumstances it requires no innuendo to identify the plaintiffs as constituting the small group of officers to whom the letter referred. The plaintiffs being definitely ascertainable as the persons to whom the defamatory statements referred, the complaint must be held sufficient in stating a cause of action by each. See annotations under "Public boards or groups of officers" in Anno. 97 A. L. R. 283, 287, 288.

#### “the” denies individuality

Sanchez 16, analyst @ NT (Aaron, “The History of Donald Trump’s Definite Article,” News Taco, <https://newstaco.com/2016/10/21/the-history-of-donald-trumps-definite-article/>)

\*When you add the word “the” before you mention a group of people – like Donald Trump does with “the Mexicans” – they are no longer individual, they aren’t people, they are problems that must be dealt with. VL

#### Any other interp inverts the error. Allowing affs to work with specific allies exponentially expands the topic and would be entirely unmanageable. In our interp, the aff just needs one “all of NATO key” card. In their interp, negs need 30x the case negs---even the hardest-working 2n couldn’t survive.

### AT Perm Do CP---“The”---xt: Kotila

#### 1nc ev is from Kotila. That decision was precise.

Supreme Court of Kentucky 6 (“Matheney v. Commonwealth,” 2002-SC-0920-MR, Lexis)//BB

[\*\*32] [\*612] Following Hayward and the first rule of statutory construction, i.e., "the language of the statute itself," United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000), Katila then applied an elementary principle of English grammar: The word "the" is "used as a function word before a plural noun denoting a group to indicate reference to the group as a whole." Kotila, 114 S.W.3d at 237 (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary of the English Lang. Unabridged 2369 (1993)). Noting that KRS 446.080(4) directs us to construe our statutes "according to the common and approved usage of language," we then concluded that "the chemicals or equipment" meant "all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine." Id. Unlike today's majority opinion, Kotila was not hastily decided; it was the culmination of a year of draft opinions and memoranda, including one opinion that was actually rendered, then withdrawn on petition for rehearing. It was ultimately rendered as an "Opinion of the Court" [\*613] because it consisted of sections written in part by four different [\*\*33] Members of the Court as it was then comprised, i.e., Chief Justice Lambert and Justices Graves, Keller, and Cooper.

### AT Perm Do CP---Collective Noun

#### NATO is a collective noun referring to the 30 members

**NATO 22** – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO "10 things you need to know about NATO," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 5-10-2022, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/126169.htm----GDS> T File

10 things you need to know about NATO

Collective defence: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 and is a group of 30 countries from Europe and North America that exists to protect the people and territory of its members. The Alliance is founded on the principle of collective defence, meaning that if one NATO Ally is attacked, then all NATO Allies are attacked. For example, when terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11 2001, all NATO Allies stood with America as though they had also been attacked.

#### “The NATO” is the whole body, not constituent members

Dr. Loreto Todd 5, Professor and Reader in International English at the University of Leeds & Author of More Than 20 Books on Linguistics & English Usage, International English Usage, Ed. Hancock and Todd, p. 133---from UM starter packet

The term *collective noun* refers to a singular noun that has a plural implication (e.g. [for example,] *government*) and is used when the whole body (and not the constituent members) is being considered. The category *collective nouns* is not discrete, and it can be argued that some usages are midway between collective and mass nouns. For example, *team* is clearly a collective noun and *butter* is clearly a mass noun but it is not so easy to decide the status of such nouns as: hair linen royalty.

### AT CP Illegitimate

#### Counter-interp: PICs out of topical requirements are core neg ground.

#### 1-Ground. Non-topical counterplans should be guaranteed neg ground. Winning competition makes theory a non-starter because it demonstrates the CP is a key test of the plan

#### 2-Education. This counterplan focuses the debate on an “obviously critical” foreign policy question.

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)

While this report calls for realigning U.S. assistance toward democratic allies and partners, it avoids diving into the specific policy debates over what countries should or should not receive security assistance. Those are obviously critical foreign policy debates, but the authors focus on improving the ability of U.S. officials to make coherent policy decisions by first creating an effective management and organizational structure of security assistance. This will also require major reform to the State Department’s own security assistance programs, which routinely and without deliberation provide billions in aid to nondemocracies. Security assistance should not be a diplomatic handout or entitlement; it should serve U.S. foreign policy and be flexible enough in its administration to align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and values. That not only requires consolidating security assistance programs in one place, but also demands significant reforms to the decision-making structure and security assistance system at the State Department.

#### 3-Alternative is worse. Unique NATO or SC DA’s are impossible, so the alternative is certainty/immediacy counterplans or generic K’s. Those are more stale and worse for debate.

#### 4-Aff ground exists. They could have defended including Turkey or criticized arbitrary exclusion of particular allies. Don’t punish the neg because they wrote an incomplete aff --- the conclusion of that logic would obviate all solvent counterplans.

#### 5-Reject arg not team.

## EXPULSION N-B

### L---CP Leads to Turkish Expulsion

#### By limiting cooperation to exclusively actors who are following the charter tenets, the counterplan identifies Turkey as in material breach---that results in Turkish exclusion from NATO, even without an exit clause

Sari 19 - Dr. Aurel Sari is an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter, Director of the Exeter Centre for International Law, a Fellow of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and a Fellow of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. His work focuses primarily on international conflict and security law and the law relating to military operations and is one of the principal experts on the legal aspects of hybrid warfare. He has spoken and written extensively on the subject, including at the invitation of the Council of Europe, NATO, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, U.S. EUCOM and U.S. AFRICOM. (Aurel Sairi, “Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent.” Just Security, 10/15/2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/)//mcu>

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also addressed the matter in its report on the treaty. Once again, the relevant passage is worth quoting in full: The treaty has been criticized in some quarters because it contains no provision for expulsion or the suspension of rights of a recalcitrant member which might fail to carry out its obligations as a result, for example, of its succumbing to communism. Given the nature of the pact and the close community of interests of the signatory states, the committee believes that such a provision would be both unnecessary and inappropriate. Obviously, however, **if a member** persistently violates the principles **contained in the pact, the other members will** no longer be obligated to assist that member. Clearly it would fail “to safeguard the freedom \* \* \*” of its people, “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” as set forth in the preamble, and to strengthen its “free institutions” as provided in article 2. Presumably it would also decline to participate in “mutual aid” (art. 3), and might well violate its undertakings in article 8 “not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.” A country suffering such a fate would be in no position either to carry out its own obligations under the treaty or to expect assistance from the other parties.(The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings, page 379.) “Material Breach” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties These passages confirm that maintaining and furthering the principles on which the Alliance is based — democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law — forms part of the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. This, in turn, suggests that a failure to comply with these principles may amount to a material breach of the treaty within the meaning of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Pursuant to Article 60, a material breach consists of: (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty. To constitute a material breach pursuant to sub-paragraph (a), the violation of the principles underlying the treaty would have to be so extensive in scope, so severe and so persistent as to effectively “disavow” or repudiate the treaty (cf. Namibia Advisory Opinion, para. 95). Turning to sub-paragraph (b), there can be little doubt that continued compliance with the values set out in the preamble and Article 2 is essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty. Official statements issued by the member states, including at the Brussels Summit in 2018 and more recently on the occasion of NATO’s 70th Anniversary, repeatedly affirm these principles. A member nation that violated them in a systematic and egregious manner would thus cast doubt on the very resolve of the allies to “unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security” (preamble, North Atlantic Treaty). Should the conditions for the existence of a material breach be satisfied, NATO’s member states would be entitled, by unanimous agreement, to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either in their relations with the defaulting state or among them all (Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention). For these purposes, a unanimous decision of the North Atlantic Council, excluding the defaulting state, would suffice. No further procedural requirements apply, including those laid down in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention. Whether or not Turkey is in material breach of its commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty is therefore a question to be determined by the other members of the Council. As Klaus Kress has observed, there is a “very serious possibility that Operation ‘Peace Spring’ could constitute a manifest violation of the prohibition of the use of force.” Coupled with President Erdoğan’s threat to “open the gates” for Syrian refugees to migrate to Europe, a threat fundamentally at odds with the unity and solidarity of the Alliance, characterizing these developments as a material breach is not entirely far-fetched. In any event, they entitle other NATO nations to suspend or scale back their military cooperation with Turkey, even without declaring Turkey to be in material breach. Although Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits the parties to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, this obligation is meant to pursue the objectives of the treaty. The duty to develop military capabilities and to cooperate to this end therefore does not override the commitment to further the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. A number of Allies, including France, Germany and Norway, as well as official NATO partner Finland, are reported to have suspended the sale of military equipment to Turkey. Overall, **the absence of a suspension and expulsion mechanism in the North Atlantic Treaty** does not **prevent the North Atlantic Council from suspending or terminating the membership of an ally** found to be in material breach of the treaty. However, with the 70th anniversary of the treaty just past, this is a sorry position for the Council to be in by any measure. Suspending, let alone terminating, a nation’s membership of NATO would be an extreme measure to be contemplated only once other attempts to restore unity and respect for the Alliance’s founding principles have been exhausted.

### U---On Brink

#### Expulsion is on the brink

Candar 6-22 (Cengiz Candar is a columnist for Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse. A journalist since 1976, he is the author of seven books in the Turkish language, mainly on Middle East issues. He is also the author of Turkey's Mission Impossible, War and Peace with the Kurds (Lexington, 2020). Currently, he is a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS) and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). AL-Monitor, June 22, 2022, “How Turkey's opposition to Sweden, Finland joining NATO could backfire,” <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/how-turkeys-opposition-sweden-finland-joining-nato-could-backfire>; accessed 6/25/2022) ng

However, Erdogan’s Turkey is in no hurry to see a strengthened NATO. Erdogan’s Turkey could be closer to Putin’s Russia in spirit than it is to the democratic nations of the Western world. The affinity between authoritarian leaders and autocracies should not be underestimated. The strengthened and reinvigorated NATO does not seem to be a priority for Erdogan. Erdogan's preconditions to withdraw Turkey’s veto are not only unrealistic but impossible for the two Nordic countries to implement. They range from the extradition of certain Swedish citizens or residents of Kurdish and Turkish origins to banning their activities in Sweden and terminating Sweden’s relations with the Syrian Kurdish groups. Turkey considers a major force within the Syrian Democratic Forces — a top ally in US-led fight against the Islamic State — to be a terrorist organization. SDF remains under the American security umbrella in northern Syria, where they can survive thanks to the American military presence in the region. Finland and Sweden would have to change their laws on freedom of demonstration and freedom of expression to comply with Ankara’s demands. This, in turn, almost amounts to upending Finland and Sweden’s democratic governance. “Mainstream Turkish politicians, as well as many humbler Turks, see the PKK purely as a security threat and criticize the West for not taking their concerns about the group seriously," the Economist summarized in a June 16 article, using the acronyms for the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which has been fighting the Turkish government for almost 40 years. "Turkey equates PKK and the Syrian Kurdish groups. … Westerners meanwhile, tend to believe that Turkey bears much of the blame for the PKK’s emergence by refusing to grant the country’s Kurds the rights they demand.” Ankara’s position has also unleashed a debate over Turkey’s NATO membership. “Turkey is a member of NATO, but under Mr. Erdogan, it no longer subscribes to the values that underpin this great alliance,” a Wall Street Journal op-ed said on May 18. "Article 13 of the NATO charter provides a mechanism for member states to withdraw. Perhaps it is time to amend Article 13 to establish a procedure for the expulsion of a member nation that meets neither the principled nor the practical requirements for membership." Almost a month after the WSJ article, The Economist echoed a similar sentiment, underscoring the mounting frustration among Western capitals. “Erdogan’s move to block Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO further damaged Turkey’s standing in the alliance,” the article said. “Obstructing Finland’s and Sweden’s membership while war rages in Europe is bound to have consequences, even if Erdogan backs down. … Western countries will try to work round Turkey’s veto by providing Finland and Sweden with security guarantees. This may leave Turkey sidelined within the alliance,” it added. Currently, the text of the North Atlantic Treaty doesn't allow member states to expel or suspend another member state under any circumstances. The 2004 EU summit where Turkey secured a date to start negotiations with the European bloc is a distant memory. Erdogan’s brinkmanship may not work in Madrid. Even if the Madrid summit ends without a compromise, Sweden and Finland will likely become NATO members one way or another. If NATO leaders fail to find a face-saving formula at the summit, Erdogan's veto may backfire. Furthermore, it looks like Madrid would not be a cost-free enterprise for Turkey regardless of the outcome. It will be difficult for NATO to forget the bitter taste that Erdogan left in the alliance's ranks.

**The counterplan signifies Turkey is no longer wanted as a NATO ally. That solves, even without a treaty-exit provision**

**Shipley 21**, senior editor @ Bloomberg responsible for the editorial page (David, “Biden Should Cut the Gordian Knot With Turkey,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-13/biden-should-cut-turkey-loose-from-the-west#xj4y7vzkg)//BB>

Turkey has long since abandoned the West. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has aligned his country with an axis of powers openly hostile to Western interests: China, Russia and Iran. This is his prerogative as a popular, elected leader. But Erdogan also craves the protection of the West’s military partnerships and membership in its economic associations. He wants Turkey to remain within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization even as he buys weapons systems that undermine the alliance’s security and hurls insults at heads of member states. And he seeks “mutual trust” with the European Union even as he threatens to flood it with millions of migrants. The West should respond by demonstrating that its tolerance for Turkish truculence is **at an end**. **The best forum to do so is NATO**, where patience for Erdogan is already wearing thin. The alliance’s first summit since President Joe Biden’s swearing-in takes place next week, and he is scheduled to meet Erdogan on June 14. Erdogan has deployed especially bellicose oratory against the U.S. Such hostility was met with amused tolerance by President Donald Trump, who showed little interest in American leadership. Now that Biden has said he will resume that responsibility, he should make it clear to Erdogan that Turkey can’t have it both ways. Biden has had plenty of opportunities to size Erdogan up over the years, and he has clearly concluded that the Turkish leader is an autocrat. Turkey, he has said, has “got to understand that we’re not going to continue to play with them the way we have.” Turkey is already testing this assertion by ratcheting up the rhetoric. Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu has openly accused the U.S. of ordering a failed 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan, and claimed Europe was enthusiastic in its support. This goes well beyond previous accusations, some aired by Erdogan himself, that the U.S. had sided with the coup plotters. In fact, Biden was vice president at the time of the coup attempt, and flew to Turkey to assure Erdogan of American support. Although Ankara has conducted exhaustive investigations into the events, and arrested thousands of people, it has not provided a shred of evidence that the U.S. or Europe were in any way involved. Yet Erdogan hasn’t thought to correct his minister’s charges, much less chastise him. As for NATO, Turkey has brushed aside its repeated warnings against acquiring Russian missile-defense systems, and is in fact proposing to buy even more. It has ratcheted up disputes with alliance members Greece (over hydrocarbon exploration) and France (over the Libyan civil war). More recently, it used its membership to further Moscow’s agenda by insisting that NATO water down its criticism of Belarus for the forced landing of an airliner and seizure of a dissident on board. NATO’s founding charter doesn’t allow for members to be expelled, but **Turkey can be told** in **various ways** that **it’s no longer wanted as a member**. A good start would be to reduce the alliance’s footprint on Turkish soil, starting with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and other strategic assets. The group can also coordinate punitive measures against Turkey, including the suspension of arms sales and economic sanctions. The European Union should underline the message by confirming it has no intention of reviving the long-stalled talks over Turkey’s accession. Biden could back NATO with unilateral American measures. His administration has already indicated it may extend sanctions on Turkey’s defense industry and will uphold the country’s suspension from the F-35 fighter program. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said even tougher penalties would be considered. This would be welcomed by Congress, where a bipartisan consensus on punishing Turkey had been frustrated by Trump’s tendency to cut Erdogan ever more slack. The site where Alexander ran his sword through the Gordian knot is an hour’s drive from modern Ankara. **Cutting Turkey loose** from the West should be a more straightforward undertaking.

### Expulsion Good---NATO

#### Turkish inclusion degrades NATO into an inviable force

Ben-Meir 17, American expert on Middle East politics and affairs, specializing in peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. For the past twenty five years, Ben-Meir has been directly involved in various Track II diplomatic negotiations and is a staunch advocate of the Arab Peace Initiative (Alon, “It’s Time to Kick Turkey Out of NATO,” <https://www.algemeiner.com/2017/11/09/its-time-to-kick-turkey-out-of-nato/>)

Sadly, the European community and the US are betraying their democratic values. They continue to treat Erdogan with kid gloves because he is presumably an important player against ISIS, and because he is allowing the US and its allies to use Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base to launch air attacks against ISIS. To be sure, Erdogan has been successful in blackmailing the West. He skillfully uses his leverage to control the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe, and to cement Turkey’s geostrategic position as the hub for the transfer of oil and gas to Europe. NATO cannot allow one of its member states to erode the alliance from within, and still expect it to be a viable force that can maintain and protect European security and its moral values. No country led by a dictator that attacks US allies — such as the Kurds in Syria — should remain a member of NATO, and no country that sells weapons to ISIS should be a member of NATO. No country that cozies up to and buys weapons from America’s enemy — Russia — should continue to be a member of NATO, and no country which is being transformed into an extremist Islamic state by a zealous leader should maintain its place as a member of NATO. Finally, no country that has violated every tenet of democracy, engages in gross human rights abuses, and wreaks havoc on its population deserves to stay in the NATO alliance.

#### Turkish expulsion is good --- prevents Russia/China infiltration AND re-establishes NATO as a liberal community

Williamson 5/22- a fellow at National Review Institute, the roving correspondent for National Review (KEVIN D. WILLIAMSON “It’s Time to Boot Turkey from NATO,” National Review, May 22, 2022, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/05/its-time-to-boot-turkey-from-nato/)//mcu>

We ought to do Turkish caudillo Recep Tayyip Erdogan the courtesy of being frank with him: A NATO that includes Sweden and Finland but excludes Turkey is preferable to one that includes Turkey but excludes Sweden and Finland. It is time for Turkey to go. As Russian war criminals murder and rape their way through Ukraine, Russia’s long-suffering neighbor, Finland, has finally decided that it is time to formally join NATO. Sweden, though a larger and more powerful country (twice as big by population and by GDP), is following Finland’s lead and is ready to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, as well. Turkey, the odd man out in NATO, plans to veto any move to bring Finland and Sweden into the alliance. At least, that is the official position. Erdogan’s real agenda is something simpler: blackmail. Notionally, this is about the presence of a handful of Kurdish militants in Nordic exile. In reality, this is about the fact that Turkey under Erdogan has come to much more closely resemble Vladimir Putin’s Russia in its fundamental political character than it does any of its fellow NATO members. Turkey has developed close economic and political relations with Russia, and Erdogan has worked hard not to irritate Putin during the Ukraine war. Every political axis needs a third member, and Ankara today fits more easily between Moscow and Beijing than it does between Paris and Berlin. NATO is not only a military alliance. It is also a community of liberal-democratic values — values which Turkey rejects with increasing vigor and openness. The West once hoped — naively, as it turns out — that Erdogan would carry the banners of secularism, democracy, and liberty for the Turkish people, but he has led Turkey in the opposite direction: toward Islamist politics, authoritarianism, and tyranny. It is time to expel Turkey from NATO. This is a possibility that has been considered before. Erdogan’s brutal suppression of dissent beginning in 2016 and his cooperation with Moscow in acquiring Russian air-defense technology both led to calls for NATO to sever ties with Turkey. Booting Turkey out of NATO will be tricky on both the legal and political fronts, not least because the North Atlantic Treaty does not contain an explicit mechanism for expelling a member. The lawyers will no doubt dice it pretty fine if NATO members argue that Turkey is in material breach of its treaty obligations, but as a matter of fact Turkey is undermining NATO in the service of Erdogan’s domestic political needs**.** Turkey is advancing the interests of Moscow and Beijing and making it more difficult for NATO members to engage in collective self-defense, which is the point of NATO. And morally, Turkey does not deserve to be in NATO. NATO’s job is to defend its members against police states, not to provide a snug harbor in which authoritarianism may be cultivated. NATO’s neighboring bureaucracy in Brussels should also do Erdogan the courtesy of being frank and formally ending all consideration of Turkey as a candidate for membership in the European Union. Turkey was not a very good fit for the European Union at its best, and it is far from at its best today. Beyond its backsliding into soft dictatorship, Turkey is an economic basket case with 70 percent inflation and increasingly irresponsible economic policies. The European Union had a hard enough time with Greece’s financial shenanigans, and Greece is Denmark compared to Turkey. Geopolitics is not a matter of friendship. As Lord Palmerston put it (and here the full quotation is more illuminating than the apocryphal proverb attributed to Charles de Gaulle), “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” There was a time when it seemed that Turkey was fitted to NATO’s permanent interests. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, when the organization was not yet a decade old and Joseph Stalin was still extant, if only barely that. NATO’s optimism was perhaps excessive, but, at the time, Turkey identified itself very strongly with the West and looked westward toward its future. Today’s Turkey looks eastward, and that fact should be acknowledged. Things did not have to go this way, but Turkey has made its choices — not only the autocratic junta of Recep Tayyip Erdogan but the Turkish people, too. Perhaps that looks like a tragedy when seen from Brussels and like something else when seen from Ankara. But however we feel about them, the facts on the ground are what they are, and it is time for NATO to recognize this and act accordingly.

### Expulsion Good---Entrapment

#### Entrapment risks outweigh any benefits

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Protecting Europe from any further expansion of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and interference was the main argument for expanding NATO membership, to include Turkey in 1952. Turkey, in turn, sought to be part of the European club and approached the West. That is why the US military presence in Turkey with conventional and nuclear forces was against the Soviet threat as well as against the potential effects of instability and conflicts in the Middle East. Where the strategic interests of the allies always dominate relations between Turkey and NATO, during and after the Cold War. That is why Turkey was under the protection of NATO and its supply of advanced weapons. Turkey is an important member of NATO because of its strategic location between East and West, and its control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles to prevent Russia from reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Also hosting the Turkish Incirlik base for the American forces and the Patriot missiles, Turkey’s contribution to NATO with its soldiers in Kosovo and Afghanistan and supporting NATO’s military and financial tasks. That is why Erdogan takes advantage of all this to use him in his despotic policies and practices that are angering NATO countries and increasing their division. The preamble to the 1949 NATO Treaty states that NATO members are “determined to protect the freedom, shared heritage, and civilization of their people, based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law.” That is why the member states of NATO are very concerned about the changes taking place in Turkey, but nonetheless NATO seeks to preserve the relationship with Turkey and not leave the alliance. **This policy towards Turkey tarnishes the alliance’s image and mission, weakens democracy and the rule of law, and** further weakens the alliance. It contributes to encouraging Erdogan to escalate his influence by supporting extremist Islamic movements, ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra Movement, and thus the terrorism industry in the Middle East, and its export to Europe. So, they should deal Turkey practices as a “frenemy” and adopt the term that has been applied to Pakistan. As a result, if NATO remains silent toward Erdogan’s authoritarian policies, which are hostile to liberal and democratic values, and his cooperation with Iran and Russia, we will find NATO implicated and responsible for Turkey’s crimes, where war crimes inside Syria and ethnic cleansing of the Kurds, as well as its interference in Libya. This will send NATO into wars to defend a member of the alliance**. This will bring disaster, instability and the possibility of Iran and Russia affecting NATO’s security and military affairs through their relations and strategic cooperation with Turkey.**

#### Expulsion avoids NATO entrapment in Turkish aggression vs Russia and Iran

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB

Ousting Turkey: The Benefits

These multiple divergences between Turkey and its Western allies cast doubt on the validity of Ankara’s ongoing membership in NATO. Despite its official stance, Ankara has proven resistant when called to intervene in defense of the Organization’s common interest; however, it has not hesitated to pursue its own objectives, even when this meant contravening the NATO line. Turkey often behaves like an unreliable and ambivalent partner, and its participation in the Alliance creates more problems than benefits:

First, any attack on Turkish territory would be considered an attack against all members, which would leave the Alliance facing the dilemma of either being involved in a war or losing the credibility of its collective security guarantee. While an attack from Russia is a calculated risk since NATO mainly exists to deter this scenario, it is also true that Turkey’s occasional recklessness – such as the downing of a Russian military aircraft in 2015 – could lead to an escalation with unforeseeable consequences. Yet Ankara can pursue its assertive policy largely because it is part of the Alliance, meaning that it exposes the collectivity to useless risks for its own benefit. In addition, Russia is not the only potential antagonist: any standoff between Turkey and Iran could produce the same effects. At present, Turkey’s improving relations with both powers would seem to exclude the possibility, but it cannot be ruled out in the future.

### Expulsion Good---LIO

#### Turkish inclusion undermines the ability to use NATO to save the LIO

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB

Third, Turkey’s membership leaves the Alliance in a compromised position on various fronts: namely Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies; his attempt to exploit the Turkish diaspora to promote his interests in Europe; the persistent occupation of Northern Cyprus; Turkey’s assertive actions in the Eastern Mediterranean; and its frequent violations of Greek airspace. For an organization based upon the principles of democracy and rule of law, which seeks to promote international peace and stability, Turkey’s behavior represents a major contradiction and damages the Alliance’s image.

### Expulsion Good---Swinland L

#### Turkey blocks Sweden and Finland

Cropsey 22, founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy (Seth, “The Turkish Question on NATO: A larger strategic opportunity in the Black Sea,” The Hill, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3497038-the-turkish-question-on-nato-a-larger-strategic-opportunity-in-the-black-sea/)//BB>

The Russian invasion of Ukraine overturned this situation and demonstrated the Atlantic Alliance’s value. Moreover, the geography of the Russia-NATO military rivalry has changed: The Baltic States’ membership in NATO makes a Russia-NATO conflict likely to involve Finland and Sweden, or at least to occur within their territorial waters. Both states would benefit the Atlantic Alliance. Both retain effective militaries focused upon great-power war; neither would need overwhelming American logistical support. Unlike nearly all of NATO’s current members apart from the U.S., Sweden and Finland can pull their own combat weight. Hungarian President Viktor Orban’s positive disposition towards the Kremlin made Hungary a more likely candidate to oppose any NATO expansion. Orban has been restrained, however, focusing instead on opposing EU sanctions on Russian energy exports. Instead, it is Turkey that opposes Swedish and Finnish NATO membership. A single country’s opposition can derail a NATO bid. Greece, for example, kept Macedonia out of NATO until 2019 because it deemed the country’s name to be an affront to Greek culture: it only relented when Macedonia added “North” to its name. Cyprus remains out of NATO primarily because of Turkey’s opposition, based on Turkish-Greek rivalry.

### Asia Pivot Terminals

#### Chinese escalation causes nuclear war---extinction.

Fiona Cunningham and Taylor Fravel 19. Fiona, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Taylor, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation." International Security, Vol. 44, Issue 2. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/738694/pdf. accessed 6-25-2022 //ART

Overconfidence about Controlling Nuclear Escalation?

In light of their confidence about avoiding nuclear escalation, how much control do Chinese experts believe that their leaders would have over escalation in both conventional conflict and from a conventional war to a nuclear war? Although their views vary, Chinese experts likely overstate the ability of China’s leaders to control escalation, even if nuclear weapons are not used.[161] Their confidence is also an exception to China’s generally skeptical views about nuclear escalation control, because it reflects a belief similar to that of the Cold War proponents that Chinese and U.S. perceptions of each other’s desire to avoid nuclear war would be robust even once a conflict began. Chinese experts hold these beliefs not because they share the views of proponents about controlling nuclear escalation, but because they underplay the pressures to escalate to a nuclear war that could result from interactions between the United States and China in a conventional conflict.

One reason why the amount of control is likely overstated is that Chinese experts may equate the CCP’s strict control over the PLA, and its nuclear forces in particular, with a corresponding ability to control escalation once a crisis or conflict erupted. In addition to the PLA’s centralized command structure, the presence of political commissars, officers who are tasked with ensuring party decisions are implemented within the PLA, is seen as strengthening escalation control by ensuring that subordinates comply with the intent of China’s top military decisionmakers on the CMC.[162] More generally, a recent defense policy study guide for party cadres underscores that China’s nuclear missiles and ballistic missile submarines “are under the direct control of the CMC.” Thus, all command decisions flow from the CMC: “When the country is under a nuclear threat, according to the commands of the CMC, [they will] increase alert status, make good preparations for nuclear counterattack, prevent the enemy from using nuclear weapons against us; when the country receives a surprise nuclear attack, [they will] use nuclear missile weapons to carry out a resolute counterattack against the enemy.”[163] Given the CMC’s tight control, and how it is discussed, it is more difficult for experts to imagine accidents and mistakes involving nuclear weapons. In addition, in some campaigns the CMC may also directly control the conventional missile force.[164] Some PLA texts also suggest that anti-satellite weapons and strategic cyberattacks would be similarly strictly controlled.[165] Chinese leaders’ strict control over strategic weapons, however, is not the same as strict control over how an adversary acts in a conflict or how a crisis unfolds.

A second reason why the amount of control exercised by China’s national leaders may be overstated is that many written sources and some experts do not consider how China’s actions in a crisis or war could be misperceived and increase the odds of nuclear escalation by the United States. The 2004 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, for example, suggests arming an ICBM with a conventional warhead to attack an opponent’s homeland as a way to signal resolve and counter air raids against China. The goal would be to “to shock the adversary psychologically, and create terror in the strong adversary’s population, making the strong adversary’s domestic anti-war sentiment increase sharply.”[166] Of course, such a launch would be indistinguishable from a nuclear attack to the U.S. early warning system, creating great risks (however unwanted) of nuclear escalation. Although there are no indications that China is preparing to use ICBMs in this way, the point is that sources like the 2004 Science of Second Artillery Campaigns do not assess the potential consequences of the actions that they propose.

A third reason why the amount of control exercised by China’s national leaders may be overstated is that Chinese sources and experts tend to assume that conventional escalation can be controlled because an adversary will respond proportionately to China’s actions. An adversary’s response can be accurately predicted if its intentions and interests in the conflict are well understood. Chinese sources do not generally acknowledge the possibility that an adversary could respond in a crisis or war with a disproportionate counterattack. For example, the 2017 Science of Military Strategy argues that long-range warning shots, most likely using conventional missiles or air strikes, would need to be calibrated to prevent an adversary overreaction or underreaction. The strike would require “a small amount of intimidation [oderniz zhenshe] to affect a military or political target that is clear, relatively isolated and easy to attack, and does not injure the population.” As the purpose of the strike is not war but deterrence, “it is necessary to precisely judge the situation, strictly control the means and scope of the attack to prevent the action from escalating and expanding to develop into war.”[167] Likewise, the 2004 NDU text Coercive Warfare, authored by missile force officers, noted that it is necessary to “strictly control the intensity of deterrence at the precise deterrence opportunity.” China must be able to select the correct intensity of escalation for the circumstances, but regarding high-intensity actions, “it is necessary to know when to stop [shike erzhi], you do not want to make the situation expand.” Optimistically, the book states that if China considers adversary interests and intentions, “only then can employing a certain level of escalation be sufficient to affect [chongdong] the adversary’s psychology.”[168]

A fourth reason, also related to misperceptions, concerns China’s nuclear signaling. In general, Chinese sources indicate that China would engage in nuclear signaling to prevent nuclear coercion or to deter an imminent nuclear strike.[169] An adversary, however, might view such signals as preparations to use nuclear weapons in a crisis or conflict. An example is the “strategic deterrence” step of “implementing movements of land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear weapons” when war is imminent. This action is described in the 2017 Science of Military Strategy as one way of “adjusting deployments” of different military capabilities.[170] Such actions could be taken to ensure the survivability of the arsenal, but they could be mistaken as preparations to conduct a first strike.[171] A textbook for party cadres on defense policy indicates that “when the country suffers a nuclear threat, according to the order of the CMC, [nuclear missile units and ballistic missile submarine units] increase their alert status and prepare for a nuclear counterattack, to stop [shezhi] an enemy from using nuclear weapons against us,” which could involve such signaling. The text states, however, that only “when our country suffers a nuclear attack, [will they] use nuclear weapons to carry out a resolute counterattack.”[172] This distinction between nuclear signaling and preparations for first use could, however, easily be lost on U.S. decisionmakers who are skeptical that China will adhere to its no-first-use policy in an actual conflict. Chinese experts’ confidence in their country’s no-first-use policy makes them less likely to recognize the risks of nuclear escalation that could arise from misperceptions of intent and unintended consequences of Chinese and U.S. actions.[173]

#### US deterrence of China hinges on credible signals and engagement.

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The erosion of US general deterrence in maritime East Asia has attracted significant attention over the last few years. To a certain extent, the discussion has been more focused on how to bolster US deterrence posture –typically through changes to the forces deployed by the US in the area. This approach has generated remarkable insights into the shortcoming of the US position, but it has at the same time pushed the question of the mechanisms of deterrence erosion in the background. This question is, however, important because it clarifies the limits of what could be achieved by changes along one dimension of US deterrence posture. In broad terms, this section argues that the erosion of US general deterrent posture in maritime East Asia can be explained by three primary mechanisms: an enduring local imbalance of interest that favors China, a changing balance of power that has eroded US position in the region and a difficulty in drawing red lines that has been compounded by China’s “circumvention” strategy.

Credibility and the imbalance of interests

Deterrence threats are inherently linked to the ability to make a credible commitment. As explained by Glenn Snyder, the calculations of a prospective “aggressor” directly depend on

(1) his valuation of his war objectives; (2) the costs which he expects to suffer as a result of various possible responses by the deterrer; (3) the probability of various responses; and (4) the probability of winning the objectives with each possible response.

A non-credible commitment implies that the probability of response is negligible and makes “aggression” inherently more attractive.

A debate exists among deterrence theorists about the malleability of commitments and the degree to which they can be manufactured. In his seminal works, Thomas Schelling argued that the credibility of one’s commitment could be manipulated by the employment of proper techniques and strategies. Multiple studies have however shown that, in practice, credibility depends primarily on the actual interests that the deterrer seeks to protect. Alexander George and Richard Smoke famously argued that credible commitments could not be created ex nihilo: “effective deterrence and effective signaling require in the first instance that the interests of the United States be sufficiently engaged by what is at stake in the area or the country in question.” Subsequent research conducted in the 1980s have largely confirmed this point: the deterrer’s level of interest in the protégé played a pivotal role in the success or failure of deterrence.

More recently, researchers have shed new light the importance of “intrinsic interests” as a constitutive part of the credibility of deterrent threats. Daryl Press distinguishes between three categories of interests:

Vital interests are those related to a state’s survival. Important interests is a broad category; it encompasses crises over stakes with real material value that do not significantly threaten the state’s survival. Concerns, on the other hand, relate to a state’s values and ideals but do not involve significant material stakes.45

All other things being equal, the more vital interests are -i.e. the more is at stake for the deterrer- the more credible is the deterrent threat.

Press proposes, however, a problematic definition of vital interests. While the inclusion of the protection of a state’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and population is uncontroversial, the inclusion of the objective of “ensuring that no country […] consolidates its control over the world’s major economic regions” overextends the notion of vital interest and appears at least partly incompatible with the classic distinction between the interests covered by direct –which are truly vital- and those covered by extended deterrence –which are not. This is not to say that preventing the rise of a hegemon in a distant region will not rank high among the “important interests” of a great power that already has controls over its own region is secured. But the emergence of a peer competitor in a distant region simply does not present the same immediate risk and threat than a direct attack on one’s state.

Reclassifying the “distant hegemony” problem as an important rather than vital interest highlights an issue with the broad category of “important interests.” “Countries,” Press argues, “have a myriad of ‘important interests,’” but this pluralistic nature of “important interests” makes it difficult to treat them as a homogenous category. Some interests are bound to be more important than others. The existing literature proposes two complementary avenues to assess the relative significance of any given important interest. On the one hand, a deterrer’s assessments of a protégé’s importance can be largely determined by the latter’s geographical position, the existence of a formal alliance, the level of economic ties and the level of arms transfers. On the other hand, the relative importance of a protégé might result from the interest the deterrer has, not in the protégé per se, but in the region or subsystem where deterrence occurs. This translates into the notion of “regional salience” that represents “the tightness of political, military, and economic linkages between a major power and a region.” Though difficult to assess directly, regional salience can be typically approximated by the relative importance of the region in the major power’s alliance portfolio and foreign trade.

When considered through the prism of “intrinsic interests,” maritime East Asia presents the US with a significant problem: a significant imbalance of interests exists between the US and China, which favors Beijing and tends to make credible deterrence threats more difficult to formulate for Washington.

China has vital interests in maritime East Asia. Beijing’s enduring ambiguity on the possible application of the concept of “core interest” (hexin liyi) beyond the traditional issue of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, has generated some debate over the last decade, but there is little doubt that Beijing considers both the ECS and SCS to be vital interests. Beijing has repeatedly stated that it has “indisputable sovereign rights” over the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Paracel and Spratly islands and adjacent waters and has, quite unsurprisingly, listed the defense of its sovereignty as one of its “core interest,” turning these islands and waters into de facto “core interests.”

From a more perhaps practical perspective, Chinese strategists are moreover acutely aware of China’s vulnerability to threats coming from the sea. The 2013 edition of Academy of Military Science’s The Science of Military Strategy archetypically argues:

Opposing an enemy invasion from the sea is the foundational strategic idea behind the establishment of our Party’s navy; it is the fundamental, long-term strategic mission of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Our political, economic, cultural and communicational centers are located in coastal provinces. Twelve coastal provinces […] concentrate 38.5% of the population, 34.3% of the middle-sized and large cities, 66.1% of [China’s] GDP.

China’s interest in the near seas, or maritime East Asia, follows in this sense the logic of a buffer, providing China with a modicum of strategic depth. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have also evoked the possibility for China to adopt a “bastion strategy” for its sea-based nuclear deterrent, making the near seas a critical component of China’s nuclear deterrence strategy as a whole.

By contrast, US interests in maritime East Asia, while undoubtedly significant, do not meet the threshold for vital interests described above. To a very large extent, the list of US interests in the region matches the list of examples offered by Daryl Press to illustrate the notion of “important interests”: “defending allies, protecting trade partners, protecting the rights of commercial shipping to navigate through international waters.” The 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy lists, for instance, three main objectives for the US - “to safeguard the freedom of the seas; deter conflict and coercion; and promote adherence to international law and standards” - which almost perfectly match Press’s list of important interests.

Other approaches to the notion of interest also suggest that US interests in the region are important but not vital. The criterion of economic dependence that measures the relative importance of a protégé is difficult to apply in the context of maritime Asia. In narrow terms, data gathered by the CSIS61 shows that only six percent of US trade transits through the SCS. Details about US’s reliance on ECS trade routes are less clear, but non-China-bound US trade routes in the area are essentially limited to South Korea, which accounts for less than 4 percent of US foreign trade.62 The second element that contributes to the relative importance of the ECS and SCS is the direct involvement of two US allies as claimants in the disputes -Japan in the ECS and the Philippines in the SCS. The two alliances have evolved in different directions over the last decades, with the US-Japan alliance being considerably reinforced under the tenures of Koizumi and Abe while US-Philippines relations were put under significant strain under the tenure of Rodrigo Duterte. It remains that in both cases, the US is involved in a game of (primarily conventional) extended deterrence, which, by definition, covers important but not vital interests.

An application of the “regional salience” framework, which focuses on the relative importance of regional trade and regional alliances in the deterrer’s portfolio,65 suggests a higher level of US interests that are not sufficient to transform US important interests into vital ones. On the one hand, East Asia accounted for around one quarter of US trade in 2018. But the fact that this figure includes US-China trade –which alone accounts for 16% of US trade66- creates an awkward situation where the relative importance stems from the high level of trade between the US and the prospective target of US deterrent efforts. On the other hand, Washington has important alliances in the region as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand all belong to the list of Major Non-NATO allies –though relations between Washington and its Southeast Asian allies came under significant strain over the last decade. As explained above, however, these alliances create a situation of extended deterrence, where, by definition, the US is not protecting vital interests. In fact, Press takes the example of South Korea to illustrate the distinction between US vital and important interests, arguing: “South Korea has been an American ally for decades and helps the United States frequently […]. But South Korean sovereignty is not vital to America.”67 This conclusion applies more generally to US East Asian allies.

A changing balance of power

One of the most obvious requirements of deterrence is for the deterrer to possess the means to carry out its threat should the deterree decide to ignore threats and cross red lines. As argued by Colin Gray: “even a credible determination to fight might avail little if the quantity and quality of combat power threatened falls short of some critical threshold of effect as seen by the intended deterrees.” One of the critical points repeatedly raised by deterrence theorists has been that military capabilities relevant to a given deterrence situation often do not reflect the overall balance of military power between the two parties. The success of deterrence is tightly linked to the credibility of a threat, and [n]ormally, one cannot readily threaten to use force in retaliation without having force at hand. This means that, to deter, a state must threaten not just verbally but with specific and appropriate military preparations which place it in some position to respond.

What is an “appropriate” –or relevant quantity and quality of– forces can however be difficult to identify clearly. In his study of the Cuban Crisis, Daryl Press considers three relevant balances of power –the conventional balances in the Caribbean and in Europe, and the nuclear balance between Washington and Moscow.

The debate about what capabilities should be factored in the “relevant balance of power” remains in many ways open, but the “local” balance of military power is most likely to play a predominant role in determining deterrence calculations. This predominance makes intuitive sense because “decisionmakers are not interested in abstract measures of national power,” but “ask themselves: Can the adversary do what he threatens to do and achieve his objectives at a reasonable cost?” In other words, an aggressor has few reasons to be concerned with capabilities that, for any number of reasons, cannot be brought to bear in the theater where the challenge takes place, and a deterrer without the adequate denial capabilities “onsite” leaves open a window of potential vulnerability that can be exploited for a rapid victory and changes to the status quo.

The above argument suggests that the most pivotal “capability factor” in the US-China deterrence equation lies essentially at the local, East Asian balance of power. For the clearest part of the post-Cold War, US ability to deter what “Chinese adventurism” has been essentially linked to US denial capabilities and the fact that “the United States enjoyed dominance vis-a-vis China in nearly all military domains.” This dominance was essentially linked to Washington’s “command of the commons, i.e. “command of the sea, space and air,” which has provided the US with the ability to project overwhelming power in the East Asian region and guarantee that any Chinese attempt to change the status quo through the use of force or coercion could be rapidly thwarted. The pivotal importance of US command of the commons appeared perhaps at its clearest in the context of the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis. While Washington’s decision to deploy two carrier groups constituted an unmistakable signal of US commitment to the security of Taiwan, it also made obvious that Taiwan and the US could maintain air superiority in a war fought in the Taiwan Strait.75 Put simply, the US dominated the escalation ladder in the Taiwan Strait, and more broadly in the East Asian region, leaving Beijing with few attractive options to mount a challenge against Washington’s preferred regional order.

This situation has been rapidly changing over the last two decades or so as Beijing engaged in the fast-paced modernization of its military. The scale of China’s military modernization in the last two decades admittedly suggests that Beijing is pursuing multiple objectives, but there is little doubt that a large part of Chinese efforts is driven by the desire to erode Washington’s capacity to project military power in the East Asian theater. A debate has recently emerged about the adequacy of the “counter-intervention” or Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) concepts to depict China’s strategy, but as Timothy Heath and Andrew Erickson rightly point out:

[t]he actions China’s military has taken to modernize its capabilities speak volumes. Open sources reveal clearly: China is developing, deploying, doctrinally supporting, and training to effectively employ many sophisticated, expensive systems clearly tailored to counter U.S. intervention.

This strategic ambition is reflected in the particular direction that the modernization of Chinese military capabilities has taken. China was the first nation to deploy operational Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) designed to target aircraft carriers and possibly other large moving warships, DF-21D and DF-26,79 and operates 1.000+ km-range YJ-62 and CJ-10 anti-ship missiles. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) deploy today more than 1,200 4th-generation fighter aircraft, which carry long-range air-to-air (i.e. PL-15) and anti-ship missiles (YJ-12). China has also devoted considerable effort to the improvement of its land-based long-range air defense systems, with the purchase of large numbers of Russian S-300 and S-400 and the deployment of the HQ-9 air defense systems.82 HQ-9 batteries have been deployed in the Paracels, and structures built on China’s artificial islands in the Spratlys suggest that one of those SAM systems will be deployed in this area in the near future.

In parallel, the PLA Navy has dramatically consolidated its sea denial capabilities in the near seas and beyond. As of 2020, China deploys the largest fleet of diesel-electric submarines of modern design worldwide with 42 boats –Kilo, Song, Yuan– that are or will likely be equipped or retrofitted with the Russian Klub or China’s brand-new YJ-18 ASM.84 China has also progressively replaced its obsolete Han-class SSN by six Shang. The first pair of Shang was reportedly disappointing in terms of quietness, but the four Shang-II, launched in the 2010s, are reportedly on par with US Los Angeles-class SSN in terms of quietness and are likely to carry YJ-18.85 Surface forces might play a relatively less central role in an A2/AD campaign, but it still worth noting that China has built more than 40 major combatants over the last fifteen years, as well as its sixty Houbei fast missile boats and forty Jiangdao corvettes, and that all carry a wide array of long-range anti-ship missiles.

The rapid modernization of China’s military forces over the last decades brings about major changes in the balance of power in maritime East Asia. At the turn of the millennium, China operated an antiquated force, with a handful of modern platforms imported from Russia that it often struggled to operate properly. In any scenario of conflict in maritime East Asia, US forces benefited from a decisive advantage -as exemplified for instance by the fact that the PLAAF operated fewer 4th generation aircraft than two US carriers. Today’s PLA Navy, Robert Ross argues, operates “submarines, surface ships armed with antiship cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles [that] now challenge U.S. access to East Asia’s ‘internal’ seas, including the South China Sea.” In the air, the PLA Air Force might not be able to gain air superiority over the region, but it can already effectively contest US air superiority, and the balance is moving fast in China’s favor. All other things being equal, the relative rise of Chinese capabilities alters the equilibrium in a way that erodes US general deterrence posture because it modifies the cost/benefit calculations of both Washington and Beijing –in the latter’s favor - regarding the alteration or preservation of the status quo.

#### Solves Chinese deterrence.

Mira Rapp-Hooper 20. Senior fellow for Asia Security at the Council on Foreign Relations. PhD in Political Science, Columbia University. "From Primacy to Openness: U.S. Strategic Objectives in Asia." CFR. 1-25-2020. https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Rapp-Hooper.pdf. accessed 6-24-2022 //ART

While the United States cannot avoid a stronger China able to exert significant regional influence, it can nonetheless secure its longstanding political, security, and economic interests in the region and avert the conditions that would most directly threaten them. Since the late nineteenth century, the United States has sought to prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating Eurasia, as this condition would impede commercial interests and potentially expose the U.S. homeland to military threats.19 Potential domination may come in novel forms, but the same objective remains worthy today. The United States should seek to avert the hostile domination of Asia. We cannot envision the precise form it will take, but Xi Jinping is seeking some form of a sphere of influence in Asia. And while a state’s domestic regime preferences do not neatly predict its regional behavior, Xi’s affection for a closed Chinese information environment already has a foreign policy analogue. Other international governance attempts may have similar features. For several years, strategists have argued that the United States must oppose a Chinese regional sphere—a geographic area in which China exercises predominate influence in military, diplomatic, or economic terms. Chinese influence in parts of Southeast or Central Asia, however, is not a prima facie threat to American interests. Nonetheless, U.S. strategy must hedge against the possibility that China’s regional aspirations are fundamentally irreconcilable with its own objectives.

Washington should seek to prevent China from establishing a closed sphere of influence—a bloc that would allow it to dominate part or all of Asia in a manner that displaces U.S. political, economic, or military power. An exclusive zone could leave the United States unable to access vital markets and strip it of its forward defensive position, thereby threatening U.S. prosperity and national security and, by extension, domestic freedom. This grave condition would occur if China co-opted the political, economic, or military independence of other states, preventing them from making free choices through coercion. Closure of the global commons could have similarly grievous effects.

The positive objective of U.S. strategy should therefore be an open Asia. Openness characterizes both American strategic priorities in the region as well as the types of interactions the United States should seek to facilitate in their service. An open Asia is one in which regional states have political and economic freedom of action and are able to make independent strategic decisions without being forced into blocs or camps that could result in their hierarchical dominance. Under this concept, Asia’s commons must also remain open, essential as they are to international commerce. Openness favors sustained interstate cooperation, beneficial trade, and the free flow of information across borders. It also calls for transparent international governance, even among those states that are not themselves full-fledged democracies.

An openness-based strategy seeks to prevent shuttered economic, political, and security spheres in Asia by helping regional states preserve their flexibility and independence and doing the same in the skies and sea lanes. It rejects the notion that regional states should “choose” between the United States and China and instead incentivizes them to eschew great power dominance in favor of agency. At a time when the CCP seeks a more closed Chinese society, commons, and domestic and international information space, the United States should strive to preserve the region’s dynamism and fluidity. An openness-based strategy acknowledges that the United States will not retain strategic primacy in Asia. It also recognizes that Washington does not require unequivocal regional dominance to prevent China from establishing a hierarchy of its own.

Securing Openness

Openness in Asia will not be easily obtained. It will require the United States to focus consistently on Asia as its primary foreign policy theater, allocate substantial military resources to the region, develop a viable island chain defense strategy, improve its coordination against sub-conventional threats within U.S. agencies and with foreign partners, and invest in regional openness economically, technologically, and domestically. Despite a relatively more constrained position in Asia, the United States can secure openness, but its objective is far from guaranteed.

Regional openness requires a strong American military presence but does not demand military primacy. The United States and its allies must retain sufficient strength to deter China from making a bid that could result in its hierarchical dominance of any part of the region, to defend against it if it were to mount one, and to keep the global commons open. These defensive requirements, in turn, mean that the United States absolutely must maintain its treaty alliances and forward position in Asia. Since the early Cold War, Washington has understood the First Island Chain archipelago to be its defensive front line, but China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach makes the direct defense of allies increasingly tenuous. If it lacks the ability to defend and deter on behalf of its treaty allies, the United States will struggle to maintain the regional position that will allow it to meet its minimum deterrence requirements. Washington currently lacks a strategy for First Island Chain defense. A counter-A2/AD strategy that relies on land- and sea-based missiles may be the most feasible approach but will be politically taxing to enact. Beyond an ally-focused defense strategy, military openness will be far easier to obtain if the United States can continue to strengthen its strategic position in Southeast Asia. It should buttress capacity-building efforts with Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines; prioritize defense cooperation with India; and synchronize similar disparate efforts with Japan and Australia. Despite modest improvements, it must also increase significantly its Foreign Military Financing to the region.

### Swinland !---NATO

#### Sweden and Finland provide vital deterrence, technological, and perceptual boosts to NATO.

Erik Brattberg 22. Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. "Finland and Sweden Would Make NATO Stronger." National Interest. 4-22-2022. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/finland-and-sweden-would-make-nato-stronger-201951. accessed 6-22-2022 //ART

For starters, Finnish and Swedish NATO membership would serve as a powerful rejoinder to Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked war in Ukraine. It would underscore what a colossal strategic mistake the invasion is for Russia by tipping Finland and Sweden over the edge, thus bringing NATO closer to Russia’s own border. While Russia has repeatedly warned of “military and political consequences” should the two countries join NATO—including recent threats by Dmitry Medvedev to deploy nuclear weapons to the area—their membership would demonstrate that Russia cannot rule by intimidation or deny European nations the right to make sovereign decisions about their own security. This is ultimately what the war in Ukraine is all about. By granting them membership, NATO would also signal that its open-door policy remains vibrant. For aspiring countries like Ukraine and Georgia—both of whom view Finland and Sweden as key partners—this should be welcome news.

Second, NATO deterrence and collective security efforts in the Baltic Sea region would get a boost, reducing the likelihood that the war in Ukraine would ever spill over into NATO territory. While Finland and Sweden already cooperate closely with NATO on regional security matters, becoming full members of the alliance would help NATO defend the Baltic states in the event of an Article V contingency. As NATO is planning additional steps to enhance the security of its eastern flank at its upcoming summit in Madrid in June, Finland and Sweden are well-positioned to make vital contributions. Stronger Nordic defense cooperation with members Denmark and Norway would also benefit the wider region, as would closer EU-NATO collaboration.

Third, Finland and Sweden would bring a unique set of assets and capabilities to the alliance. Both countries have advanced militaries that are already highly interoperable with NATO forces and have contributed to all major NATO operations in recent years. For its part, Finland, which can mobilize a 280,000-strong force and has committed to a 70 percent increase in defense spending, was the first European country to receive the American-made Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and recently decided to purchase sixty-four F-35 fighter jets. Meanwhile, Sweden has a highly professional military and recently boosted defense spending with the goal of reaching the 2 percent defense spending target “as soon as possible.” Sweden has also beefed up its military readiness since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, including by being the first non-NATO country to purchase the Patriot air defense system.

Besides military capabilities, both countries have a long tradition of implementing a “total defense” doctrine that emphasizes civil defense and resilience and would bring important first-hand knowledge of countering hybrid warfare and disinformation threats to the alliance. Both countries are also sophisticated technological leaders home to companies such as Nokia and Ericsson. Finland and Sweden could help the alliance deepen its technological edge in artificial intelligence and 5G/6G. Moreover, with geographical proximity and a long history of dealing with Russia, Helsinki and Stockholm have a unique knowledge and understanding of Russia and the “High North” that would benefit the alliance in supporting Europe’s territorial defense.

Finally, at a time when Western democracy is under pressure from populists and nationalists at home, the fact that Finland and Sweden are both solid democracies—ranked among the top five democracies in the world according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index—is not insignificant. Their membership would help reinforce NATO’s role as a political alliance of democracies with shared values, an increasingly urgent priority as the West confronts growing authoritarian challenges from Russia and China.

#### Adding Sweden and Finland would bolster NATOs deterrence to Russian aggression BUT Turkish opposition prevents it.

Cropsey 22, founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy (Seth, “The Turkish Question on NATO: A larger strategic opportunity in the Black Sea,” The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3497038-the-turkish-question-on-nato-a-larger-strategic-opportunity-in-the-black-sea/)//BB

Swedish and Finnish NATO membership would be a strategic gain for the Atlantic Alliance and the United States, both to counter Russian aggression and to ensure a united front on Eurasian policy. However, there is dissent within NATO about whether Sweden and Finland should be accepted, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan opposing both states’ participation in the alliance.

President Biden must act swiftly, recognize Erdogan’s incentives, and court Turkey properly to strengthen NATO’s long-term position. His response should involve inducements and concessions — Erdogan receiving desired Western military technology, and in return giving NATO warships access to the Black Sea.

Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids break with both states’ long-standing foreign policies. Each has retained connections with the Atlantic Alliance through the Partnership for Peace and peacekeeping deployments; each deployed forces under International Security Assistance Force auspices in Afghanistan. Sweden has a relatively independent defense-industrial base; Finland, by contrast, has increasingly committed to using NATO technology and is now an F-35 purchaser. Nevertheless, both are formally neutral between NATO and Russia, a policy that served them reasonably well throughout the Cold War, primarily because high-end ground combat would be concentrated in Germany, not northern Europe or Scandinavia.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine overturned this situation and demonstrated the Atlantic Alliance’s value. Moreover, the geography of the Russia-NATO military rivalry has changed: The Baltic States’ membership in NATO makes a Russia-NATO conflict likely to involve Finland and Sweden, or at least to occur within their territorial waters.

Both states would benefit the Atlantic Alliance. Both retain effective militaries focused upon great-power war; neither would need overwhelming American logistical support. Unlike nearly all of NATO’s current members apart from the U.S., Sweden and Finland can pull their own combat weight.

Hungarian President Viktor Orban’s positive disposition towards the Kremlin made Hungary a more likely candidate to oppose any NATO expansion. Orban has been restrained, however, focusing instead on opposing EU sanctions on Russian energy exports. Instead, it is Turkey that opposes Swedish and Finnish NATO membership.

A single country’s opposition can derail a NATO bid. Greece, for example, kept Macedonia out of NATO until 2019 because it deemed the country’s name to be an affront to Greek culture: it only relented when Macedonia added “North” to its name. Cyprus remains out of NATO primarily because of Turkey’s opposition, based on Turkish-Greek rivalry.

However, Turkish opposition to Swedish and Finnish NATO membership is neither strategic nor ideological. It is, instead, a diplomatic signal to the Biden administration.

Erdogan’s public reasoning is that Sweden in particular and, by extension, Finland offer shelter to Gulenists and Kurds, the two great enemies of the Turkish state. Additionally, Sweden and Finland imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after its offensive in northeastern Syria in 2019.

Both charges have extremely limited substance. Census data is not current, but Finland likely has no more than 30,000 Turks and Kurds, making Erdogan’s Gulenist charge unfounded. Sweden has 150,000-plus Turks and around 85,000 Kurds; however, there is scant evidence of Swedish Turks or Kurds engaging in activities against the Turkish government. Swedish attempts to create a European Union-wide arms embargo against Turkey failed; Turkey’s military-industrial complex has not been hindered by Swedish and Finnish sanctions.

Turkey is employing a “stick” alongside its “carrot” to NATO. After briefly sitting on the sidelines of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Turkey closed the Dardanelles to all warships. Its legal procedure includes an exemption for Russian Black Sea Fleet warships transiting to their homeport after deployment — but Russia cannot transfer additional warships to the Black Sea, thereby capping Russian naval combat power. Additionally, Turkey has served as a valuable interlocutor between Ukraine and Russia — it is virtually the only power Kyiv and Moscow have trusted to host talks — and the Turkish military-industrial complex produced many of the combat drones that Ukraine has used to extreme effect against Russian forces. Overall, Turkey has sided with Ukraine and NATO in resisting Russian aggression.

Erdogan, however, surely hopes to extract broader concessions before coming in from the cold. Turkey has been at odds with its NATO allies previously, with its Syria intervention receiving the most attention. Equally relevant, however, was Turkish intervention in Libya; by the summer of 2020, a Franco-Russian-Saudi coalition opposed Turkey and the Tripoli government it backed, creating serious spillover risks. Although Libya’s second civil war legally ended in October 2020, Libya remains unstable — and renewed conflict may resurrect a Franco-Russian partnership against further Turkish intervention.

Technologically, Erdogan’s desire for foreign policy independence cut off Turkey from high-end Western military equipment. Its purchase of Russian S-400 air-defense missiles led to its exclusion from the U.S.’s F-35 fighter jet program and may jeopardize its ability to obtain additional F-16s.

#### Swindland extends Russian deterrence and upgrades defense capabilities.

Bundt 22, Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee. She is also Chair of the Board of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations (NUPI), a board member of the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) and a member of the CSIS Stuart Center Advisory Council (Kate, “A strong northern deterrence: Sweden and Finland want to join NATO,” IPS Journal, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/a-strong-northern-deterrence-sweden-and-finland-want-to-join-nato-5996/)//BB

Both Sweden and Finland are politically stable democracies, well-entrenched constitutional states and militarily strong. A united North in NATO increases the Alliance's military capacity and collective defense readiness. The membership of the two countries will strengthen NATO as a community of values and increase the political weight of the North in the Alliance. The two countries' defense capability extends NATO's deterrence and its defense capability in a region of strategic importance to the Alliance. Intelligence cooperation will also be greatly facilitated and a better understanding of the situation will be possible.

#### Inducting Sweden and Finland enhances deterrence---cooperation, logistics, training, etc.

Bundt 22, Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee. She is also Chair of the Board of the Norwegian Institute of International Relations (NUPI), a board member of the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) and a member of the CSIS Stuart Center Advisory Council (Kate, “A strong northern deterrence: Sweden and Finland want to join NATO,” IPS Journal, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/a-strong-northern-deterrence-sweden-and-finland-want-to-join-nato-5996/)//BB

A strong norther deterrence

In terms of military strategy, the Finnish and Swedish formations can be easily integrated into NATO. The armed forces of both countries are already NATO-compatible, having participated in multinational operations and exercises for decades in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Norway, among other places.

In the next few years, the Nordic countries will build up a significant fleet of modern combat aircraft. In total, Norway, Finland and Denmark will then have about 150 F-35 fighter aircraft and Sweden a considerable number of JAS 39 Gripen. That is an impressive air military capability. With this comes significant potential for cost-effective cooperation in bases, logistics and training and education.

Adding Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK as part of the North Sea cooperation, Northern Europe then has approximately 250 to 300 F-35s plus the Swedish fighters. This creates a comprehensive and robust deterrence regime in Northern Europe. And it increases NATO's ability to protect the transatlantic link across the North Atlantic against Russian disruption strategies. The latter is a crucial point to ensure that formations and reinforcements from the US can reach Europe in case of crisis or war. It has often been said that Norway is 'NATO in the North'. With Finland and Sweden in NATO, Norway - as the only Atlantic coastal state with a border with Russia and with responsibility for an enormous maritime area seven times larger than its mainland - receives considerable backing.

### Swinland !---Baltics

#### Swinland integration aves the Baltics

The Economist 22 (“Why NATO should swiftly admit Sweden and Finland,” The Economist, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/05/19/why-nato-should-swiftly-admit-sweden-and-finland)//BB>

For finland and Sweden to join NATO is a rebuke to the anti-NATO arguments of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. Two countries that are proud of their long history of military non-alignment think the risk of antagonising their neighbour to the east is outweighed by the security they will gain. It is the direct result of the invasion of Ukraine, which Mr Putin ordered ostensibly to forestall nato’s expansion.

Finland and Sweden submitted their applications on May 18th. Despite Turkey’s stalling tactics, over Kurdish militants and possibly American fighter planes, their admission is likely. They will bring formidable capabilities in Arctic warfare and, in Finland’s case, the largest artillery force in Europe. Membership will more than double the length of NATO’s border with Russia. It will also make the Baltic states easier to defend. Mr Putin’s regime has responded by cutting electricity supplies to Finland and threatening “military-technical” action, whatever that is supposed to mean. He is not the first Russian leader to object to enlargement. In the 1990s Boris Yeltsin complained when members of the old Warsaw Pact applied to join the alliance. Over the years this hardened into the line of argument cited by Mr Putin as justification for invading Ukraine. Russia’s president says that enlargement breaks an undertaking that James Baker, then America’s secretary of state, gave the Soviet Union in February 1990. Many Western commentators argued that enlargement was unwise, because Russia would feel threatened. The West had other ways to enhance security, such as the Partnership for Peace, which sets out to strengthen relations between the alliance and non-members. These arguments do not stand up. Mr Baker was speaking about eastern Germany. His words were overtaken by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact nearly 18 months later. nato and Russia signed an agreement in 1997 that did not contain any restriction on new members, though enlargement had been discussed. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined almost two years later. The undertaking that has been violated is Russia’s pledge to Ukraine not to use economic or military coercion, given in 1994 when it surrendered the nuclear weapons based on its soil. In fact NATO has every right to expand. Under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by the Soviet Union, countries are free to choose their own allies. The Warsaw Pact suffered grievously under Soviet rule. Why would its ex-members not seek a haven? For many years Finns and Swedes mostly opposed joining nato. This shifted after the invasion of Ukraine in February. Indeed, the right for sovereign countries to determine their own destinies is one of the many things currently at stake in Ukraine. But was nato expansion wise? A spiral of mutual suspicion between Russia and nato clearly exists, but to blame nato expansion for triggering it is scarcely credible. Mr Putin has increasingly used nationalism and Orthodox religion to shore up his rule. He needs enemies abroad to persuade his people that they and their civilisation are under threat. That is why he seized territory in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. Besides, Russia has a long history as an imperial power. Like most declining empires, it was likely to resist as its periphery drifted off, regardless of nato expansion. Finland and Sweden are both long-term members of the Partnership for Peace. If one of them were attacked, nato would have no commitment to intervene. Nor would American and British nuclear weapons cover them. Their choice to join NATO suggests that the partnership was not able to cope with Russian aggression. Likewise, denying central and eastern Europe membership of nato would have created a security vacuum that Russia may very well have been tempted to fill. Finland and Sweden are right to have concluded that Mr Putin is dangerous and unpredictable—not because of NATO, but in the way he governs Russia. Their applications should be rapidly approved. ■

#### That’s the most likely nuclear risk--- limiting commitment solves

Thompson 16 [Loren B. Thompson is Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, “Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin”, July 20th, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044>]

While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons.

First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance.

Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland.

Third, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain in a future war. Russia has massive local superiority in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond.

Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly.

Fifth, any counter-attack by NATO in the Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes against attacking forces would occur on Russian territory, and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance system would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war. Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional conflict along the Russian periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments.

Sixth, both sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine potentially justifying the use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly that it needs non-strategic nuclear weapons to cope with the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would use such weapons in order to protect its core assets and values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict. Successive U.S. administrations have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments.

Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater ready for quick use if tactical circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict. Nuclear-capable NATO jets could reach the area within hours.

Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers.

The bottom line is that all the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use. Neither side understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides would likely have a tenuous grasp of what was happening. The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for catastrophe.

This situation calls for a reassessment by Washington. While losing the Baltic states would undoubtedly be a blow to NATO, their location makes them of far greater importance to Russia than America. It simply makes no sense to tie America's security to countries of such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances. If the Obama Administration took the threat of nuclear war more seriously, it would find a way of loosening the commitments it has made.

#### Only U.S.-Russia war causes extinction -- other nuclear wars don’t.

Cotton-Barratt ’17 [Owen; February 3; Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Pure Mathematics from Oxford University; Global Priorities Project, “Existential Risk,” <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>]

1.1.1 Nuclear war

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter.

According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons 10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.

It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

### Swinland !---Arctic

#### Adding Sweden & Finland bolsters NATO credibility, deterrence, and military capabilities.

WP 22. Washington Post. "Why NATO Should Welcome Finland and Sweden.” 4-27-2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-nato-should-welcome-finland-and-sweden/2022/04/26/9958d532-c561-11ec-8cff-33b059f4c1b7\_story.html. accessed 6-22-2022 //ART

As for NATO, the Finnish bid would certainly make sense militarily. Although it has a small standing army, Finland’s reserve force is Europe’s largest; some 900,000 Finns have military training. The country’s air force and intelligence services are among the most advanced in Europe. If Sweden joins, its military’s air-defense and submarine prowess would bolster NATO’s ability to counter hostile Russian activity in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic.

There would be political benefits as well. It’s true that previous rounds of expansion, particularly to less-developed democracies in southeastern Europe, have strained the alliance’s resources and forced it to do business with illiberal governments. But adding Finland and Sweden, both prosperous democracies, would only bolster NATO’s credibility as a defender of liberal values. It would also help distribute the long-term costs of maintaining European security, allowing the U.S. to devote more attention to the Pacific. Despite Putin’s repeated threats, history shows that a larger alliance provides greater deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe, not less.

#### Doctrine and deployments mean Arctic War goes nuclear.

Féron, 18—Postdoctoral Research Associate at Columbia University School of Law (Henri, “A New Ocean: The Legal Challenges of the Artic Thaw,” 45 Ecology L. Q. 83 (2018), dml)

The Arctic is at risk of becoming a military flashpoint. The likelihood of military tensions over control of newly accessible natural resources should not be overstated, as most Arctic resources are clearly in the EEZs or continental shelves of this or that Arctic State.270 Yet the Arctic thaw inevitably opens new invasion routes that Arctic States must take into account when planning their defense—be it through the Arctic Ocean, the Bering Sea, or the RussoScandinavian borders.271 Loud calls on all sides against the militarization of the Arctic have been followed by quiet improvements in Arctic military capabilities, especially by Russia.272 The central concern here is the deep fracture between the seven Arctic NATO states and Russia, the geographically largest Arctic state. Russia was not represented at Arctic security forums following the Ukraine crisis, increasing the room for distrust, misunderstanding, and overreaction in the Arctic context.273 Indeed, key Russian security documents such as the 2014 Military Doctrine, the 2015 Maritime Doctrine, and the 2015 National Security Strategy identify NATO’s expanding influence as being among the top security threats to Russia, and highlight the need to defend Russian Arctic interests.274 Security tensions are already having economic implications, as anti-Russia sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine crisis have blocked a number of Russian Arctic resource development projects by preventing U.S. and EU companies from contributing equipment, technology, and financing.275

These outcomes appear to have been wholly preventable—a product of mutual fear rather than necessity. Four periods can be distinguished in Russian Arctic security policy in the post-Cold War era, with none clearly directed at threatening the interests of other Arctic states. Ekaterina Klimenko, writing for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, first notes an almost complete disbanding of Russian Arctic forces in the 1990s, as the country was reeling from the Soviet collapse.276 The 2000s then ushered a period of national power restoration, notably through the State Rearmament Program, which unsettled neighbors despite the spending targets remaining much more modest than in the Soviet era.277 Klimenko notes for instance that while the Program paid particular attention to the overhaul of Russia’s northern fleet, in particular for submarine patrols in the Arctic, the number of operational submarines at Moscow’s disposal actually fell by three-quarters from 1986 to 2010.278 Klimenko then highlights a period of attempted cooperation beginning in 2008, as a key Russian policy document insisted that it was a top strategic priority for Russia to keep the Arctic a “zone of peace and cooperation.”279 This posture presumably reflected the fact that Russia simply cannot afford to substantially fortify its extremely long northern coastline, especially considering that the Russian military budget is only about a seventh of America’s, and that the country’s economy was hit hard by plunging oil prices.280 In any case, this period was marked by Arctic advances such as the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, the Norway-Russia Agreement on the Barents Sea in 2010, and the setting up of Arctic security roundtables.281 Note also that Russia’s 2013 Arctic Strategy outlines exclusively defensive goals for Russian armed forces in the region, such as safeguarding sovereign rights, providing strategic deterrence, and repelling aggression.282 Finally, the 2014 Ukraine crisis began a period of rapidly deteriorating Russo-Western relations and a strengthening of Russia’s Arctic posture, for instance through large military exercises mirroring those of NATO and the setting up of a Joint Strategic Command for Russia’s northern forces.283 Klimenko notes, however, that many Russian military developments in the region since 2013 are products of plans that were announced long before the Ukraine crisis, such as the State Rearmament Program.284 So while it may be expected that other Arctic States would seek, like Russia, to proportionately protect their Arctic interests, there does not yet appear to have been any particular event making Arctic militarization an ineluctable necessity.285

Be that as it may, the Arctic is also at risk of nuclear escalation. Because it represents a direct way for the two most important nuclear powers to bomb each other, it has been regularly patrolled by long-range nuclear bombers and by nuclear-armed submarines since the Cold War.286 The mutual downsizing of arsenals after the collapse of the Soviet Union did relax the nuclear danger for a time.287 Yet tensions are on the rise again after Washington noticed its withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) roughly three months after 9/11.288 President Bush claimed this move was necessary to defend against “terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction,” but the ensuing development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities also destabilized the global nuclear balance.289 BMDs fuel an arms race logic insofar as countering them requires firing more missiles than they can intercept, so the expected response to U.S. BMD development by nuclear powers not allied to Washington is to maintain, modernize, and perhaps develop their nuclear arsenals.290 BMDs are particularly relevant to the Arctic because the most important American BMD base is Fort Greely in Alaska, where dozens of ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) interceptors are emplaced to defend against incoming ballistic missiles by intercepting them midcourse.291 Russia has in response deployed some S-400 missile defense units, which are similar to American Patriot systems in their multi-role ability to target both aircraft and ballistic missiles, albeit with a greater range.292

The Arctic thaw could further destabilize the global nuclear balance. It could facilitate the deployment of the American sea-based Aegis BMD in the Arctic Ocean (designed to intercept midcourse short-to-intermediate range missiles), as well as the deployment of surface anti-submarine warfare capabilities to hunt nuclear-armed submarines.293 The development of American BMD capabilities in the Arctic could also provoke China into developing a larger nuclear arsenal and deepening military cooperation with Russia, as Beijing is already actively developing counter-measures against the development of U.S. BMD capabilities in the Pacific.294 The Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists now suggests we are only “two minutes” away from an apocalyptic “midnight,” closer than we were during the 1980s, and “the closest the Clock has ever been to Doomsday . . . .”295

### AT Turkey Doesn’t Leave

#### If NATO humiliates Turkey, they’ll leave

Pandey 6-22 (Ansh Pandey, Associate Editor at TFIGlobal News, TFIGlobal, June 22, 2022, “Turkey could quit NATO,” <https://tfiglobalnews.com/2022/06/22/turkey-could-quit-nato/>; accessed 6/25/2022) ng

Everything is not okay between NATO and Turkey, as NATO wants to induct Finland and Sweden into NATO. Turkey is quite adamant to oppose the motion. Erdogan stated that his opposition to Sweden and Finland joining NATO is the Kurdish insurgency, which Turkey views as a security danger.

But, this is not the first time that Turkey and NATO have sparred with each other. There have been many more reasons earlier as well where Turkey has disagreed with NATO allies. A famous case is Jamal Khashoggi when Turkey started softening its stance with Saudi Arabia ditching NATO’s efforts.

You see, Turkey has a sense of being exploited inside the alliance, and so, for the first time ever, Turkey has indicated that it wants to leave the alliance and explore more opportunities, and it could prove to be a major setback for NATO.

Media alarms NATO

Turkish media has openly started raising voices against its own allies in NATO. Recently, a Turkish media has uploaded an article against the US entitled, “US will not cut the NATO bond, Turkey should”. In this article, the author openly states and proves, why will NATO and Turkey apart their ways soon.

The article asserts that there is no single satisfactory answer to what advantage Turkey and the Turkish people have seen in 70 years. Ankara has faced only humiliation.

For instance, the US continues to aid Greece, the arch-nemesis of Turkey. With its new defence deal, the United States has transformed Greece into an “American garrison”; the US has made a military build-up from Alexandroupoli to Crete which is clearly against Turkish interests.

Moreover, Turkey is also concerned as the US has pitched a new NATO border with Greece, Southern Cyprus, and Israel line carving out Turkey.

The author of the article also believes that the US wants to keep Turkey in NATO for multiple purposes, but none of that is beneficiary for Turkey. The US wants to make the Black sea a NATO lake; wants to continue Caucasus plans and importantly, wants to dampen Greater Eurasia’s dream. All of these serve no substantial gain to Ankara.

What could Turkey do?

We all know very well that Turkey is an opportunist country and it can go to any extent to secure its gains. Talking along the same lines, the article stresses that Turkey should close the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Western gate of Central Asia for the USA, and become a part of the Great Eurasian Partnership and the new world.

This all could be done at one cost which would be leaving NATO. For Turkey, it will be worth it. The USA does not want to cut ties with Turkey, it wants the nation to get anchored by the West despite differences. Therefore, it is up to Turkey to cut that bond.

The article is indicative of the growing political atmosphere in Ankara. It would not be a surprise if Turkey eventually quits NATO.

#### The US can force a break in Turkey

Dr. Nicholas Danforth 21. Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, Turkey Program, ELIAMEP. "Turkey and the West: A Hostile Dance." Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Policy-paper-60-Nick-Danforth-final-1.pdf. accessed 6-24-2022 //ART

There are also a number of observers who believe that Turkey and the West are moving steadily, even inexorably, toward a more formal, definitive and acrimonious break. Like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, these scenarios are all disastrous in their own unique way. Some imagine Turkey formally leaving NATO, launching a nuclear program or going to war with one of its neighbors. Some picture Turkey going rogue like Iran, becoming indebted to China or entering into an alliance with Russia. In many cases these scenarios are accompanied by a more nakedly authoritarian turn in Turkey’s domestic politics, with Erdoğan forcibly overturning elections and violently crushing protests.

Interestingly, pessimistic predictions vary in the degree to which they see this geopolitical break as the fulfillment of Erdoğan’s own ideological agenda or the result of circumstances escalating beyond his control. Erdoğan has made it clear how committed he is to a more “independent” Turkish foreign policy, one that would make his country a civilizational and geopolitical center in its own right, rather than a part of any other great power’s sphere of influence. He has also made it clear that he expects to have to achieve this in the face of sustained Western resistance. Yet, as laid out in the previous scenario, Erdoğan seems convinced that Turkey’s success in this venture will eventually bring Western powers around. Thus, while there is good reason to think Erdoğan’s worldview or domestic political needs might lead him to take provocative measures that could trigger a break, it seems unlikely that he would see the break as a goal in itself.

#### Even if Turkey doesn’t formally leave, the CP still solves Turkish aggression. Punishment forces Erdogan to stop external aggression

Ellis 20, analyst @ Ekathimerini (Tom, “Time for the West to punish Turkey,” *Ekathimerini*, <https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/258084/time-for-the-west-to-punish-turkey/>)

If Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan achieves his maximalist goals, it will be a huge defeat – not just for Greece, Cyprus and other countries in the region, but for the Western system of stability and peace. To those high-ranking US diplomats and officials from both parties who cite the “risk” of losing Turkey and see it evolve into a new Pakistan or Iran, the answer is that the country is not behaving as if it is part of the Euro-Atlantic project and should not be treated with subtlety and criticism limited to mere rhetoric. Not after Ankara purchased the Russian S-400, invaded Syria with the aim of attacking the Kurds, got involved in Libya with forces and military equipment and plays a negative role in the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Not to mention past allegations of dealings with Islamic State. All this is before we mention the numerous provocations that affect Hellenism, such as consecutive navtexes near Kastellorizo’s territorial water, surveying inside the Cypriot exclusive economic zone, opening Varosha despite the international outcry and UN resolutions, but also converting Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Turkey’s complete impunity undermines the West’s credibility. Erdogan has crossed every line. He denounced the joint military exercises of Greek and American forces in Thrace. Lately he is even turning against Turkish-Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci because he dares to refuse to align with Ankara’s appetites, and openly undermined him in order to make him lose the elections in the occupied north of the island. The Erdogan regime insults everyone, from French President Emmanuel Macron to US presidential nominee Joe Biden, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Republicans in Congress who are critical of him. He invests exclusively in his personal relationship with President Donald Trump – whatever the motives behind it. But even Trump has limits and priorities. When Erdogan jailed pastor Andrew Brunson, angering the Evangelicals, a key part of the US president’s electoral pool, Trump threatened to “destroy” the Turkish economy if the pastor was not released. The Turkish president complied. To return to the issues that concern us, it is obvious that other countries, no matter how friendly and supportive they are to Greece, are not going to get involved in a military confrontation on our account. Our allies and partners can, however, do enough damage to Turkey to force it to stop its aggression. It is in this light that, at last, the imposition of severe and substantial sanctions that will really hurt the Turkish economy must be seriously considered, both by the EU and the US. It is a fact that we have witnessed direct criticism from the US State Department against Turkey rarely seen in the past. It was preceded by France, while Germany is also starting to raise – slowly and belatedly – its voice. Strong statements by the powerful players that Erdogan counts on are a first step. They send clear messages that are difficult for the Turkish ruler to ignore. Athens is always reaching out to Ankara for friendship and dialogue, proposing that we delimit our maritime zones, stop the tension and reap the benefits that will result. If Erdogan continues the “calculated provocations” – which is how the Americans described them and not the Greeks or Cypriots – the next step should be targeted sanctions that will seriously affect Turkey. At the same time, the readiness of the Greek armed forces completes the puzzle of the potential cost that Erdogan is called upon to bear. As Turkish forces are spread too thin and on so many fronts, he must realize that in the event of a conflict, Turkey will pay a heavy price too. The West must punish the Turkish leader. He has turned his country into a pariah and he must be made to understand that he is not invincible – before it’s too late.

### AT Expulsion Bad---Top-Shelf

#### The alliance is over. Any benefit to Turkish membership is long-dead. Kicking them out just formalizes it.

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB>

As such, many claim that ousting Ankara from NATO is an option to be seriously considered. In principle, this raises costs in the form of losing a powerful partner in a strategic position, but in practice the problem may be less serious than it appears. The assets currently based on Turkish territory can be moved to more trustworthy partners, even though this would have some operational consequences. Most importantly, Turkey’s own uncooperative, if not outright abrasive, attitude already offsets the advantages its membership is supposed to bring. At the same time, expelling Turkey would allow the Organization and its members to simply counter Ankara whenever the latter’s actions go against its common interests, and NATO would be freed from any obligation to protect an untrustworthy ally that does little to promote the common interest and often acts openly against it in a manner that undermines NATO’s cohesion and policies. As such, Ankara’s exit from NATO would put an end to the numerous problems linked to its membership. And, arguably, it’s the Turkish government itself that is choosing this path. Ankara’s recent tilts toward rival powers like Russia and Iran seems to indicate that it is already drifting away from its trans-Atlantic commitments; therefore, expelling the country from NATO would simply make official the de facto break-up that Turkey has been actively seeking over the past decade.

### AT Expulsion Bad---Countering Russia

#### Turkey is actively working to help Russia and Iran, against US interests

Rubin 21 - is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Michael Rubin, “To Use Turkey as a Bulwark Against Russia and Iran Is Wishful Thinking,” July 12 2021, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/use-turkey-bulwark-against-russia-and-iran-wishful-thinking-189524)//mcu>

For decades, Turkey was a staunch Cold War ally. One of only two NATO members to border the Soviet Union, Turkey went above and beyond in its partnership with the United States: Turkey contributed more men under arms to NATO than Germany and France combined. Turkey subsequently joined the Baghdad Pact and Turks fought alongside the United States in the Korean War. Behind the scenes, Turkey proved crucial to numerous intelligence and counter-terror operations. With the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations remained strong, at least **until the rise of** Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip **Erdoğan**. Slowly but deliberately, Erdoğan turned away from the West. He picked fights like a master tactician, confident that he could find former ambassadors and others in the State Department, White House, or pay-to-play think tanks. He artfully played and rewarded those inclined to apologize for any Turkish outrage or desperate to preserve the alliance. The frequency of U.S. elections and new U.S. administrations—at least in comparison to the last two decades in Turkey—meant Erdoğan could always find an American official eager for a reset. Often, those seeking to promote rapprochement with Turkey argue that repairing the relationship is necessary given the broader strategic imperative of checking Russia’s and Iran’s geopolitical ambitions. **The idea that Turkey can be a bulwark against either is magical thinking**. It rests upon an embrace of an Istanbul bubble not representative of broader Turkish thinking, a wholescale embrace of the notion that Turkey’s depiction of its enemies and its narrative of history is accurate, and an anachronistic idea that Turkey has not changed over the decades. The idea that it is possible to ignore the ideology and volatility in Erdoğan is analogous to embracing Iranian reformists in the hope that they will somehow nullify the influence of the supreme leader. Likewise, to believe that nearly two decades of Erdoğanism has not changed Turkish society is to believe that twenty years of Khomeinism did not change Iran. Both are foolish delusions. Consider, for example, the notion that **Turkey checks Russia’s interests**. In May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed energy cooperation agreements to give Turkey its first nuclear power plant, with help from Russian energy companies. Earlier this year, Russian president Vladimir Putin and Erdoğan jointly celebrated the start of the construction of the new Akkuyu power plant. **Such cooperation has become the rule rather than the exception**. Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia has made headlines not because it represents a lucrative contract for Russia, but because the integration of S-400s into Turkey’s air defense would **require compromising NATO electronics and computer codes to Russian engineers.** Even if Turkey kept the S-400s on a separate system, they might be used to track and gather data on NATO air platforms. In 2016, the two counties signed an agreement on the TurkStream gas pipeline and, on January 8, 2020, they launched the pipeline. To suggest Germany’s pursuit of Nord Stream 2 is pro-Putin (it is) but, by omission, bless Turkey’s involvement in the TurkStream pipeline defies logic. Syria has become a flashpoint for Turkey’s Islamist ambitions. The reason why American officials from both parties ignore Turkish complaints about U.S. partnership with pro-PKK groups is not because of some conspiracy to promote Russian or Iranian interest as some suggest, but rather because Turkey’s partnership with the Islamic State forced that cooperation in the first place. Given how Turkey and Russia often appear on separate sides in the Syria conflict, it might be possible to argue that Turkey’s involvement checks Russian ambitions. The problem, **however**, is that **Turkey’s approach to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is inconsistent**. In May 2007, the PKK derailed a train in Turkey that was carrying rocket launchers, mortar shells, and light arms to Syria, likely destined to Hezbollah. For example, in 2008 and 2009 Erdoğan was hosting joint cabinet meetings with Assad and vacationing with the Syrian dictator on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Certainly, the Syrian civil war changed perspectives but, on January 24, 2017, Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement to establish de-escalation zones and essentially cooperate to create spheres of influence in Syria. Damascus and Ankara replicated the same model in Libya and in Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Officials in both Armenia and Artsakh—as the self-styled Armenian state in Nagorno-Karabakh calls itself—openly speculate that Turkey traded influence in Idlib to Russia in exchange for the Kremlin agreeing to greater Turkish involvement in the South Caucasus. It is true that Turkey’s relationship with Russia has not always gone smoothly. In October 2012, Turkey forced a Syrian passenger plane to land, accusing it of carrying Russian munitions leading Russian officials to accuse Turkey of endangering Russian passengers. Three years later, Turkey shot down a Russian military jet close to the Syrian border. Putin called the move a “stab in the back.” Russia suspended military contracts, instituted a travel ban against Turkey, and implemented sanctions in response. After Erdoğan apologized**, however, Russo-Turkish relations resumed where they had left off**. Erdoğan’s use of the Gülen bogeyman to deflect blame from the consequences from his own policy choices proved useful in papering over other crises, such as when an off-duty Turkish police officer assassinated the Russian ambassador to Turkey. Certainly, tensions remain and the Kremlin is not afraid to play hardball with Erdoğan but whether out of ideological symbiosis or trade, **neither Erdoğan nor Putin appears willing to break their embrace**. The two leaders have met nearly two dozen times in either Turkey or Russia since 2012, and that figure does not include phone calls, video conferences, or mutual attendance at multiparty summits in third countries. Nor does it factor in Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan’s frequent travels to Moscow. The money at stake is significant. In 2019, Turkey’s exports to Russia totaled $4.15 billion, and Russian exports to Turkey were five times that amount. It is likewise farcical to believe Turkey can be a bulwark against Iranian influence. When, in 2010, Erdoğan appointed Fidan to be his intelligence chief, alarm bells sounded in Western capitals where his Western counterparts knew him as an Iran sympathizer if not an asset. To couch a renewed Turkish alliance as good for Israel or Jews is absurd. Fidan not only personally supervised efforts to unravel Turkey-Israel ties but also ordered Turkish intelligence actively to monitor Jews. He killed two birds with one stone when he allegedly exposed an Israeli spy ring targeting Iran’s nuclear program and has also betrayed intelligence to Hamas and China. Under Fidan, Turkey also endangered American forces by exposing the locations and supplies of U.S. forces operating in Syria. To suggest, in each case, that Turkey is simply acting in pique toward some sleight or following its own interests misses the point. Strong allies share not only short-term interests but also a broader ideological base. This has been the key to ensuring the stability of the post–World War II liberal order. The Turkish government, however, **no longer shares common values with the United States or the West.** Nor after two decades bombarded by vile anti-Western, anti-Semitic propaganda does a Turkish public, at least that beyond a few central Istanbul neighborhoods, some more cosmopolitan areas in Ankara, and the Mediterranean coast. Forty percent of the Turkish population has lived the entirety of their conscious lives under Erdoğan’s domination. To excuse Erdoğan as transactional is equally bizarre. In times of crises, allies do not seek to engage both sides in a bidding war for Turkey’s affection but that is at best what Erdoğan now tries to do. Turkey is skilled at caviar diplomacy; I know. While I never solicited nor received Turkish money (or that of any other foreign state), I was a frequent guest at Turkish conferences until the Erdoğan regime grew frustrated with both my refusal to promote its party line and my willingness to talk directly in the spirit of independent research to those it deemed enemies. Turkey continues to throw out the red carpet for those who amplify its narrative and offers golden parachutes for diplomats who amplify Turkish interests. Conversely, it restricts access to academics and policy analysts who do not tow its party line. Such enticement, however, is not only intellectually dishonest but also makes for buffoonish policy prescriptions, the notion that Turkey today can be a bulwark against Russia and Iran chief among them.

### AT Expulsion Bad---Afghanistan

#### Turkey won’t stabilize the economy---that makes instability inevitable

UN 6/23- (“Talking to the Taliban ‘only way forward’ in Afghanistan,” United Nations, 6/23/2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1121122)//mcu

The economic crisis is perhaps the single most important issue in Afghanistan, **and a potential driver of conflict** and misery. It is estimated the economy contracted by up to 40 per cent since August. Unemployment could reach 40 per cent this year, up from 13 per cent in 2021, while the official poverty rate could climb as high as 97 per cent. “If the economy is not able to recover and grow meaningfully and sustainably, then the Afghan people will face repeated humanitarian crises; potentially spurring mass migration and making conditions ripe for radicalization and renewed armed conflict,” he warned.

### AT Expulsion DA---Middle East

#### No Middle East escalation

Imran 19- writer for The News International (Myra Imranz Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’. 2/6/19, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/428298-seminar-on-strategic-dimensions-of-peace-and-conflict-in-south-asia-middle-east)//mcu>

Islamabad : There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, participated by prominent national and international scholars. Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University, Australia, argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East. Speakers grappled at the notion of non-state actors and proxy wars: PIPS director Muhammad Amir Rana said non-state actors often evoke memories of violent elements. This despite that as per definition, non-state actors include organizations working for human rights. Prof. Syed Rifaat Hussain, Department of Government and Public Policy, NUST, said the term “proxy wars” is a contested notion. There is no universal agreement on its definition, nor on the set of circumstances behind such wars. Interestingly, he said, proxy wars are as old as the phenomena of conventional war itself. Speakers noted proxy wars are instruments of state power. As to why states go for it, it was argued, it is because they are often cheap undertaking to change the status quo. Participants noted over the decades, much of the conflict involves non-state actors. Interstate conflict, on the other hand, has declined. In recent times, he said **tit-for-tat tactics on behalf of such actors have reduced their appeal.** Dr. Ibrahim Fraihat, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies, Doha, termed proxy war as an arms conflict between two parties, though one of them is not directly involved. This way, domestic conflicts are escalated by external power intervention. At the same time, proxy war, if unresolved, can take the shape of conventional war, the most significant example was of Vietnam War. In contemporary times, he lamented, the Middle East has been rendered a stock market of proxy organizations. William Gueriache, Associate Professor American University in the Emirates Dubai, said on surface, all states support open diplomacy and multilateralism. Yet the survival of patronage has paved the way for foreign intervention during conflicts in the whole Middle East. Dr. Marwan Kablan, Director Policy Analysis at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Doha, also hinted multiplicity of actors involved in Syrian conflict, calling it as mother of conflicts in the region. It was said that wars cannot be ended unless patron states achieve their interests. Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Professor National Defence University Islamabad focused on the apprehension of Pakistan about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. She said Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Kabul reinforces a perception of encirclement while growing US-India strategic cooperation further aggravates these apprehensions. Dr. Muhammad Riaz Shad, National University of Modern Languages (NUML) Islamabad, said **fighting through proxies gives states an opportunity of deniability.**

#### No great power involvement in Middle East war---every external actor will limit damage from regional instability rather than get involved

Ekaterina Stepanova 16, researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Summer 2016, “Russia in the Middle East: Back to a “Grand Strategy” – or Enforcing Multilateralism?” http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E\_PE\_162\_0023--russia-in-the-middle-east.htm

In contrast to the 20th century and the early years of the 21st century, the regional crisis in the 2010s developed at a time when, overall, the role and leverage of major powers external to the Middle East, as either active meddlers or security guarantors in the region, or both, actually declined rather than increased. The United States serves as the most evident case in point: the “post-interventionist” US administration has clearly become “tired of the Middle East”, struggling and often failing to keep pace with the dynamically changing situation and unable to alter or decisively affect the course of events. The same even more strongly applies to the European powers. In terms of activity and impact, regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Turkey) increasingly appeared to outplay external powers and influence.

For external powers, however, that did not remove a number of risks and threats connected to, or emanating from, the Middle East. The increase and diversification of global energy supply and the latest crisis in energy prices made the region less central to the global economy than it had been in the past. At the same time, the fundamental socio-political, statehood and security crisis in the Middle East brought with it new security concerns and implications. They mostly stemmed from reinforced perceptions about the long-term nature of regional instability, the continuing potential for further destabilization, and the related consequences and implications beyond the region, ranging from terrorist connections to migration flows. These challenges affect external powers unevenly. For instance, the role of the Iraq-Syria area as the main focal point for global terrorism activity and magnet for transnational flows of violent extremists in the mid-2010s poses a threat to everyone (but mostly to the countries of the region itself, as well as to those in Europe and Eurasia). In contrast, the avalanche of refugee and migrant flows from the Middle East primarily targets Europe (rather than North America, Eurasia, or other regions).

Until recently, the main type of response by key (Western) external powers to turbulent developments in the Middle East, while not amounting to a hands-off approach, boils down to limited containment. Examples range from limited air strikes against “Islamic State” positions in Iraq and Syria, carried out by the US-led coalition since 2014, to the 2013 deal on Syria’s chemical disarmament co-brokered by the United States and Russia. Not surprisingly, this limited-containment approach has had equally limited results for Syria, Iraq and the region – as well as for the West itself (as shown, e.g., by the persistent migrant flows and accelerating terrorist attacks in Europe). Despite the growing centrality of the Middle East to global politics and security, and its more direct impact on and ties to the West, this damage limitation course taken by key external actors has not been very different from, e.g., the approach taken by the United States and its Western allies (and also by Russia and China) to the Afghanistan problem in recent years.

#### No scenario for draw in, even with military presence.

John Glaser 17, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute., 1-9-2017, "Does the U.S. Military Actually Protect Middle East Oil?," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/does-the-us-military-actually-protect-middle-east-oil-18995?page=0%2C1

In addition, the balance of power globally and in the region today is favorable for energy security. First, an external power gaining a stranglehold over the Persian Gulf region is implausible. The Soviet Union is long gone and today’s Russia suffers from systemic economic problems that hinder its potential to project power in the Middle East. China, while increasingly powerful in its own sphere, lacks the political will to dominate the Gulf . The regional balance of power is also favorable. According to Joshua Rovner , “the chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” No state in the region possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling influence over oil resources, and most are bogged down and distracted by internal problems. Overall the region is in a state of defense dominance: while too weak to project power beyond their borders, the major states do have the capability to deter their neighbors, making the costs of offensive action prohibitively high. So, three of the major scenarios that have traditionally justified a forward deployed military presence in the Persian Gulf—the entrance of a hostile external power, the rise of a regional hegemon and a military clash among the major states—are exceedingly unlikely even absent the U.S. military presence.

#### No Middle East war---states are too weak and deterrence solves

John Glaser 17, associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Master of Arts in International Security at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, "Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous," *Cato Institute*, 7-18-2017, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture

Regionally, the circumstances are similarly advantageous. According to Rovner, “the chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” 134 There are only three potential major powers in the region: Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. None of them possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling influence over Persian Gulf oil resources. In addition to being too weak to make a bid for regional dominance, all three are bogged down and distracted by internal problems. Overall, the region is in a state of defense dominance: the major states are too weak to project power beyond their borders, but they do have the capability to deter their neighbors. Deterrence works well in this environment because the costs of offensive action remain prohibitively high. 135

### AT Expulsion Bad---Prolif

#### Turkey prolif now—NATO isn’t key

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Ask 10 experts on Turkish politics whether the United States should worry about Ankara’s nuclear weapons ambitions and you’ll likely hear 10 denials. Get beyond the Washington Beltway and you’ll get something different. The Israelis worry Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is getting all too close to a nuclear-armed Pakistan that likes to share nuclear technology. Turkish environmentalists spotlight that **Erdogan’s uneconomic and unnecessary nuclear power program may pose proliferation risks.** The Greeks whisper about Erdogan’s **nuclear bomb posturing**. Any sound US approach to Turkey demands that American officials listen to these foreign voices. There are popular reasons to think Turkey won’t acquire nuclear weapons. It’s in NATO and already has 50 American B61 nuclear bombs at a joint US–Turkish airbase. It also forswore acquiring its own nuclear weapons, is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. So, what suggests Turkey may want to go nuclear in the not too distant future? Three things. First, President **Erdogan says he wants the bomb.** Last fall, he complained before the UN General Assembly that the NPT bars states like Turkey from developing nuclear weapons but ignores that other states have them. Earlier, he told members of his Justice and Development Party that “some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us] we can’t have them. This, I cannot accept.” He then said nuclear weapons are an enormous source of power for Israel. Second, **Erdogan is often bombastic**, but on nuclear energy he’s taking action. Along Turkey’s Mediterranean coastline, the Russians are building four large civilian nuclear power reactors at the Akkuyu Nuclear Facility. Erdogan hopes the Russians will complete the first reactor by 2023, in time for the centenary celebrations of the founding of modern Turkey. Ankara says it needs nuclear energy to decrease its dependence on natural gas imports from unreliable partners—Russia and Iran—and to meet electricity demand. This demand has grown at the highest rate of all OECD countries since 2005. But **Ankara’s case for nuclear power doesn’t add up**. The Akkuyu facility doesn’t make Turkey less dependent on foreign powers. Russia will own and operate the facility, and it is well-established that Moscow uses all of its energy assets—not just fossil fuels—**for coercion**. Actually, the Akkuyu plant is a bad investment. While Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation, is footing the bill for the first reactor, it will not do the same for Akkuyu’s other three reactors. Despite years of searching, the Russians haven’t found a single private investor for the project. To finish Akkuyu, the Turkish government will have to finance it through public debt or secure increasingly scarce foreign investment. If President Erdogan were paying attention to the market, he would know that natural gas and renewables beat nuclear. Even before the pandemic, Turkey was importing natural gas for a fraction of the Akkuyu plant’s market electricity price—an uneconomic 12.35 cents per kilowatt hour. And Turkish access to gas will soon expand; by backing the interim government in Libya that enjoys UN support, Turkey scored cheap gas and drilling rights in Libya’s maritime zone. More natural gas will allow Turkey to meet electricity demand today. Cheap domestic renewables should help it tomorrow. As it stands, 10 percent of Turkish electricity comes from solar and wind. One of Turkey’s top universities recently reported that these sources could meet 30 percent of Turkey’s electricity demand by 2026, given proper investment. An objective observer must wonder why bad economics hasn’t dampened Erdogan’s nuclear ambitions. What’s worrisome is **Turkey could exploit nuclear power as a cover to procure bomb-related technology and hardware**. The technology transfer is already occurring. Since the Akkuyu project began, Turkish engineering students have become the second largest national group studying nuclear sciences in Russia, where hundreds of Iranian and North Korean scientists came before them. While Russia was building Iran’s civilian power facility at Bushehr, side agreements led to the transfer of equipment and exchange of scientists, which assisted Iran’s weapons program at other sites. These actions fooled US intelligence (who believed Iran had stopped its weapons program between 2003 and 2007) and international inspectors. Many experts doubt that Turkey would ever go nuclear. They emphasize that Turkey has signed an additional protocol agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, opening the country up to closer inspections than Iran had to prevent military diversions of nuclear fuel. The fuel, however, isn’t the only issue. As a major study of Iran and similar cases detailed a decade ago, the agency is disadvantaged in tracking the intangible technology and dual-use transfers that are critical to bomb making.

## AFFIRMATIVE

### Perm Do CP

#### “The” allows particulars

**Random House 6** Unabridged Dictionary, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)---GDS> T File

(used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article *a* or *an*): the book you gave me; Come into the house.

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good

#### Cooperation with Turkey draws them into NATO-led initiatives

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However, all is not lost. The Ukrainian crisis has increasing questions about the wisdom of Turkey’s cozy relationship with Russia and a greater appreciation of NATO’s value, recently reiterated by two prominent retired Turkish ambassadors. Interestingly, their reasoning is not that different than the Turkish diplomats and ministers of foreign affairs from the 1940s and 1950s who played a central role in negotiating Turkey’s entry into NATO, revealing the continuity that comes with geography but also the persistent commitment to a Western vocation dating from Ottoman times. Moving forward, revitalizing Turkey’s traditional Western vocation and its NATO membership will be dependent on two developments. Erdoğan is failing to address Turkey’s mounting problems. His approval ratings have dropped from almost 56% at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic to 38.6% at the end of 2021, while the governing AKP has also steadily lost support and was down to 23.9%. Under these circumstances, the opposition stands a growing chance of winning the next elections if they are reasonably free. However, the opposition led by the social democratic People’s Republican Party (CHP) has remained by and large quiet on foreign policy issues and shied from advocating pro-Western policies. This would need to change, and the opposition would need to adopt an informed and rational platform that dispels prejudices and better explains to the public why revitalizing stronger relations with the West would benefit Turkey’s interests. The West needs to do its part too. Foremost, there needs to be a recognition that there is political change in the offing in Turkey. It is far from certain but there is a decent likelihood that the next elections would be won by the opposition. In the meantime, it will be important for the U.S. to recognize that the current crisis over Ukraine has once more shown the strategic value of Turkey to NATO and develop, together with other allies, a constructive narrative that would welcome a post-election Turkey back into the core of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Given the stalling out of its enlargement process, the EU is unlikely to be able to play the robust role it did in reforming Turkish democracy in the 2000s. But just like 70 years ago, Turkey’s NATO membership could become a conduit for mutually reinforcing Turkey’s Western vocation and its democracy while benefiting European security, including that of Ukraine.

#### Incorporating Turkey into the plan ensures Turkish buy-in

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Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion. A Constructive Role for NATO As Turkey and the European Union ramp up their rhetorical joust, it is perhaps no surprise that NATO is better placed to act as a forum for the de-escalation of the crisis. It is indeed Turkey’s membership to NATO, and the daily staff-to-staff contacts which it generates, that makes the alliance able to work as a platform where their diplomats can negotiate, exchange information, and address issues of common strategic interest with European counterparts, thus helping to undermine the “us-versus-them” mentality which at times prevails across E.U. institutions. As the latter hardens its rhetoric, NATO can generate the much-needed safety valve where diplomatic efforts have a chance of succeeding**.** To this end, the alliance should capitalize on the consultative function of its institutions to allow for parties to sit together, express their views and concerns on national and collective security considerations, and improve mechanisms to reach a consensus on the means to address any perceived challenges. Consultations have indeed always been at the core of the alliance, and remain important vectors for addressing intermember disagreements. The recent announcement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that a military de-confliction mechanism would be established between Greece and Turkey is but one example of the productive results that such diplomatic efforts can yield, and an encouraging sign that the two sides are not willing to see their relations deteriorate further. Yet a limited arrangement between Greece and Turkey is also unlikely to address the deep-seated causes of the political turmoil between Ankara and European allies, and NATO should find new and improved ways to act as a forum to discuss, and to act, where necessary, on issues affecting the security interests of its member states. This is key if the organization wants to remain flexible and relevant in the increasingly contested and fast-paced security environment of today.

#### Cooperation brings Turkey back into the NATO fold

Erdemir 12-3-2021, \*Turkey Program Board of Advisors, \*\*Sinan Ciddi, Nonresident Senior Fellow, \*\*\*John Hardie, Research Manager and Senior Research Analyst (Aykan, Collusion or Collision?, FDD, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/12/03/collusion-or-collision/)//BB

Although Erdogan and Putin have found ways of cooperating, often at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners, Turkey’s and Russia’s respective interests and ambitions conflict or diverge on multiple fronts. Washington should seek to leverage these tensions to undermine Erdogan’s collusion with Putin and contain Moscow in the short run, while laying the groundwork to bring Ankara back into the NATO fold in the post-Erdogan era.

#### The aff’s strategic dialogue solves disputes with Turkey – shared values ensure the alliance will be repaired

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While the current standoff between Turkey and the United States appears to be moving from bad to worse, **it has yet to reach** a breaking point or a **point of no return.** Although tensions and policy differences continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment **point to** perhaps **better days to come**, given the resilience and endurance of the **ties that bind the two nations together**. The US perspective on Turkey could be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing in recent months over new border disputes in the Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot gas and oil tracks at sea. Despite these and other policy differences over Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey, **both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage to their alliance**. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military confrontation with the country over Syria. The most hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United States as important to America’s national security interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors. Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by Western standards, **will work toward increasing harmonization toward the U**nited **S**tates **and its NATO allies in the long run. This can only happen through a sustained strategic dialogue.** The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes more visible. There is indeed current evidence for better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding policy and strategic differences. In short, **Turkey is not yet lost**, but there are challenges facing America and its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a fundamental question: What kind of strategic relation- ship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or desire? Clearly, they are at a policy and strategic cross- road. The answer lies in the need for the United States to craft a new strategy toward Turkey and vice versa that takes into account the new realities of Turkish, NATO, and American domestic political dynamics, their changing nature and character, as well as Tur- key’s quest for regional influence and ambitions and its goal of becoming a great regional power. **Turkey, NATO, and the U**nited **S**tates **share Western values, and** **these values**, although not equal for all partners, **are keys to better multicultural harmony if applied properly** across the board.

#### Turkey is pursuing a parallel policy with NATO and will remain an active member of the alliance, despite differences

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Despite the considerable degree of divergence, Ankara acts in parallel but not necessarily against the EU and the United States. In the grand scheme of things, Turkey is tightly connected to the European economy, a fact highlighted by the ongoing recession, which puts at risk EU investors too. Turkish trade with EU members Romania, Greece and Bulgaria is by far more significant than with the Western Balkans, though Serbia is picking up too. On the security side, Turkey pursues a policy independently of NATO and has deepened ties to Russia. **Yet, it remains part of the Alliance and contributes to its initiatives, including those aimed to deter Moscow.** When it comes to the Balkans, Turkey has no alternative to offer to local countries to woo them away from Euro- Atlantic institutions. Its resources are limited, too, in comparison with the collective West. What is also important is that Balkan elites do not necessarily see a trade-off between ties to Western organizations and to Turkey. That is clearly visible in the policy of non-aligned Serbia, which has also been courting Russia, China and the Gulf while negotiating its membership in the EU. But it is also the case of Bulgaria which has emerged as a leading advocate of engagement with Turkey within the Union. The only country in Southeast Europe which has deep-seated concerns and fears about Turkish expansionism is Greece, which has long-standing territorial disputes with its neighbour only made worse by the looming conflict over offshore gas deposits in the proximity of Cyprus. But Greek policymakers have demonstrated the capacity to be flexible and deescalate tensions (Christofis in this issue). Turkey is embedded in the politics, economies and societies of the Balkans. It is an autonomous player, and the cult of Erdoğan has become central to its presence in the region, often with divisive effects. However, **there is no evidence that its actions or policies are geared at replacing the West** as the lynchpin of regional order. Rather, **Turkey is pursuing a parallel policy, which** at times **overlaps with that of the** EU, **US and NATO.**

#### US-Turkey relations can be repaired through multilateralism – neither want the instability of a hostile relationship

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In the recent decade, the U.S. has pursued a strategy to support armed Kurdish groups to repel radical Islamic terror groups, particularly ISIS. Nevertheless, Turkey has become increasingly concerned about the strengthening of the Kurdish administration and its nationalist ambitions. These concerns are pushing Turkey into the arms of U.S. rivals in the region. Both Iran and Russia are expanding their authority in the region by establishing political and military support for radical regimes such as Assad’s in Syria and political and militant movements like Hezbollah. These strategic policies are increasingly connecting Iran’s and Russia’s allies in an ever-strengthening regional security complex. Given these regional circumstances, Turkey finds itself flip-flopping between these rival regional security complexes. The primary cause for current problems in U.S.-Turkey relations is not simply the recent actions of the two countries. The complex view of the IR system facilitates the understanding that the U.S.-Turkey relationship is shaped by the feedback loops generated under both regional and global circumstances. The complexity of the international system can trigger a dramatically different evolution of relations between U.S. and Turkey as a feedback (reaction) caused by the U.S. For example, the U.S. does not hesitate to use methods like arming the YPG, even if these methods hurt former allies such as Turkey. As a result, U.S.-Turkish relations continue to be vulnerable to the U.S. approach toward minority, rebel groups which have problematic bonds with Turkey. The international roles that the U.S. and Turkey pursued for themselves in the post-9/11 era have had consequences for perceptions of historical friendship or hostilities – what the Regional Security Complex Theory ties to cooperative or non-cooperative behavior of states. There were hostility perceptions among Turkish military and Foreign Service chiefs in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union when the U.S. sought to maintain its global supremacy role. Given its resources, the U.S. cannot help but be superior to smaller, poorer states that do not have Washington’s military capacity. The issue is the way in which the U.S. dominates – that is, its treatment of its allies, not considering their strategic security concerns, etc. Turkey was deeply concerned with events in northern Iraq following the 1991 Iraq war. These events amounted to challenge Turkey’s priority of preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The hostility perceptions in Turkey turned to be reciprocal between the U.S. and Turkey thanks to the feedback loops generated by the 9/11 attacks. The unilateral U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks during the Bush administration undermined the U.S.-led liberal international order and played no small role in the inauguration of Trump as a president who questions this order and views local U.S. allies as burdens on the U.S. If we acknowledge that the complexity of the international relations system is at play here, the causal logic of the complexity approach leads us to expect that Turkey’s internal characteristics can pressure systemic transformation – something other than the predictions generated by the regional security complex approach.83 A U.S. that operates with a systemic moral conscience could assist Turkey in managing its affairs. Facing complexity **invokes improving diplomacy and collaboration, adopting multilateral solutions** and soft power **and constructing** some **advanced strategic partnerships**. If the U.S. chooses to nurture its relationships with allies such as Turkey, the erosion of the U.S. position of influence could be mitigated and the U.S. still could be the primary actor in maintaining stability in the Middle East. The underlying message of this paper is that **the U.S. and Turkey are rebuilding their alliance due to various factors.** Both **countries could form a revised alliance as an important constituent of the regional peace system.** Neither of them desires the continuation of the Syrian chaotic status-quo and its accompanying insecurity nor do they desire Iran to dominate with a greater role in Syria or in the Middle East. Clearly, the security of the region is in a state of greater flux today than it has been in the past, yet **tackling the present challenges** in the Middle East **depends on the effective involvement of regional U.S. partners.**

#### Turkey is shifting its foreign policy towards diplomacy – US reciprocation will facilitate it

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The end result of Turkey’s tarnished ties with its traditional allies in the West and its neighborhood(s) have demonstrated the limits of the illusion of Ankara’s strategic autonomy. Indeed, despite its aspiration, **Turkey remains firmly anchored in the Western community of nations.** In addition to being a NATO member, over 40 percent of the country’s exports are destined for EU member states and another 6 percent or so each to the UK and the United States. In addition, Turkey gets most of its foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology from Western countries. EU member states account for almost 70 percent of all incoming FDI, with another nearly 10 per- cent accounted by the United States. Against this backdrop, the 2020 economic downturn, compounded by a sharp drop in FDI, a negative foreign investment balance sheet (excluding real estate), and a lowering of credit risk scores—and, more recently, a spike in inflation and a downturn in the value of the national currency—are to be associated with these frail political relations. The next phase of Turkey’s foreign relations paradigm will therefore be marked **by how well the country’s growing capabilities**—but also its ambitions—**can be reframed to allow for a more cooperative foreign policy** pattern. This objective will in turn require three fundamental changes. The first is the decoupling of foreign policy from domestic political considerations. A new balance will have to be found between the need for a democratic government that is accountable to its electorate and the need for a more mature and predictable foreign policy. This new understanding should be instrumental in containing the proclivities of the ruling elites to instrumentalize foreign policy for domestic goals. This objective will be greatly facilitated by a second, namely the reinstitutionalization of foreign policy. As discussed above, the transition back to a presidential system has led to the erosion of the role of traditional institutions (e.g., ministries) in the policymaking process—to the benefit of the presidential administration. This is also true of foreign policy, where the role of the Foreign Ministry has been diminished. This domain requires re- balancing, which would reempower the traditional institution of policymaking. Such a rebalancing would improve the predictability of Turkey’s foreign policy, as the heavier weight of the relevant institutions could more effectively counter the tendencies fueled by exclusively domestic political considerations. Third, the country’s foreign policy retransformation will be more effective if Turkey’s partners respond positively to such an agenda of change. The United States and the EU—Turkey’s strategic allies in the domains of security, defense, and economy—can help Ankara in its bid to develop a new understanding of how Turkey, as a rising power, can prioritize positive sum scenarios. For instance, **Washington will need to** alter its approach and **start to engage constructively with the Turkish leadership to tackle** the corrosive set of **bilateral problems,** including the ongoing U.S. relationship with the PKK-linked Syrian PYD and the dysfunctionalities in defense industry cooperation. At the same time, the EU will need—at the very least—to cease its obstructionism regarding the launch of an ambitious trade agenda and endorse the start of the negotiations for a modernized Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. The outcome of new negotiations to reach a fair and lasting model of cooperation on the refugee issue will be of equal importance. At bottom, what is at stake in the next decade is the identity of Turkish foreign policy. **A departure from** what marked the past decade—**unilateralism** inspired by a strong yearning for strategic autonomy—**is already under way**. **This change in approach is evident in** the more **recent efforts at diplomatic rapprochement with allies and regional partners**. Ultimately, the success of this transformation will be conditional on a clear demonstration of intent by the country’s leadership that **Turkey**, as a rising power, **needs to establish a more constructive and cooperative relationship with its main allies.**

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good---AT Spoiler

#### Turkey isn’t a terminal spoiler --- there are avenues for cooperation [like the plan]

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Turkey as an awkward partner

Despite the rift between Turkey and the West, Ankara’s Balkan policy is neither disruptive nor entirely beholden to neo-imperialist fantasies. Rather it reflects a mixture of ideology and pragmatic calculations and is often a product of circumstances rather than grand designs. To start with, there is no evidence that Erdogan or the AKP are systematically exporting authoritarian institutions and practices abroad, undermining the West. Authoritarianism in the Balkans is a home-grown phenomenon and not an import. In the 1990s, for instance, both Serbia and Croatia saw the emergence of strongman regimes led respectively by Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman. Such regimes combined democratic and authoritarian elements, e.g. competitive elections in tandem with state capture skewing the playing field, the propagation of illiberal ideology and the suppression of minorities. It would be far-fetched to fault Erdoğan, Putin, Viktor Orbán or anyone else about the rule of law and accountability deficits in a region with historical experience with competitive politics but is still a novice when it comes to democratic governance. External powers may take advantage of state capture and corruption, as they often do, but these are by and large local conditions liable to be exploited (Bechev 2017; Bieber and Tzifakis 2019). Foreign meddling could well exacerbate matters – e.g. Turkey’s partnership with or outright patronage over certain politicians and factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina consolidates their grip on power and public resources – but is not the root cause of democratic dysfunctionality. Secondly, Turkey is not always the lone wolf it appears to be. A ‘neo-Ottoman’ policy would imply that Turkey acts mostly unilaterally instead of through institutions or alliances such as NATO. To be sure, Turkish foreign policy has a strong unilateralist impulse, as many scholars and experts have pointed out. Self-reliance and distrust of foreigners are entrenched in the Turkish public’s perceptions and attitudes (Aydın 2019). Ankara has made moves and asserted its interests in the Balkans, such as providing economic assistance through TİKA), supporting domestic political players aligned with the AKP, funding schools, trying to mediate in regional disputes etc. The same was very much true of the Middle East before the Arab Spring when Davutoğlu was touting the notion of Turkey as an order-setter (düzen kurucu ülke) (Davutoğlu 2001). At the same time, even with President Erdoğan in complete control and nationalism rampant, foreign policy has played along and adapted to multilateral institutions. To give the obvious example, despite its strained relationship with NATO and the EU, Ankara continues to support their enlargement to the Balkans, as in the AKP’s early years of power. Rather than pursue an obstructionist strategy, as does Russia, and try to wean countries into its diplomatic orbit, it ratified without delay Montenegro and North Macedonia’s NATO accession treaty. There is no rhetorical or substantive opposition from Ankara vis-à-vis the EU’s expansion (Daily Sabah 2020). That makes sense from a purely rational perspective. Bringing new members also means expanded market access for Turkey thanks to the Customs Union with the EU. Notably, Turkey is amongst the top five export markets for Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, all members of the Union.7 In short, there still remains a multilateral dimension to Turkey’s engagement with the Balkans, even if it gets overshadowed by Erdoğan’s leader-to-leader diplomacy (Büyük and Öztürk 2019). To sum up, despite the overarching trends towards de-Europeanization affecting both Turkey and the Balkans, there remains institutional ties and economic ties that bind them both in the Western sphere. This creates space for Turkey and Western actors to join forces in the region on an ad hoc basis.

#### They aren’t a terminal spoiler. There’s room for cooperation.

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Turkey is embedded in the politics, economies and societies of the Balkans. It is an autonomous player, and the cult of Erdoğan has become central to its presence in the region, often with divisive effects. However, there is no evidence that its actions or policies are geared at replacing the West as the lynchpin of regional order. Rather, Turkey is pursuing a parallel policy, which at times overlaps with that of the EU, US and NATO.

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good---AT S-400’s

#### Turkey only bought S-400s from russia because there was no US agreement on modalities

Pamir et al 20-- Ahmet Üzümcü- Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006 (“Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat,” European leadership network, 16 December 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat/)//mcu

Bashing Turkey in international fora has become fashionable. Some suggest that Turkey is no longer a reliable or trustworthy member of NATO. Some go further, claiming that Turkey is a liability, ignoring its history as a staunch ally. As former Turkish Ambassadors to NATO, we believe that a healthy dose of reality should be injected into this debate, which risks descending into a blame game in which only NATO’s opponents stand to gain. For the good of NATO and Turkey we offer some constructive proposals and perspectives to restore a sense of balance. First, we should seek to understand and resolve the one issue overshadowing all else, the Turkish purchase of Russian made S-400 air defence systems and the U.S. decision to both disengage Turkey from the F35 programme and to place some sanctions on it. It should be remembered that Turkey wanted to buy US air defence systems but there was no agreement on the modalities. Nevertheless, this impasse in bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S., and therefore within the Alliance, must and can be overcome with a modicum of give-and-take on both sides. In our opinion, the issue of the Russian-made S-400s could be satisfactorily resolved if Turkey makes a verifiable pledge within NATO not to activate the system and the U.S. takes a decision in parallel to reverse its position on the exclusion of Turkey from the F35 programme and on the recently imposed sanctions. Such conciliatory moves should be complemented by a decision, backed by Alliance solidarity, to enable Turkey to reach a deal on the joint production of a missile defence system under a generous technology sharing agreement. We firmly believe that such a compromise is achievable.

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good---AT Russia

#### Turkey and Russia engage in conflict over cooperation.

Antoine Got 20. Fellow, Geneva Center for Security Policy. M.A., International Relations, University of Edinburgh. "Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO." War on the Rocks. 11-19-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART

Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion.

### AT Expulsion---No Link

#### Turkey chooses NATO first.

Yaprak Gürsoy and Ilke Toygür 18. Yaprak, Lecturer, Aston University. Ilke, Adjunct Professor, Carlos III University of Madrid. “Turkey in and out of NATO? An instance of a turbulent alliance with Western institutions." Elcano Royal Institute. 6-11-2018. https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ari73-2018-gursoy-toygur-turkey-in-out-nato-turbulent-alliance-western-institutions.pdf. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART

What does Turkey expect from its cooperation with Russia? First and foremost, it has a bargaining chip to be used against its Western partners. This type of flirtation threatens the alliance and forces the NATO powers to support Turkey’s agenda in Syria. However, Turkey is aware that Russia is an unreliable partner and that in the long-run it is no benefit to be outside NATO. That is why, for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs declarations continue to stress Turkey’s place in NATO and why Turkey continues to support its NATO allies’ air strikes against Damascus. It seems that if Turkey is pressed to decide between NATO and Russia, it will continue to choose NATO.

#### Turkey would never alienate NATO.

Dr. Mehmet Yegin 19. Assistant Professor, Istinye University. "Turkey between NATO and Russia: the failed balance: Turkey's S-400 purchase and implications for Turkish relations with NATO." German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63534/ssoar-2019-yegin-Turkey\_between\_NATO\_and\_Russia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-yegin-Turkey\_between\_NATO\_and\_Russia.pdf. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART

In terms of alliance dependence, Turkey would not put the peace and deterrence provided by NATO at risk in a volatile neighborhood. This approach includes Russia-originated threats. Despite conjunctural cooperation between Turkey and Russia, the chances for a new strategic axis centered on the two countries is improbable. Rather, NATO is an important asset for Turkey, even in developing its relations with Russia, as membership eases the threat of domination by Moscow. As a NATO member, Turkey can rely on deterrence that discourages regional adversaries from engaging in a full-scale military campaign against Turkey. This deterrence is no less important than having particular weapons, such as S-400s. NATO also supports inter-alliance peace between Turkey and Greece, thereby sustaining a delicate balance to prevent the Aegean dispute from turning into a military confrontation. Turkey has a long-term policy of participating in the international organizations that Greece joins in order to maintain parity. Leaving the most crucial one – NATO – would put Turkey in the difficult position of confronting the alliance alone. Lastly, Turkey would not want to give up the NATO nuclear umbrella, given that some of its neighbors possess (Russia) or are striving for the capability of developing (Iran) nuclear weapons.

#### Turkey won’t leave

Synergia Foundation 19 (NATO AND TURKEY: AN IMMINENT DIVORCE?, https://www.synergiafoundation.org/insights/analyses-assessments/nato-and-turkey-imminent-divorce)

Stung by the continued rejection of its EU membership on grounds of its “poor human rights record”, the authoritarian Erdogan just does not have the incentive to toe NATO line.

Suspension of GSP benefits and increasing pressure from the Senate to impose sanctions on Turkey under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) will only widen the gap between Turkey and NATO.

However, Turkey is unlikely to unilaterally opt out of the alliance because the alliance does have many benefits apart from the prestige of being a member of NATO.

Hardening of the Turkish stand will impinge on conflict resolution in Syria where Turkish national goals are at a tangent to Western plans. Here, Turkey may leverage Russia to checkmate US and its allies.

#### Turkey won’t leave NATO or respond to the plan

TASS 5-30 (TASS, 30 MAY 2022, “Turkey will not leave NATO, but press for its interests — expert,” <https://tass.com/world/1458067?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com>; accessed 6/23/2022) ng

MOSCOW, May 30. /TASS/. Turkey will continue to pursue an independent military policy, but will refrain from "challenging" the United States or quitting the North Atlantic alliance, the head of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, told TASS on Monday. "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while being a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance, pursues an independent, externally unrestrained military policy. The way I see it, he will continue like this this further on," Kortunov said. Erdogan "firmly defends his interests, for he is well aware that Turkey will not be expelled from NATO, while he will not leave on his own," the analyst said. At the same time, Kortunov predicts Ankara’s conflicts with NATO. "There will be harsh statements and threats from both sides, but I don't think it will come to Turkey's withdrawal or expulsion from NATO. It would cost both sides too much." Turkey’s interests Without Turkey, Kortunov explained, "NATO's southern flank will lose a lot, if not everything," since the country is the bloc’s leading member and its armed forces are inferior only to those of the US. For this reason, he continued, the Turkish leadership will be pressing for concessions from the US and EU countries, "but it will never challenge them." Erdogan has a whole list of complaints against the United States, Kortunov recalled. For instance, Turkey wants the lifting sanctions related to its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense systems and its return to the US F-35 fighter program. "There is as great deal to bargain about. Clearly, Erdogan will not get everything, but he will be able to get something in the end," he believes. The expert also suggested that the Turkish side might be able to defend its interests on the issue of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. For one, the Turkish leadership wants these countries to curtail their traditional support for the Kurdish opposition. "I think they will eventually come to an agreement. Here, concessions are expected not only from Stockholm, but also from Brussels," Kortunov explained. While commenting on the Turkish leader's contacts with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the expert noted: "In the alliance, no one would want Erdogan to play his own game with Moscow behind its back. But it be impossible to prevent it, so they will have to leave everything as it is." The analyst stressed that Turkey had long had a very special relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance and declared certain interests that often do not coincide with the stance of other NATO members. The Turkish leadership, Kortunov forecasts, will continue to pursue a policy that, in a sense, might violate the unity of the bloc. "However, in this regard, Erdogan will go as far as he will be allowed to," he stressed. "He will be declaring his special interests in Libya or the Eastern Mediterranean, he will put himself in opposition to some European countries, or position himself as a global advocate of Islam, but I don't think he will go to extremes."

### Expulsion Bad---L-List

#### Turkish inclusion into NATO solves Russia, Middle Eastern and Caucasus war

Hess 6-22-2022, Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Maximillian, “Why the West Should Make Peace With Erdogan Now: He is the one unsavory character the West urgently needs better relations with.,” Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921)//BB>

The democratic West has a long and controversial history of entering alliances of convenience with dictators and strongmen around the world—unsavory but necessary partners in confronting threats to the international order. Denounced as ethically dubious, this sort of stance is also realist, balance-of-power politics par excellence. It enabled the world to unite to defeat Adolf Hitler in World War II and the West to win the Cold War. Atop the list of unsavory partners the West urgently needs better relations with today sits Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. That he is unsavory is clear: He has actively undermined Turkish democracy, undone decades of liberalization, weaponized migration, terrorized the Kurdish minority both at home and in neighboring Syria, and helped Iran violate U.S. sanctions. Most recently, he has threatened to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. It will take a long time before the West can genuinely trust him. However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February. At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival. The West also needs Turkey on its side in the economic war against Russia. Ankara’s support alone can restrict the flow of sanctioned Russian goods in and out of the Black Sea, which continue even as Ukrainian ships are stuck in port. Ankara’s help is crucial in cutting ratlines for Russian money and kleptocrats. Turkey has become a major destination for Russian money (and oligarchs’ yachts) fleeing sanctions and plays a growing role in supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new autarkic economy. Turkey is one of the few major countries that freely accept Russian payment, undercutting the impact of Western banking sanctions. Bringing Turkey onboard would plug one of the largest holes in the sanctions regime. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. But most importantly, Turkey will be a key player in the reordering of European energy supplies, not least because it controls energy access through a number of crucial pipelines. The key to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor strategy, for example, is gas from Azerbaijan supplied via Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines—inaugurated in 2018 and 2020, respectively—and feeding into the European gas grid in the Balkans and Italy. Erdogan is also actively seeking to develop Turkey’s own gas resources and potentially even link Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to the European pipeline network. Such efforts are of course complicated by Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and its surrounding waters. A revived European-Turkish partnership may be the only way the Eastern Mediterranean’s rich energy resources can be fully utilized. Such a partnership might also nudge Erdogan to make an about-face vis-à-vis Russia, where the inauguration of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 signaled a new high point in Turkish-Russian relations. Finally, aligning with Erdogan would offer the West more geostrategic leverage over the Kremlin beyond the war in Ukraine. Turkey is also a key player in three additional conflicts where Russia is involved: Syria, Libya, and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan moved from a policy of benign neglect to active intervention in these conflicts over the past decade, motivated by a desire to boost Turkey’s role as a regional power independent of the West. A resumed partnership with Erdogan offers further pressure points in the effort to constrain Moscow’s global influence. For Erdogan’s drift away from the West and closer relations with Moscow to be reversed, it is important to understand what motivated it. Today, the West is paying a price for failing to listen to his concerns. The drift initially began in 2011, as the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Erdogan was ebullient, as the uprisings offered the prospect of bringing Islamists similar to himself to power across the region. He felt betrayed when then-U.S. President Barack Obama failed to uphold his redlines in Syria and abandoned then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and publicly backed by Erdogan, when the Egyptian military ousted Morsi in a coup. “Turkey has learned the hard way that the U.S. is unwilling to invest in the region,” Muhammet Kocak, an international relations specialist based in Ankara, told me. Similarly, “Turkey’s security concerns have not been perceived as a particularly relevant issue in the NATO agenda,” said Elizabete Aunina, a doctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam focused on Turkish security policy. But what accelerated Erdogan’s drift away from the West—and shift to Moscow—was his sense of betrayal after the 2016 failed Turkish coup, which he publicly accused the United States of fostering. He also felt abandoned by his NATO allies when Washington withdrew its Patriot missile defense systems from Turkey and when NATO barely even reacted after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter aircraft intruding on its airspace, the first such incident involving NATO and Russian or Soviet airpower in 60 years. Since then, Erdogan felt that Moscow offered a better route to improving his regional and domestic position. Turkish-Russian cooperation since then includes the TurkStream pipeline, plans for Russia to build a $20 billion nuclear power plant in Turkey, and the 2017 announcement that Ankara would buy Moscow’s S-400 missile defense system. And although Turkey and Russia have occasionally sparred—they back differing sides in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars, for example—relations have remained broadly warm and manageable. That only increases the potential strategic leverage the West would gain if it reversed Erdogan’s orientation. What carrot could the West offer Erdogan for abandoning Moscow? Turkey’s economic crisis may be just the opportunity. With annual inflation reaching 73.5 percent in May, currency reserves near all-time lows, and the Turkish lira down by 30 percent versus the dollar year-to-date following a 44 percent drop in 2021, Turkey’s risk of default has spiked. Foreign investors have fled the market. Desperately searching for fresh foreign capital, Erdogan even patched up relations with his key regional rival, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It would be better for the West to offer Erdogan an economic lifeline than to allow Moscow to do so. The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, for example, should consider offering Erdogan a currency swap line, a stabilizing instrument they have significantly expanded in recent decades. Access to dollars and euros could alleviate many of Ankara’s mounting economic challenges and set the stage for a more cooperative partnership. Erdogan knows he has a strong hand and is likely to make other demands. He has already exerted his leverage over Sweden’s and Finland’s desired accession to NATO, linking it to a freer hand for Turkey against the Syrian Kurds, who have been the West’s valiant allies in the fight against the Islamic State. Earlier this month, Erdogan announced plans for a new operation targeting them. He may well make demands about other regional interests, and he will certainly seek to blunt Western criticism of his domestic governance. These concessions could prove costly to other Western interests. There is clear hesitancy to engage Erdogan at the moment. The West’s strategy appears to be to “count on the possibility Erdogan will lose the [June 2023] elections,” according to Kocak. Counting on Erdogan to allow a free and fair election and a potential peaceful transfer of power a year from now is idealistic at best and hopelessly naive at worst. Erdogan is an unsavory character and will likely remain one. But it is in the West’s interest that he be on its side—not Russia’s—in order to weaken Putin and ensure Ukraine’s survival. The opportunity is there, and it would be unwise of the West not to try.

### Expulsion Bad---Turkish Aggression

#### Turkey expulsion collapse Black Sea deterrence, sparks Greece-Turkey war, and creates a European refugee crisis.

Peter Pry 19, chief of staff of the Congressional EMP Commission and served on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee and at the CIA, “Expelling Turkey from NATO would create a dangerous foe”, TheHill,10-23-2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466747-expelling-turkey-from-nato-would-create-a-dangerous-foe///SJ>

Some analysts evaluate Turkey as among the most militarily powerful nations, ranking ninth among 137 military powers worldwide.

Do we really want to kick Turkey out of NATO and have its military power and strategic geography aligned with Russia?

Geographically, Turkey occupies some of the most strategically important territory in the world. It is the only NATO member state in the Middle East, bordering Syria and Iraq, near Lebanon and Israel, a region that has been — and continues to be — the crucial crossroads of empire and history since biblical times. Turkey controls the Bosporus Straits, Marmara Sea and Dardanelles Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, giving it the capability to contain Russia’s powerful Black Sea Fleet. Turkey’s geographic location and strong military makes it the anchor of NATO’s southern flank against Russian aggression.

Turkey also is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, with 98 airports capable of supporting NATO air operations over the Middle East, Black Sea and the Balkans.

It is one of only five NATO states (the others being Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands) storing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. Some 50 B-61 nuclear bombs are bunkered at Incirlik Air Force Base, controlled by U.S. personnel stationed there.

Washington’s foreign policy elites are so fixated on recent Kurdish contributions to defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) that they seem to have forgotten Turkey’s much longer record as an ally of the U.S. and NATO:

* Turkey fought alongside the U.S. during the Korean War (1950-1953).
* During the early Cold War, Turkey agreed to basing U.S. nuclear bombers and IRBMs on its territory, making Turkey a nuclear target for the USSR. (President Kennedy was able to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union and resolve the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis by secretly promising Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to remove the U.S. IRBMs.)
* Turkey joined the U.S. and NATO in bombing Bosnia during Operation Deliberate Force (1995).
* Turkey joined the U.S. and NATO in bombing Serbia during Operation Allied Force (1999).
* Turkey participated in Baltic Sea air patrols demonstrating support for the NATO Baltic states (2006).
* For years and continuing today, Turkish forces have participated in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo.
* Turkey provided military and intelligence support to U.S. operations that destroyed the ISIS terrorist “caliphate.”

Turkey’s membership in NATO quelled the long cycle of conflicts and wars with Greece, also a NATO member. Significantly, even Turkey’s controversial invasion of Cyprus in 1974 did not trigger a war with Greece, in no small part because both are NATO members.

Unfortunately, Turkey under President Erdogan is abandoning secularism and democratic norms, becoming an Islamist authoritarian state, and pulling away from the U.S. and NATO. Indeed, Erdogan is beginning to align Turkey with Russia, buying Russian military equipment over U.S. objections.

Erdogan even has threatened to develop nuclear weapons, which justifies withdrawing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. Yet Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Middle East allies all have legitimate fear of Iran developing nuclear missiles, so threatened nuclear proliferation by Turkey and others may be a sign of U.S. failure to uphold its alliance obligations through credible extended nuclear deterrence and other means.

Turkey controls the flow of Middle Eastern refugees into European NATO, a crucial role whereby a friendly Turkey can help stabilize its neighbors — or an unfriendly Turkey could unleash a human flood into Europe.

Israel, too, will be better served if Turkey remains in NATO and, thus, a moderating influence on Islamist Erdogan, who eventually may be replaced by a secular leader. Imagine the threat to U.S. and Israeli interests if Turkey leaves NATO and becomes another Islamist rogue state like Iran.

Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO may, or may not, be historically inevitable. But the United States should do everything possible to keep such a valuable ally in NATO and prevent Turkey from becoming a dangerous foe.

### Expulsion Bad---NATO

#### NATO needs turkey—acts as a peace bridge to the middle east, Muslim majority, and decisive ally versu China and Russia

**Oguzlu** 15- Associate Prof. Dr. in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, taken from Bilkent University in 2003. He holds a Master of Science degree in IR, taken from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2000 and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken from Bilkent University in 1998 (Tarik Oguzlu, “TURKEY’S NATO MEMBERSHIP IS AN ASSET FOR BOTH TURKEY AND THE ALLIANCE,” https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/analysis-by-tho-contributors-and-liaisons/turkeys-nato-membership-is-an-asset-for-both-turkey-and-the-alliance-9620)//mcu

Just as Turkey derives immense benefits from NATO membership, the alliance in general and the United States in particular also benefit from Turkey's membership. First, since its entry to the alliance Turkey has played a key role in European security by shielding the continent from the east and the south. Turkey does not only act as a buffer zone insulating the Kantian Europe from the Hobbesian Middle East but also as a spearhead enabling NATO allies to reach out to the Caucasus, Black Sea, Central Asia and wider Middle East. During the Cold War Turkey acted as a bulwark against Soviet penetration into the wider Middle East and helped lessen the Soviet military pressure on central Europe by tying up sizable Soviet troops. Turkey's role as an unsinkable aircraft carrier has been well noted. Second, Turkey is the only ally within NATO which has a Muslim-majority population. Turkey's membership serves as an antidote to the claims that NATO is an alliance of Christian nations. This has become more and more important in the post-9/11 era, as civilizational and identity-related considerations have increasingly colored international politics. For NATO's military operations across the globe not to be seen as biased against Islamic nations, Turkey's presence inside the alliance has been vitally important. Third, if the Biden administration is sincere about revitalizing the rules-based international order and committed to strengthening NATO as a bulwark against Russia and China, securing Turkey’s cooperation within NATO would be decisive. Turkey is too important an ally to lose to the Russian-Chinese axis. Fourth, as NATO's current Secretary General has underlined many times, Turkey's cooperation within NATO has been vital to the defeat of radical religious terrorism in the wider Middle East. Besides, Turkey is home to millions of refugees who would like to otherwise go to European countries. Fifth, having the second largest army within the alliance and participated in almost all NATO military operations to date, Turkey has decisively contributed to NATO's overall military capabilities. Turkey's participation in multinational NATO operations in Afghanistan and taking command of it numerous times speak volumes in this regard. Turkey hosting the upcoming negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban could potentially facilitate the peace process. Sixth, Turkey's membership in NATO provides western countries with important opportunities to have an influence on Turkey's international and internal policies/orientation as well. Why to lose this prerogative by pushing Turkey further away from the alliance? All in all, both Turkey and NATO allies gain from Turkey’s membership. Unless NATO turns out to become an ideological weapon at the hands of the liberal hawkish cabals in the West, Turkey would feel quite comfortable within the alliance.

#### Expulsion of turkey weakens NATO—increased antagonism, influence, loss of second largest military and Incirlik Air Base

Blaha 19- graduated from the University of Michigan School of Education in 2012. Prior to law school, he served as a Logistics Officer in the United States Army (JONATHAN BLAHA, “Married for Life? Can and should NATO divorce itself from Turkey?,” MJIL, <http://www.mjilonline.org/married-for-life-can-and-should-nato-divorce-itself-from-turkey/>)//mcu

While NATO may ultimately be able to expel Turkey, it would not be in NATO’s best interest to do so. First, the expulsion of Turkey could lead to increased antagonism between Turkey and NATO. Second, the loss of Turkey’s military contributions would be a significant loss to the alliance. Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus placed it in conflict with fellow NATO member Greece.[23] While NATO membership did not prevent the conflict, in part because Cyprus was not a member of NATO, Cyprus has maintained an uneasy peace since the invasion, managing to accede to the European Union in May of 2004.[24] An unaligned Turkey may be more likely to disrupt the peace in Cyprus, which is not a NATO member and may not be defended by the international community. The preserved peace in Cyprus, and the value of the NATO forum for preserving that peace, may be instructive for influencing potential future actions by Turkey. While the results of Turkey’s incursion into Kurdish controlled parts of Syria are currently unknown, NATO is more likely to influence Turkey as a member than a non-member potentially allied with Russia. Additionally, a loss of Turkey’s military contributions to NATO would significantly weaken the alliance. Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base serves a critical role in NATO operations. At the peak of the fighting, missions from the base dropped an average of 180 bombs per day.[25] Turkey is the geographically nearest member to Syria and Russia, as well as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,[26] and a loss of the base would hamper NATO operations in the region. NATO has invested over $5,000,000,000 on infrastructure in Turkey.[27] The importance of Incirlik Air Base to NATO was affirmed by the inclusion of $48,000,000 for its improvement in the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2018.[28] In addition to its strategically vital location, Turkey’s military contributions to the alliance would be missed. Turkey has the second-largest military in NATO, larger than the third and fourth largest militaries combined,[29] as well as the seventh-highest defense expenditures.[30] Turkey has been part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan since 2001 and may have advantages in peace brokering due to shared Islamic religion.[31] There are clear benefits to maintaining Turkey’s membership and this course of action has advocates.[32] However, the question of membership may not matter. The United States is considering removing nuclear weapons from Turkey .[33] This would signal that NATO does not trust Turkey, making it a member in name only, and one unaligned with the rest of NATO, making the question of membership strategically irrelevant.

#### Nukes in İncirlik are key to NATO nuclear defense

Ergin 21- B.A. degree in international relations from Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, Ergin has been active in journalism since 1975 when he began to work for Turkish News Agency as a general assignment reporter. He served as diplomatic reporter at daily Cumhuriyet’s Ankara office from 1979 to 1987. (Sedat Ergin, “What Biden said about nuclear weapons at İncirlik base and what he can do,” Daily News, May 06 2021, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/sedat-ergin/what-biden-said-about-nuclear-weapons-at-incirlik-base-and-what-he-can-do-164487)//mcu

İncirlik’s place on NATO’s nuclear deterrence In other words, when Biden was entering the presidential run of 2020, he started out stating his discomfort regarding the nuclear weapons in Turkey. The person who has expressed such worry is currently sitting at the White House. Can these statements of Biden reflect on the policies he will follow during his presidency? Let’s try to answer this question by examining the moves Biden has made on foreign policy. Biden sees strengthening transatlantic ties, that is, relations between the U.S. and Europe, and institutional cooperation structures as one of his primary foreign policy goals. In this context, NATO appears as the most strategic institution for the U.S. president. His strategy against Russia, which NATO continues to see as the main threat, is to protect nuclear deterrence, as reflected in all relevant documents of the alliance. In this context, we can remember the decisions of the NATO summit in Brussels in 2018. According to these, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is based on “the nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. in the allied countries in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by the relevant allied countries” - as well as the contributions of the U.S. strategic forces and the U.K. and France. One of the “relevant allied countries” is Turkey. Without a doubt, İncirlik has a very essential place in the infrastructure provided to the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. By allowing the possession of U.S. nuclear weapons in İncirlik and becoming the host to these weapons, Turkey has assumed a significant role in NATO’s nuclear deterrence. In this respect, İncirlik forms one of the most critical pillars of NATO’s nuclear umbrella under current conditions. Of course, the proximity of this base to not only Russia but also to the Middle East is undoubtedly a factor that needs to be taken into account. Biden will continue the old policy but… Given that İncirlik is so heavily integrated into NATO’s nuclear planning, it seems unrealistic to expect Biden’s sentiment in his interview with New York Times to be reflected in the U.S. official policy - unless there arises a major policy change. Next month, the NATO summit in Brussels, where Erdoğan and Biden will meet face to face for the first time in the new period, will probably be finalized with a result that will emphasize NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy once again. Nevertheless, if the Turkish-U.S. relations do not enter a period of recovery and continue to be the scene of crises as they are today, the possibility of further strengthening of the questioning view of the U.S. press, opinion leaders and the U.S. public opinion regarding the nuclear inventory in İncirlik should not be underestimated.

### Expulsion Bad---Prolif

#### Kicking Turkey out causes fast prolif

F Stephen Larabee 13, PhD in Political Science, holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation, served as vice president and director of studies of the Institute of East–West Security Studies in New York, “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, RAND, 2013, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RR200/RR258/RAND\_RR258.sum.pdf//SJ

Turkey’s approach to the nuclear issue will heavily depend on U.S. policy and the credibility of the commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to Article V of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. As long as Turkey feels that NATO takes seriously Turkish security concerns, Ankara is unlikely to rethink its nuclear policy. However, if Turkish confidence in the U.S. and NATO commitment to its security weakens, Ankara could begin to explore other options for ensuring its security, including the possible acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent. Thus, maintaining the credibility of the commitment of alliance members to Article V remains critical.

#### Regional arms racing and nuclear war

Adam Garfinkle 18, Founding Editor of The American Interest and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs”, American Interest, 09-03-2018, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs///SJ

Now, the logic of the security dilemma is such that in the absence of the credible U.S. provision of extended deterrence, Turkey would feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities, illustrates the stability of Turkish trust in U.S. protection—until recently—and the ability of both sides to bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements. As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers.

But of course if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons for such a purpose, other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire their own weapons, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 They have already practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course.

Indeed, that kind of hedging behavior is exactly what analysts have discussed for many years now as the so-called N+ danger inherent in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. It is not just the danger posed by Iranian nuclear weapons, bad enough as that would be, but the mousetrap effect of proliferation that would likely drive other states to want such an insurance policy: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, and so on.

Now, some observers have argued that nuclear weapons are really not very important after all. If the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China, France, and the United Kingdom, survived the Cold War without any nuclear use, it must be because deterrence is easy and hence stable, since all rational people know that the weapons are unusable save for the since-become-impossible exception of a state holding a monopoly over them. One well-known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued persistently that the more nuclear the weapons the better—because they would sober everyone up and lead to more stability and fewer wars. Happily, those with actual government responsibility did not agree.

It is unspeakably lazy thinking to glibly superimpose the U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence experience onto places like the Middle East. It is, after all, one thing to maintain stable deterrence when there are only two, or a small number of, nuclear powers, and quite another to maintain stable deterrence when the number of nuclear actors gets larger and becomes somewhat open-ended as more states lean that way. Under such conditions it becomes much more difficult to calculate what a sufficient deterrent is, and so efforts to make sure of having “enough” can touch off a multilateral arms competition in which sufficiency becomes an ever-moving target, almost impossible to hit. At the same time it becomes much more difficult to imagine crisis stability if one or more states resort to launch-on-warning deployment postures, which are more likely when young arsenals are small and unprotectable against preemptive attack.

Other important potential differences between U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence and potential multiparty deterrence in the Middle East exist, too. Let us note just three.

First, U.S. and Soviet arsenals displayed clear lines of civil-military authority in highly institutionalized state systems, but many Middle Eastern countries lack both such clear lines of authority and highly institutionalized arrangements, being instead looser and more personalized by nature.

Second, it was taken for granted that both U.S. and Soviet leaderships cared about the safety of their populations, a necessary assumption for effective deterrence. But in some heterogeneous and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries this premise may not so surely apply—think both Iraq and Syria under minoritarian (and coincidentally Ba‘athi) leadership, both of which committed mass murder against its own citizens.

And third, U.S.-Soviet deterrence operations became inextricably bound up in the minds of observers with intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The result is that some people today think that if missiles can be limited in one way or another, then the dangers of nuclear weapons, even if they come to exist, would be much mitigated. This is delusional because it is technologically obtuse. You need intercontinental ballistic missiles if you’re trying to shoot a warhead across an ocean. But if your enemy target is not across an ocean, but, as in the Middle East, quite nearby, airplanes are immensely less expensive and more reliable as delivery systems.

The basic point is that in both theory and practice, there is little difference between the proliferation stimulating effects of a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout and an Iranian one. So if the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership unravels, logic does indeed suggest a Turkish effort to develop its own nuclear capabilities. (Of course, the same kinds of pressures pertain to other key countries were they to lose, one way or another, their U.S. nuclear umbrellas, including Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others.)

If that happens, the Turkish government could probably develop deliverable nuclear warheads at least on its side of the ocean within two to three years. If the Iranian government had thought for its own good reasons to avoid overt testing and breakout postures once the nuclear deal expires by calendar or “is expired” by volition, a Turkish bomb would make that posture far more difficult to justify. One could therefore imagine a situation of twinned or near-simultaneous breakouts of Turkish and Iranian nuclear weapons even a mere three, four, or five years from now. The shock to the region would be profound, and possibly very dangerous.

### ---xt: Prolif---Link

#### NATO prevents Turkish prolif now---but it’s the last barrier.

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Turkey’s approach to the nuclear issue will heavily depend on U.S. policy and the credibility of the commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO**) members to Article V of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. As long as Turkey feels that NATO takes seriously Turkish security concerns, Ankara is unlikely to rethink its nuclear policy. However, if Turkish confidence in the U.S. and NATO commitment to its security weakens, Ankara could begin to explore other options for ensuring its security, **including the possible acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent.** Thus, maintaining the credibility of the commitment of alliance members to Article V remains critical.

#### Studies prove

Philip Baxter 15, Ph.D. Candidate in International Affairs, Science, and Technology at the Georgia Institute of Technology and a Senior Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Turkey’s Nuclear Move: Deciphering the Developments”, https://duckofminerva.com/2015/10/turkeys-nuclear-move-deciphering-the-developments.html

A recent [article](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898) in the National Interest by Hans Rühle, former Head of the Planning Staff in the German Ministry of Defense, argues that Turkey is positioning itself similarly to Iran in its leveraging of civilian nuclear power for potential nuclear weapons breakout capability. His argument, meant largely to justify German spying on the NATO-ally, posits that since Turkey is developing nuclear power plants, potentially developing its own nuclear fuel production capacity, and does not have a provision for spent nuclear fuel to be return to suppliers (a provision not necessary if producing fuel domestically), it is obviously shadowing the Iranian proliferation formula. These arguments are significantly flawed. While the Turkish movement into the nuclear arena could be afforded more clarity, particularly on the heels of a decade of efforts to corral the Iranian program, nefarious purposes should not be assumed; nor, are they immediately apparent. Rühle argues that the size of the nuclear industry that Turkey is planning, as well as the amount of fuel that would be needed to supply that industry, would provide ample material for a nuclear weapon. From a purely technical perspective, nuclear fuel from most civilian power reactors is not ideal for a weapons program. Turkey plans to construct four light-water pressurized reactors. These light-water reactors make breeding the type of plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons difficult – as purity is key in having a safe and reliable arsenal. Rühle dismisses the point that the less-pure plutonium from a civilian power reactor would not be used for military program. Rather, Ruhle argues that regardless of plutonium purity, a state will seek to acquire any form of nuclear material and use it for a nuclear arsenal. However, the quality of plutonium is a critical factor in understanding and forecasting proliferation strategies. Not all plutonium is created equal. Having impure plutonium in a nuclear arsenal, an arsenal that a nation would use to deter attack by other states, would be extremely dangerous. When uranium (particularly civilian reactor-grade uranium) is used in a power reactor, plutonium-239, the fissile material used for the production of nuclear weapons, is created. However, other by-products and isotopes of plutonium are also generated. The ratio of these by-products depends on the type of fuel you start with and how long the fuel is used in a power reactor. The longer it is in there, the less pure the plutonium output. While Rühle dismisses this point, other isotopes of plutonium which would be created in the civilian power reactor would be dangerous in a nuclear arsenal, particularly Pu-240 due to its unstable neutron flux which makes the long-term viability of the warhead questionable. With a quicker decay rate than Pu-239, comes the potential for spontaneously released neutrons – which is what starts the chain reaction to detonation. In the short-term, this is less of an issue, but the risk of unintended detonation increases over time. For a state that wishes to have a nuclear arsenal that will be able to deter the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons, a stable arsenal is critical for reliable use if necessary and for the warheads not to detonate on your own territory. The type of reactor that is used is also important. The reactor models that Turkey plans to build make hiding illicit activities, such as diverting material, difficult. Reloading the fuel in the models being sought halts reactor operations and would stop operations for days or weeks at time. Turkey desperately needs energy. It imports roughly [90% of its oil and natural gas, and is heavily reliant on coal](https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Turkey/turkey.pdf). Domestic energy production, particularly electricity, is lacking. Expanding its energy capacity is critical to Turkey’s economic development strategy. Shuttering a nuclear reactor for weeks or months at a time in order to extract costly fuel does not align with this policy objective. Further, plans for a nuclear energy sector of two dozen or so power reactors, with contracts in place already for eight, points to a desperate need for energy, not a mask for illicit activities. There are also significant differences in Iran and Turkey’s nuclear sectors. Iran purchased one power facility, Bushehr, from Russia, and then justified its expansion of uranium enrichment by the need for medical isotopes. This justification enabled Iran to enrich up to 20% U-235, which accounts for roughly 80% of the work load to get to weapons-grade material. In terms of breakout capacity, this strategy is designed to conduct enrichment in the open, and then quickly escalate to weapons-grade. Turkey, on the other hand, is justifying its nuclear expansion for economic reasons, driven by shortages in energy. Additionally, recent studies have found that a [lucrative market for mining and fuel production](https://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Turkey/) could be developed in Turkey. With developing nuclear energy sectors in number of countries (China, Vietnam, UAE, etc.), uranium ore and fuel services will likely be in greater demand. Again, the economic motivations appear to outweigh the security explanations. Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency would also have greater access in Turkey than it did in Iran in the early years of the Iranian program. Currently, Turkey is a member in good standing and a signatory to the [Additional Protocol](https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol) (AP). The current safeguards regime in Turkey, which includes the advanced monitoring and access that comes from the AP, requires early notification and cooperation with the IAEA as sites that deal with nuclear energy are developed. This access is well beyond what Iran was subjected to during the early stages of its program. As Turkey expands into nuclear energy, be it mining and milling or energy production, under the current safeguards regime, the IAEA would be engaged during the planning stages and would be able to identify at the outset possible anomalies. Turkey, in order to move into the nuclear arena, also [signed a Cooperative Nuclear Agreement](https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc90/html/CDOC-110hdoc90.htm), known informally as a 123 Agreement, with the United States in 2008. This agreement places stringent controls on the technologies that Turkey receives from the US, or the technologies from any other state that has a 123 Agreement with the US. With the IAEA safeguards system and other international regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, this additional layer of protection would help to prohibit illicit use of materials Finally, Turkey’s external security outlook and alliance structure are also dramatically different than that of Iran’s. Scholars have examined in depth the determinants of proliferation, with security demands often found to be the primary motivating factor. However, Philipp Bleek and Eric Lorber, among others, have [found](https://jcr.sagepub.com/content/58/3/429.abstract) that security guarantees significantly reduce the likelihood for proliferation. While Iran could be said to have sponsor states in China and Russia, these relationships are largely driven by economic interests and self-interested foreign policy. Conversely, Turkey is a long-standing member of the NATO alliance. The Article V security guarantee ensures Turkey’s existential security. Iran lacked this protection.

#### US has 50 nukes in turkey—removal from NATO causes them to prolif

Fernholz 19- covers space, the economy and geopolitics for Quartz (Tim Fernholz “The US is rethinking the 50-plus nuclear weapons it keeps in Turkey,” Quartz, October 13, 2019, <https://qz.com/1727158/us-rethinking-the-50-plus-nuclear-weapons-it-keeps-in-turkey/)//mcu> ty owen

Turkish forces are pushing into northern Syria, replacing and sometimes even firing on the US troops retreating at Donald Trump’s orders. The question of whether Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is really a US ally was put to US defense secretary Mark Esper on Fox television this morning. “No, I think Turkey, the arc of their behavior over the past several years has been terrible,” he said. Which brings up a problem: **The US is storing perhaps 50 air-dropped thermonuclear bombs at its Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey**, less than 100 miles from the Syrian border where this conflict is taking place. The nuclear stockpile dates back to the Cold War, when the US sought to keep a sufficient supply of atomic weapons deployed in Europe to deter potential Soviet aggression. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy also host similar arsenals, and the US trains the participating nations in the use of the doomsday devices. Today, these bombs remain in place largely because of inertia, and the hope that countries like Turkey will see the depot as sufficient reason not to develop nuclear weapons of their own. It doesn’t seem to be working: Last month, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he could “not accept” efforts to prevent Turkey from developing its own atomic bombs. But instability in Turkey and the region, along with Ankara’s close relationship with Russia, have had American strategists talking about re-locating their weapons for years. (The US does not officially discuss the arsenal, but there is no indication that the stockpile has been removed.) A 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan saw power to the base cut off for several days, raising questions about the safety of the stash. More recently, Turkey has purchased advanced air defense technology from Russia, which has raised hackles in the US defense community because Turkey was a partner in developing the US F-35 fighter-bomber. The US Air Force canceled the partnership over worries that Russia would be able to learn from Turkey how to better shoot down US aircraft. Now, Russia and Turkey are coordinating military policy in northern Syria, with the US as a bystander. The move to exploit a civil conflict in Syria to gain a geopolitical advantage typify how strategists see a new era of great power competition playing out. One reason to be worried is that the recent shift in US strategy launched by Trump appears to have caught the US military establishment by surprise. It’s not clear how prepared the US is to deal with the knock-on effects of the about-face, whether it is disappointed former allies like the Kurds (paywall) or ISIS fighters escaping from prison camps, much less the calculus of nuclear deterrence.

### ---xt: Prolif---AT NPT Dead

#### NPT will survive despite member backlash over various issues

Lyon 20 [Rod Lyon is a senior fellow at ASPI. “Will the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Survive the 2020s?” 2-21, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/02/21/will_the_nuclear_nonproliferation_treaty_survive_the_2020s_115059.html>, y2k]

Treaty members will vent about a range of issues during the upcoming five-yearly review conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 27 April to 22 May. North Korean nuclear and missile developments, the trials of the Iranian nuclear deal, the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the continuing modernisation programs of the five recognised nuclear weapon states—instead of disarmament—provide plenty of new grist for the mill.

Still, every review conference seems to precipitate a sense of unease over the future of the treaty. This year’s no different. Yet the NPT will survive this conference, too, because most treaty members continue to believe that an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would make for a more dangerous international security environment than the one we already have. Moreover, few states would want the NPT to collapse and leave the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (which still hasn’t been ratified by enough states to enter into force) in sole possession of the field.

#### Even if it collapsed, the US can use the alliance network to tamp down proliferation

Onderco 20 [Michal Onderco, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “If Kroenig is right, the United States needs a new nonproliferation policy. Soon,” New Perspectives, 2020, Vol. 28(1) 118–122, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2336825X20908469>, y2k]

An argument could be made that even if the rest of the world somehow lost interest in the NPT, the United States would remain the ‘‘enforcer of last resort’’ (cf. Horovitz, 2015 for a version of this argument). This argument is consistent with the standard account of the success of the United States’ unilateral attempts to constrain the nuclear developments among friends and enemies alike (Gavin, 2012; Miller, 2018). Yet many of the tools that the United States would use to compel countries to give up their nuclear ambitions stem from the United States’ unique position within the international system, where the United States sits in the center of various political and economic networks (cf. e.g. Winecoff, 2015). These tools, however, work only as long as the United States and its allies dominate the world (Nexon, 2018). Yet the centrality of the United States in various networks comes under strain, not least because the United States decided to ‘weaponize’ these interdependence networks (Farrell and Newman, 2019). One only needs to listen to the repeated calls for alternative payment channels (such as the EU’s Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, known as INSTEX, a channel for conducting business with Iran) and different currencies to settle transactions to understand the phenomenon (for a recent overview, see McDowell, 2019). And while the rising powers do not fundamentally question the goal of nonproliferation, they are not as heavily invested in it. Shell

#### Security commitments are key to effective non-prolif---sustains the NPT – Russia cooperation is irrelevant in a world with the NPT BUT we can walk and chew gum at the same time with prolif and Russia

Daalder 20 [Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, “Can 50 Years of Minimizing Nuclear Proliferation Continue?” 3-5, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/opinion/minimizing-nuclear-proliferation.html>, y2k]

Imagine we are living in the year 2030. New seismic activity indicates an underground nuclear explosion somewhere near the Arctic Circle. One more country announces it’s joining the once-exclusive club of nuclear weapons states that has now grown to 20 nations — more than double the number in 2020.

The trouble started in 2023, when a group of former allies of the United States renounced their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and opted to acquire the very nuclear weapons capabilities that they foreswore decades earlier.

Since then, nations across the world had raced to acquire the bomb, and the global security situation had become increasingly precarious. Sooner or later, as centers of nuclear decision making multiplied, one of those weapons was bound to go off, with consequences incalculable for all.

A far-fetched future? Perhaps. The nonproliferation treaty entered into force 50 years ago, on March 5, 1970. At the time, only five nations — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France — were recognized as nuclear weapons states. Just four more countries — India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea — have since acquired the bomb. And, yet, this scenario is more plausible now than many may think.

To understand why, we need to go back to 1963, when President John F. Kennedy warned of a “world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.” Kennedy expressed the widely held belief that further proliferation was likely, if not inevitable. Every nation that possessed the capability to build a bomb had done so and American officials worried that the trend was about to accelerate.

That didn’t happen. Having stood at the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union redoubled efforts to stabilize their nuclear relationship and prevent other states from crossing the nuclear threshold. The nonproliferation treaty was one result of those efforts. Under the treaty, states that didn’t have nuclear weapons pledged not to develop or acquire them, while those that did committed to eventual nuclear disarmament.

But it wasn’t just U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations that turned the proliferation tide in the 1960s. Even more important was Washington’s determination to assure its allies in Europe and Asia that they could rely on America for their nuclear security. Only after they were convinced that the American nuclear guarantee was credible, did allies like Germany and Japan decide to forego a national nuclear option and join the nonproliferation treaty.

Whenever new developments seemed to call the American guarantee into question — as when a new generation of Soviet medium-range missiles were deployed in Europe in the 1970s and when North Korea expanded its nuclear and missile programs in the 1990s and 2000s — Washington worked to reassure its allies that its nuclear commitment remained strong and credible.

In recent years, new questions about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee have returned. One reason is the changing strategic environment. In Europe, a more adventurous and better-armed Russia no longer shies away from using military force, as its invasion of Ukraine and its support for the Assad regime in Syria have underscored. In Asia, China’s rapid rise has expanded its military reach throughout the Asia-Pacific, and North Korea has emerged as a potent foe, armed with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that threaten the entire region.

Even as threats have multiplied, allied doubts about the American commitment have grown perceptibly since Donald Trump entered the White House expressing deep distrust of alliances. His early failure to reconfirm NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense commitment, his threat to leave NATO if allies did not sharply increase military spending, his insistence that Asian allies greatly increase their financial contributions to maintain the U.S. military presence, his musings about some allies acquiring their own nuclear capabilities — all these have increased uncertainty in allied capitals about whether they can still count on the United States.

Which raises the question: if not the United States, who will assure their nuclear security? So far, few experts argue that the answer lies in a national nuclear program. But as worries about America’s security commitments continue to grow, more countries may reach that conclusion.

To forestall this danger, Washington needs to act swiftly.

First, the president needs to unconditionally reaffirm America’s fundamental commitment to the security and defense of its allies. Yes, the allies need to do more and spend more, but it is in America’s vital interest to ensure that they are safe and secure — and without their own nuclear weapons.

Second, America and the other nuclear powers need to resume serious discussions on arms control. As a first step, Washington and Moscow need to extend the New START treaty capping their long-range nuclear forces before it expires next year. Next, along with Britain, France and China, they should start a serious dialogue on how to limit their nuclear capabilities and work together to prevent further proliferation. And all of them should halt nuclear modernization efforts while those talks continue.

For 50 years, the nonproliferation treaty has largely succeeded in preventing more countries from going nuclear. America’s security alliances have played an essential role in that success. Reaffirming those alliances and committing to serious arms control efforts can help ensure its continuation in the next 50 years.

### Expulsion Bad---ME

#### Turkey is an essential ally in NATO key to stabilization measures in the middle east

Pamir et al 20-- Ahmet Üzümcü- Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006 (“Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat,” European leadership network, 16 December 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat/)//mcu

But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, **Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.** It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. **Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“.** Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. **Turkey has become an essential partner** in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, **Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts**. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nation in 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat. We, as former Turkish Ambassadors to NATO, are proud to confirm that our country has assumed its responsibilities toward the Alliance in their entirety. Turkey is one of the few allies to fulfil its commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defence; it has the second largest army in NATO, and it ranks fourth in contributions to NATO operations and fifth in NATO expenditures. In an Alliance of thirty nations, there are inevitably ups and downs in the relations between allies. In the past, these differences **have turned out to be circumstantial and temporary.** They were eventually resolved, mostly bilaterally, but sometimes with the use of good offices of the Secretary General or other Allies. **There is no reason to suppose that the current spate of disputes will not be resolved in the same way**. During the recent tension in the eastern Mediterranean, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, took the welcome initiative of inviting Greece and Turkey to agree upon deconfliction measures. The parties concerned must be engaged in a dialogue in order to achieve an equitable solution in line with international law. Other countries should facilitate this process by encouraging dialogue among two longstanding allies. To conclude, there needs to be a solution to the impasse presented by the procurement of Russian-made S400s and the U.S. decisions both to disengage Turkey from the F35 program and to apply sanctions on its ally’s defence procurement agency. A compromise would unleash much positive momentum. We believe that Turkey will continue to observe its obligations and commitments as a reliable member of the Alliance. It will continue to support the Alliance efforts toward global peace and security. **The Alliance would, no doubt, be weaker without the active participation and support of Turkey.**

#### Specifically, Afghanistan unstable now and will escalate drawing Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia

CPA 5/11- aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests.(Center for preventative Action, “War in Afghanistan,” Global Conflict Tracker, May 11 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan>)//mcu

In February 2020, after more than a year of direct negotiations, the U.S. government and the Taliban signed a peace agreement that set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Under the agreement, the United States pledged to draw down U.S. troops to approximately 8,500 within 135 days and complete a full withdrawal within fourteen months. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent territory under its control from being used by terrorist groups and enter into negotiations with the Afghan government. However, no official cease-fire was put into place. After a brief reduction in violence, the Taliban quickly resumed attacks on Afghan security forces and civilians. Direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban began months after the agreed upon start of March 2020, faced multiple delays, and ultimately made little progress. Violence across Afghanistan continued in 2020 and 2021 as the United States increased air strikes and raids targeting the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban attacked Afghan government and Afghan security forces targets and made territorial gains. Civilian casualties across Afghanistan have remained high over the past several years. The United Nations documented a then–record high of 10,993 civilian casualties in 2018. Although 2019 saw a slight decline, civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 for the sixth year in a row and brought the total UN-documented civilian casualties since 2009 to more than 100,000. Despite another decline in 2020, the first half of 2021 saw a record high number of civilian casualties as the Taliban ramped up their military offensive amid the withdrawal of international troops. In addition to the Taliban’s offensive, Afghanistan faces a threat from the Islamic State in Khorasan, which has also expanded its presence in several eastern provinces, attacked Kabul, and targeted civilians with suicide attacks. Uncertainty surrounding the future of international assistance has strained the Afghan economy. Although the United States and its allies pledged in late 2020 to continue providing support to the Afghan government, they could reduce aid following the Taliban takeover. Such a move could compound Afghanistan’s **deteriorating economic situation.** Concerns The United States has an interest in attempting to preserve the many political, human rights, and security gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. The Taliban takeover of the country could once again turn Afghanistan into a terrorist safe haven, as the group is believed to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. The takeover also threatens to reverse advances made in securing the rights of women and girls. Moreover, **increasing internal instability, a mass exodus of refugees, and a growing humanitarian crisis could have regional ramifications as neighboring countries respond**. In addition, **Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia are all likely to compete for influence** in Kabul and with subnational actors**.**

### ---xt: ME---AT NATO Withdrew

#### True, but that makes Turkish alignment with NATO all the more important

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The Turkish Armed Forces left Afghanistan, but **Ankara is poised to play key security and diplomatic roles in the country**. Turkish officials announced the evacuation of the Turkish military contingency from the Kabul Airport on August 25, 2021, despite separate discussions with the United States and the Taliban for Turkey to continue running the Kabul International Airport.[1] Top Turkish officials had argued that the Turkish forces could continue to manage the security and operations of the airport as they had since 2015 if the Taliban so desired.[2] Ankara also pivoted to establishing relations with the Taliban through the Turkish Embassy in Qatar at least as early as August 15, when the Taliban reached Kabul, in a likely bid to maintain and expand the Turkish role in Afghanistan.[3] The bulk of Turkish forces left Afghanistan by August 27 under reported Taliban pressure, but the Turkish Embassy is continuing its operations as of September 3.[4] Recent statements by both the Taliban and Ankara indicate that Turkey is exploring ways to help run the Kabul Airport and support the new Taliban government.[5] Ankara and the Taliban both believe Turkey can play a role in shaping the new Afghanistan. Ankara will likely double down on its political and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to **prove its ability to stabilize and shape conflicts as a regional power**. Turkey has provided training for Afghan security forces, political outreach to various Turkic communities, aid and private sector investment, and non-combatant military services. Turkey refrained from participating in military campaigns against the Taliban and instead took on logistical and security duties like Kabul Airport security, intelligence sharing, and funding and training at Afghan military schools.[6] Turkish officials leveraged this non-combatant history when they offered the Taliban further “technical and security assistance” in August.[7] Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Naeem said that the **Taliban wants Turkey’s support** in areas ranging from reconstruction and economy to healthcare and education on August 25.[8] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan views such a Turkish role as a natural one, underlining Turkey’s long-standing ties to its fellow Muslim country with a significant Turkic population. Ankara and the Taliban are also in talks about the future of Kabul Airport. President Erdogan stated that the Taliban asked Turkey to run the operations of Kabul International Airport if the Taliban provided its security instead of Turkish forces. However, anonymous Turkish officials claimed that Turkey would only run the airport in partnership with Qatar and only if security was provided by a private security firm of former Turkish soldiers.[9] SADAT International Defense Consultancy, known for credible reports of its supervision and payment of Turkish-backed Syrian fighters in Libya and Azerbaijan, is the only private Turkish security company that could adopt such a duty.[10] Discussions are ongoing as of September 3 and the Taliban’s position remains unclear. Turkey’s Ambitions and Constraints Afghanistan is a theater of opportunity, but not an existential security problem for Ankara. Afghanistan poses little direct threat to Turkish national security, in contrast to the perceived terrorism and internal stability threats the country is fighting in northern Iraq and Syria. Afghanistan’s current situation presents an opportunity for Ankara to maximize its political and security reach by filling growing gaps in foreign investment, projects, and support and by **advancing NATO interests**. Turkey can advance its mutual interests with NATO in Afghanistan while pursuing its own objectives as an aspiring power in the region. A successful bid in helping stabilize Afghanistan could elevate Turkey as a necessary and capable security player in the region and to its allies—two longstanding goals of the Erdogan government. During an August 25, 2021, speech to celebrate the anniversary of a historic Turkic battle, Erdogan said “We transformed from a country of existential battles inside its own borders to one that has a say in every critical matter in the world.”[11] This self-perception of Turkey as a regional powerbroker helps drive President Erdogan and Ankara’s top leadership’s pursuit of more activist policies beyond Turkey’s immediate neighborhood—including in Afghanistan.

### ---xt: ME---Link

#### Turkey is key to effective Afghanistan stabilization

Yazici 21- is the Evans Hanson Fellow and Turkey researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi leads ISW’s research efforts on Turkey and Turkey’s military and political activities abroad. She received her Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria and published a paper on the de-facto Turkish control in northern Syria in Tufts University’s Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. (Ezgi Yazici, “TURKEY AIMS TO PLAY STABILIZING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 3, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal)//mcu

Turkey will likely perceive one or multiple of the following objectives in the near term as advantageous to its regional and global standing: Deliver legitimacy to a new Afghan government: **As a Muslim NATO country**, Turkey could be a useful partner for the Taliban leadership to gain international acceptance and legitimacy as well as access to global financial systems. Advance the Turkish security role in line with, and beyond, NATO goals: Turkey has been offering military training and security cooperation deals to an increasing number of developing countries. Turkish forces have hosted Afghan, Somali, Azerbaijani, Pakistani, Libyan, and other security forces for capacity-building trainings as part of, or beyond, NATO missions. Turkey will likely continue its trainings with Afghanistan and offer new technical and military cooperation opportunities to the Taliban government. Insert Erdogan-friendly Turkish companies to Afghanistan for profit: Turkish companies with strong ties to the Erdogan government have won significant reconstruction contracts in Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and elsewhere. Turkey will likely look for similar construction and investment opportunities in Afghanistan for profit and to benefit the crony network Erdogan cultivates for government-friendly companies. Improve Turkey’s position within NATO: **Turkey is one of the few, if not the only, NATO countries that will maintain a diplomatic mission in Afghanistan.** It has also been in frequent contact with many NATO allies to discuss developments in Afghanistan and demand financial support.[12] Ankara will seek to use its unique position in and access to Afghanistan to improve relations with NATO allies, particularly the United States, and gain concessions. Position Turkey as a regional power for security and stabilization: President Erdogan suggested that Turkey, Turkic Central Asian countries, and Pakistan could work with the Taliban if they take “positive steps” during a speech on August 29.[13] Erdogan has not specified what those steps include or how Turkey might support them, but Turkey could leverage its ties to Central Asian countries to promote regional security initiatives. Meanwhile, Ankara also faces the risks of deteriorating public opinion, increased refugee flows, and growing financial costs

#### Turkey-US relations are impossible

Dalay 21, research director @ Brookings (Galip, “US-Turkey relations will remain crisis-ridden for a long time to come,” *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/29/us-turkey-relations-will-remain-crisis-ridden-for-a-long-time-to-come/)//BB>

At this stage, there is limited room for progress on the above-mentioned five main areas of contention in relations. A mutually acceptable formula on the S-400 systems is unlikely to be found anytime soon, and this issue is set to become a long-lasting irritant in the relationship. On the Eastern Mediterranean, at best, the crisis can be refrozen, which means launching bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece and both sides refraining from sending ships into contested waters for exploration. Plus, on the Eastern Mediterranean, we are likely to see more policy coordination between the U.S. and Europe. The future of Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian Kurds is intimately linked with the future of the ruling coalition in Turkey, and political developments inside Turkey. As long as Erdoğan’s coalition with the far-right MHP remains in place, the prospect for a policy recalibration is limited. And the Biden administration will likely be more vocal on high-profile, politically-motivated cases such as against the former co-chairman of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş, philanthropist Osman Kavala, and novelist Ahmet Altan. Similarly, the Halkbank case will continue to cast a shadow over bilateral ties. All these feuds will make crisis a permanent fixture of U.S.-Turkey relations.

### ---xt: ME---Impact

#### Turkey’s key to ME stabilization

Sandano 3/4- Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Sindh (IMRAN ALI SANDANO, “Change in Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East,” MAR 04, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/change-in-turkish-foreign-policy-toward-the-middle-east)//mcu

Turkish foreign policy mainly aims to protect its interests in a strained global and regional environment. Turkey always tried to create conditions for sustainable peace and development with both neighboring and more distant states. Ankara has recently become more involved and active in the Middle East. Some analysts are of the view that this change indicates Turkey is moving away from the West, as they observe that Turkey's confidence in the region is mismatched with its Western coordination. However, others believe that security, power projection, rational considerations and a mix of national interests have forced Turkey to drive its foreign policy toward the Middle East. After the Arab uprising, regional geopolitics and security challenges opened new channels for Turkish foreign policy, which led Ankara to even get involved in the region. It started humanitarian and economic engagements. With the passage of time, Ankara’s involvement in the Middle East has extended and it has become the third party in the regional conflicts. To normalize ties with the Middle Eastern countries, especially with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, would open new channels for augmenting Turkey’s diplomatic, strategic and economic assets in its foreign policy. The strained ties the between leading regional actors have proven deleterious to understanding the true prospect of economic relations. A shift and a response The shift in Ankara’s Middle East policy is a response to external factors – both regional and international, and domestic issues related to security and economy. Turkey has begun to change its positions and restart its relations, which had previously been based on hostility. Washington has always remained a key player in the Middle East, but the United States administration under President Joe Biden prioritized East Asia, focused on its own domestic matters and has pushed away diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the previous Donald Trump administration. In the meantime, the U.S. has started reevaluating its military forces from the region. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not be part of the Saudi intervention of Yemen, and Washington may go back to the nuclear deal with Iran. These changes triggered and pushed Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and the UAE towards a de-escalation process. On the other hand, Russia's growing influence and the U.S. decreasing engagement in the region pushed Turkey to act it to balance between the two. Turkey has a long relationship with the U.S. and Russia, but with some differences – however, it has maintained a good balance in Syria and Libya. In this context, **Ankara’s Middle East policy has shifted into a new track to rebalance the region**. Saudi Arabia a key actor Last year at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit, Gulf countries signed the Al-Ula declaration and formally ended the dispute with Qatar. This regional development created further encouragement for Ankara to take the plunge with Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi. Since then, Turkey and Qatar have started negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE for reconciliation. Saudi Arabia is one key regional player in the Middle East region. The good relations between Ankara and Riyadh would prove to be a game changer for this region. **The cooperation initiative has been started between Ankara and Riyadh**, their relations have appeared in a positive dynamic after a phone conversation between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Arabia’s King Salman ahead of a G-20 leaders summit in 2021. Recently, Erdoğan visited the UAE for bilateral and economic cooperation with a flurry of agreements during his first visit to the Gulf state since 2013. No doubt, Riyadh also wants close relations with Ankara, which will help Saudi to counter rivals or disrupters. The normal ties between Riyadh and Ankara would take preference over all regional reconciliation efforts. This move would be a good option for Saudi Arabia to get much-needed space to enhance its capacity for political activity, connectivity, and cooperation with various other regional states, which are perceived as Riyadh’s rivals. **Better relations between both states would open new economic, political and defense opportunities**, where Saudis may retain their traditional regional role and effectively deal with security challenges. The regional power game between the main stakeholders of the region is persistent strategic competition, which will **only destabilize** their diplomatic positions, and create more economic cost than benefits. The current developments and the changing nature of their regional de-escalation approach is a sign of a **reconciliatory drift** in the region, which will normalize the strategic and economic situation in the region. To sum up, regardless of the problems in balancing Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel, the current change in the foreign policy of the Middle East is a good option for Turkey to move forward with win-win cooperation. Certainly, Turkey possesses such capability to go with Middle Eastern countries for their collective cooperation.

#### Middle East war escalates.

Lantier 19, PhD @ Geneva (Alex, “Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria,” <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/10/14/syri-o14.html>)

The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War.

### Swindland Bad

#### Inducting Sweden and Finland leaves NATO exposed and vulnerable to Russian aggression.

Emma Ashford 22. Senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. "NATO Should Think Twice Before Accepting Finland and Sweden." Washington Post. 5-30-2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-should-think-twice-before-accepting-finland-and-sweden/2022/05/30/b412ee2a-dff7-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

Yet from the point of view of existing NATO members — and particularly the US — it’s still not necessarily a net win. Finland and Sweden have long focused their militaries on defending their own territories, raising doubts about their value in contributing to a common defense, which is at the heart of NATO’s charter.

And while both nations have pledged to increase their military spending and ability to bolster Europe’s broader defenses, it is also possible that they would not. Instead, they may free-ride on America’s military strength — and its nuclear umbrella — as so many European states have done for years. According to the International Monetary Fund, neither country comes close to meeting the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense.

History suggests the most likely outcome is two more states adding to America’s defense burden at a time when Washington should be pivoting to Asia.

Consider also the question of the defensibility of new NATO territory. Admitting Sweden could be strategically beneficial, allowing NATO forces to better control the Baltic Sea and to use Gotland Island, at an important chokepoint off the Baltic States, as a staging ground for any future conflict.

Finnish territory, in contrast, is a strategic nightmare. It would dramatically increase the alliance’s exposure to any future attacks by Moscow: the country shares an 800-mile border with Russia that, as a recent study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies put it, is “highly exposed to Russian military threats.”

There are grab bag of other reasons for caution, including the usual concerns about expanding the alliance to an ever-more unwieldy set of member states. It doesn’t take a genius to predict that 32 nations will be even harder to manage than 30. Before its Ukraine moment, NATO was struggling to maintain the peace between Greece and Turkey, few nations were meeting the 2% spending goal, and President Emmanuel Macron of France had drawn headlines for suggesting the alliance was experiencing “brain death.”

Even in the face of Russia’s aggression, support for adding the two members isn’t unanimous. Turkey’s vehement opposition to Finland and Sweden may be an attempt to wring political concessions from the alliance, but also owes a lot to these countries’ support for Kurdish causes.

Alliance leaders should also consider the risk of Russian overreaction. Moscow has started three wars over potential NATO expansion — invading Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 before the current war. While Moscow is clearly not able to stage another major military campaign right now, one cannot rule out President Vladimir Putin doing something irrational in response to a NATO expansion that takes the alliance within 200 miles of his birthplace of St. Petersburg.

At the same time, it’s not clear that Finland and Sweden are at increased risk unless they are allowed NATO membership. They have long relied on their neutral status and domestic defense capacity to prevent crises. Refusing to admit them to NATO is not hanging them out to dry, but simply retaining a workable status quo.

#### Expansion alienates Russia---triggers arms racing and escalation.

Stephen Collinson 22. Politics Reporter at CNN. "The most striking aspect of Sweden and Finland's application to join NATO." CNN. 5-18-2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/18/europe/sweden-finland-nato-analysis-intl/index.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

The most striking aspect of Sweden and Finland's application to join NATO is how little debate there is about whether it's a wise idea.

The entry of the two Nordic nations would be the most significant geopolitical outcome of the Ukraine war, transforming the strategic security picture in northeastern Europe and adding hundreds of miles of direct NATO borders with Russia.

For decades, even during the most tense moments of the Cold War, neither country seemed to feel the need to join the Western military alliance despite their proximity to the giant to their east. But that changed this year, after Putin sent tanks rolling across the border into Ukraine in February.

Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson on Sunday called the invasion of Ukraine "illegal and indefensible," and worried that Moscow might do something similar "in our immediate vicinity." Finnish President Sauli Niinistö told CNN the same day that the invasion indicated Russia was ready to attack an "independent, neighboring country."

Many analysts believe that one of the main goals of Russia's invasion was to weaken NATO by taking Kyiv's possible future membership off the board. If so, it has backfired spectacularly. The alliance is now stronger and more united than it has been for years, and it could soon be much larger.

But expanding NATO could also trigger serious reverberations. Doubling the security alliance's direct frontier with Russia would be a personal blow for Putin, who has focused on undermining the Western alliance since he first became Russia's President, more than 20 years ago. And if Putin felt Russia was already being hemmed in on its western flank, could adding two more NATO members during the worst tension between the West and Moscow in decades exacerbate the Russian leader's paranoia?

In the 1990s, revered US diplomat George Kennan — the founder of the Cold War containment policy of Russia — warned that NATO expansion would alienate Russia and cause an adverse reaction. A contemporary counterargument would be that Moscow's terrible losses in Ukraine, dented military prowess and failure to siege Kyiv show that it is too weak to do anything about an expanding NATO. And why should Putin get any say in who joins the alliance anyway?

The Kremlin's response to Finland and Sweden hasn't exactly been thundering so far. But it's still a formidable nuclear power and any decision to move missiles or tactical nuclear weapons closer to NATO borders could trigger a new game of brinkmanship in Europe.

#### Sweden and Finland in NATO incurs multiple paths of Russian retaliation---provocations, cyberattacks, energy wars, etc.

Holly Ellyatt 22. Correspondent at CNBC. “NATO is about to get bigger and Putin is unhappy: Here are 3 ways Moscow could react.” CNBC. 5-17-2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/16/how-could-russia-react-to-finland-sweden-joining-nato.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

1) More NATO provocations

Over the years, Russia has made repeated provocative incursions near or into NATO allies’ airspace and these seem to have increased in frequency in the last few years. With Sweden’s and Finland’s latest move to join NATO, experts believe the alliance should prepare itself for more provocations from Russia.

“This changes the security environment for the entire Baltic Sea and for the Arctic,” retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commanding general of the U.S. Army in Europe, told CNBC on Monday.

“Of course there will continue to be airspace violations, just like there are over other NATO countries, but we’re a defensive alliance and we’re going to react coolly and professionally. The last thing that the Russians want is to get into a fight with all 30 NATO nations, soon to be 32,” he told CNBC’s “Capital Connection.”

“[Putin’s] going to complain about it, he’s going to threaten things but he actually has nothing that he can do as most of his military is tied up in Ukraine, so I don’t see any real threat against Sweden or Finland.”

Russian provocations of NATO are nothing new. In 2020, NATO air forces across Europe were scrambled more than 400 times to intercept unknown aircraft approaching the alliance’s airspace with almost 90% of these missions in response to flights by Russian military aircraft, NATO said in a statement.

Last March, NATO planes were scrambled 10 times in a six-hour period in response to an “unusual peak” of Russian warplanes near the alliance’s airspace over the North Atlantic, North Sea, Black Sea and Baltic Sea.

2) Cyberattacks and soldiers

Sweden and Finland have both insisted that joining NATO is not a move against Russia but both concede the decisions have been taken in light of Moscow’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

Sweden’s prime minister, Magdalena Andersson, told CNBC on Sunday that her country felt NATO membership was the best thing for its security, saying “what kind of retaliation there can be is up to Putin, we see there can be cyberattacks and hybrid attacks and other measures, but it is all up to them,” she told CNBC’s Steve Sedgwick in Stockholm.

Meanwhile, Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde said in the transition period before Sweden and Finland become full NATO members, heightened tensions are likely, noting “we foresee more military troops close to our border.”

3) Energy wars

Another potential space for retaliation, and possible Russian punishment for NATO’s expansion, could come in the energy sphere.

Russia still holds a powerful card in this area because it has traditionally accounted for around 40% of the EU’s gas imports. And while Europe scrambles for alternative energy sources to reduce its dependence on Russia as a provider of oil and gas, it is still reliant on it.

Gilles Moec, group chief economist at AXA Investment Managers, said in a note Monday that there was an “ever so present possibility Russia ‘turns the tap off’ its supply to the EU” although he noted that, so far Moscow has restricted itself to “half measures” which have not dried up supply — reflecting the country’s own dependence on these financial resources.

A day after Finland’s leaders announced their support for NATO membership, Russian state-owned utility company Inter RAO announced it would stop exporting electricity to Finland from Saturday (Finland gets about 10% of its electricity from Russia) citing a lack of payment as a reason, although the move was widely seen as retaliatory.

#### Escalates to nuclear war

Buchanan 22, author of “Nixon’s White House Wars: The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever.” (Pat, “Why would US give a war guarantee — to Finland?,” *The Journal*, <https://www.journal-news.net/why-would-us-give-a-war-guarantee-to-finland/article_01922d40-31e0-5711-9225-ee78c610b3e4.html)//BB>

Nervous about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions, Finland wants America legally and morally bound to fight Russia on its behalf, should Putin invade Finland as he invaded Ukraine. From the Finnish point of view, this is perfectly understandable. But why would the United States consent to go to war with Russia, the largest nuclear power on earth, for violating Finland’s frontiers? Finland is not Alaska; it is not Canada; it is 5,000 miles away. And no one ever asserted during the Cold War, or for the decades since, that Finland was a U.S. vital interest. Why, then, would we consent, in advance, to go to war with Russia over Finland? President Joe Biden said last week that NATO has an “open door” policy and Finland and Sweden are welcome, and he looks forward to their joining. Consider what Biden is actually saying and doing here. He is ceding to Finland, a country of 5.5 million people with an 830-mile border with Putin’s Russia, the right to obligate the United States of America to go to war with Russia, if Russia attacks Finland. What patriot would commit his own country, in perpetuity, to go to war on behalf of another country not his own? Why would America surrender to the Finns our freedom of action in deciding whether or not to fight a nuclear-armed Russia? NATO is not a country club; it is a military alliance Putin regards as an enemy. Every member of that alliance is obliged to treat an attack on any one of its 30 members as an attack on all, and all are obligated to come to the defense of the nation attacked. By welcoming Finland into NATO, Biden is offering Helsinki the kind of war guarantee Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave to Poland in the spring of 1939, which led to Britain’s having to declare war on Sept. 3, 1939, two days after Germany invaded Poland. How did that work out for Britain and the empire? In his farewell address, President George Washington warned his countrymen against “permanent alliances.” In conscious echo of our first president, Thomas Jefferson warned against “entangling alliances.” NATO is a military alliance that has been in existence since 1949. While it began with the U.S., Canada and 10 European nations, it ended the Cold War with 16. We have since added 14 more. Six of the nations NATO added since the Cold War — Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania — were members of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact. Three of the newest NATO members — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — are former republics of the Soviet Union. The last quarter-century of NATO’s encroachment into Russia’s space and onto Russia’s front porch has been a leading cause of the worsening relationship between the world’s two great nuclear powers. The repeated refusal of Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to rule out NATO membership for Ukraine was a primary cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This does not absolve Putin of culpability in launching the war on Ukraine, but it should tell us that any new members of NATO, in Russia’s “near abroad,” especially a new NATO member with an 830-mile border with Russia from the Baltic to the Arctic, is running a real risk and raising the possibility of war. Indeed, with Russia’s war in Ukraine in stalemate, having failed to achieve its objectives in Kyiv, Kharkov and Odessa, Russian officials have repeatedly raised the prospect of a desperate resort to tactical nuclear weapons to stop the bleeding. “Escalate to de-escalate” is the slogan. Bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO, which has already elicited rage from Moscow and ominous threats, is unlikely to reduce whatever pressure currently exists to escalate to nuclear war.

### AT Baltic War

#### There’s no chance of US/Russia war.

Aleksandr Khramchikhin 18, Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, 1/25/2018, “Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346

In an atmosphere of crisis permeated by mutual recriminations and suspicions, both sides—NATO and Russia—have engaged in a series of military activities along the line of contact. These maneuvers in turn have triggered multiple warnings from both sides of a sharp deterioration in European security, a growing threat of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and an urgent need to deescalate the situation in order to avoid a catastrophic war with disastrous consequences for all. An emerging conventional wisdom maintains that the new Cold War in Europe, if allowed to continue unchecked, runs the risk of escalating into a hot war unless steps to reduce tensions are taken swiftly.

But conventional wisdom is often wrong, and so it is this time. The hysteria that has engulfed public commentary throughout Europe about this ostensibly dire military situation on the brink of getting out of hand has little, if any, basis in fact. Both sides in the standoff exaggerate the tensions and the danger of escalation, and the risks of the military moves—their own and their adversary’s—supposedly driving these tensions.

In reality, the military balance between Russia and NATO is stable, the danger of escalation is hardly approaching critical levels, and little needs to be done militarily to defuse the current tensions. The true cause of the tensions is not military, but political and diplomatic. Until those causes are resolved, tensions between Russia and the West will remain high. The likelihood of a military confrontation will remain low, however, because neither side’s posture points to a heightened state of readiness or intention to go on the offensive. Until that changes, political and diplomatic tensions will remain mere tensions.

THE BALANCE, THEN AND NOW

The best evidence that the military situation in Europe is stable and that the continent is not on the brink of World War III is in the forces that each side has available for conducting military operations. Even a brief comparison of the present-day arsenals of Russia and NATO to those of the Soviet Union and NATO during the height of the Cold War should allay fears of military conflict (see table 1). This comparison should also take into account critically important political and psychological factors. Russia’s and NATO’s present-day forces do not measure up well against their predecessors of a generation ago.

One remarkable feature of the present situation is that even though the number of NATO member states has nearly doubled since the end of the Cold War, the alliance’s order of battle across many classes of weaponry has decreased since 1982, when East-West tensions were high. Over the past quarter century, military technology has developed rapidly, new weaponry has come online, and many advances in warfare have taken place. However, the arsenals of most European countries have had minimal qualitative improvements that do not begin to compensate for the major reductions in their military capabilities. Major acquisitions of military hardware have been limited mostly to wheeled armored personnel carriers (APCs) to be employed in expeditionary warfare.

The size of the U.S. military presence in Europe has decreased to an even greater degree since the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of 2016, the U.S. military had deployed ten brigades in Germany, but only two of these (the 2nd cavalry regiment and 12th combat aviation brigade) were actual fighting elements; the remaining eight were purely support units.1 One American airborne brigade is deployed in Italy.2 In 2017, the U.S. Air Force component deployed in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom had nine wings, but these are primarily support units, and there are only six fighting squadrons.

These cuts in military hardware are consistent with a general tendency in the West (to a greater extent in Europe than in the United States) to embrace ideas of hedonism, pacifism, postmodernism, tolerance, and political correctness. A 2016 Pew survey found that Europeans overall, with the exception of the Poles and Dutch, do not support increasing defence spending. Many Europeans are reluctant to support the use of hard power in international affairs. A 2017 Pew survey found that Europeans are also divided in terms of their willingness to come to a NATO ally’s defense against Russia, with Germany, the UK, and Spain demonstrating the least support. Along with the falling birth rates experienced in these countries, this shift in defense dynamics makes it virtually impossible to conduct a war that would result in major loss of life.

As a result of these shifts in attitudes and ideological trends, NATO troops may be unlikely to demonstrate heroism and willingness to make sacrifices, elements that are absolutely essential in wartime. Almost all NATO countries have transitioned to an all-volunteer military force, which has further decreased the motivation of their military personnel, or at least suggests that they are motivated more by money than by patriotism. The transition to an all-volunteer force has also resulted in increased defense spending, for reasons that deserve further consideration.

Like those of its NATO rivals, Russia’s modern-day military capabilities do not compare favorably with the combined military machine of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies (see table 2). Even a cursory comparison of Soviet and Eastern European militaries at the height of the Cold War—in 1982—and now makes clear that Russia is not poised for offensive action in the European theater.

THE HIGH COST OF WAR

NATO forces are highly sensitive to the risk of incurring casualties, and this heightened sensitivity was one of the reasons many Western countries chose to develop a concept of noncontact network-centric warfare heavily reliant on precision-guided munitions (PGM). However, this approach requires extremely expensive weaponry, equipment, ammunition, and supplies. Shrinking NATO military forces and arsenals mean that significant losses of lives or hardware have become unacceptable: losing even a few tanks and aircraft is now almost a catastrophe, comparable to losing a battleship or an armored division.

A high-intensity war that calls for large stocks of ammunition is also becoming prohibitively expensive—a trend illustrated by the evolution of wars that NATO countries have waged over the last quarter century. In 1991, NATO countries, with significant support from both Egypt and Syria, roundly defeated Iraq’s large and well-equipped army in Operation Desert Storm. The coalition against Iraq used PGMs only against high-value targets in the Desert Storm campaign.

### AT Arctic War

#### No Arctic war---their ev is all hype.

Øystein Tunsjø 20, professor and head of the Asia programme at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norwegian Defence University College, “The Great Hype: False Visions of Conflict and Opportunity in the Arctic,” Survival, Vol. 62, No. 5, 09-23-2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1819649

In recent years there has been an abundance of studies, reports, articles and statements presenting the Arctic as a new frontier for resource extraction and sea lanes of communication.1 These studies claim that the receding Arctic ice provides not just commercial opportunities, but also security challenges that could fuel great-power rivalry and conflict.2 Yet, despite the hype, there is little likelihood of a shipping bonanza or a natural-resource boom in the Arctic.3 This does not mean that climate change is unimportant for the region – we can expect more shipping activity, investment and competition as the ice cap recedes. But it is important to maintain a balanced view of the opportunities and challenges presented by the ‘new Arctic’.4

Equally important, the stakes in a changing Arctic are not high enough to warrant a great-power conflict. As in the past, it remains unlikely that military force will be used to resolve a conflict originating in the Arctic. It is more likely that any potential great-power competition in the High North between Russia and NATO will reflect the more consequential sources of competition and conflict in Eastern or Southern Europe – in other words, that conflict might spill over into the High North from somewhere else.5 Developments in the Arctic appear to have caused some observers to forget that Russia’s recent naval build-up is primarily focused on safeguarding traditional Russian security interests, such as maintaining its sea-based nuclear deterrent and contesting sea lanes of communication in the North Atlantic. Thus, it is a familiar security challenge – Russia’s rivalry with the United States and NATO over the European security order – that has the highest potential for creating conflict in the Arctic.

Similarly, the recent focus on China’s Arctic ambitions minimises the importance of the changing balance of power in East Asia as the primary source of US–China competition. Beijing’s foremost security concern is the US response to China’s activities in its own maritime periphery, but Chinese behaviour will also determine the United States’ global strategic priorities. Sino-American competition will compel the US to prioritise the Asia-Pacific, and thus to draw down its commitments to other regions. This will constrain its options in the High North.

Since European states are unprepared to substitute for American power, Russian advancements in Europe and the Arctic will primarily reflect US retrenchment and European inertia, rather than improved Russian capabilities. Moreover, heightened US–China competition in the Arctic, much like heightened competition with Russia, will be a spillover effect of US–China rivalry in East Asia.

The new Arctic: land of opportunity?

One of the leading champions of the new Arctic has been the Norwegian government. It defined the region as a national priority in 2005 and launched an international diplomatic offensive to increase international awareness of its supposedly vast potential. In a speech in 2006 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Norway’s then-minister for foreign affairs Jonas Gahr Støre declared that ‘in the years to come … the High North will be one of the most important strategic areas in the world’.6 In 2014 Oslo released ‘Norway’s Arctic Policy’, which stated that ‘the Arctic is the Norwegian Government’s most important foreign policy priority’, adding that ‘access to energy resources and other natural resources is becoming easier, and new trade routes are opening up in the north. All this is creating new opportunities.’7 Such claims have been echoed in other countries too. US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, for example, emphasised in a speech to the Arctic Council in May 2019 that

the Arctic is at the forefront of opportunity and abundance. It houses 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its undiscovered gas, and an abundance of uranium, rare earth minerals, gold, diamonds, and millions of square miles of untapped resources … Steady reductions in sea ice are opening new passageways and new opportunities for trade.8

This kind of public diplomacy, along with exaggerated media reporting, appears to have contributed to the circulation of imprudent claims and unfounded assumptions about the opportunities presented by the new Arctic – and about the likelihood of conflict in the region.9

#### Russia’s peaceful in the Arctic and will pursue cooperation.

Jeremy Tasch 20. Professor of Geography & Environmental Planning, Towson University. “Why the Talk of an ‘Artic Cold War’ Is Exaggeration”. Valdai Club. Jul 7 2020. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/why-the-talk-of-an-artic-cold-war-is-exaggeration/

As Russia’s government has promoted a more visible presence in the Arctic—nervously observed by international governments aware of Russia’s increased military presence in its High North—a few related critical points seem often disregarded.

In summer 2007, while both the Mir-1 and Mir-2 submersibles were assisting a planned Russian government expedition to map the seabed, the famous flag-planting performance was funded by Frederik Paulsen, a Swedish pharmaceutical entrepreneur and the event was organized by an Australian-American group of deep-sea exploration enthusiasts. In other words, this feat, which drew the ire of Canada’s Foreign Minister and focused international media attention on a “new Cold War,” was unlikely prearranged either to perform scientific research in support of Russia’s Lomonosov territorial claims nor as a statement of territorial acquisition.

Although Moscow has always maintained interest in its Arctic, arguably this interest is growing. A Russian naval doctrine acknowledges that the Arctic is among its priority regions, and Russia not only already possesses the world’s largest fleet of nuclear icebreakers but plans to increase its size. This is used by some Western commentators to point to Russia’s military advantage relative to the United States in the Arctic. From here, it then is a short-stretch for some commentators to note that the 2014 events concerning Russian-Ukrainian relations demonstrate Russia’s readiness to bend and at times break the rules of international conduct.

But as have other Arctic and non-Arctic states, so too has Russia benefited from international cooperation and rules-following in the Arctic. This is not least because the complexities of operating in the Arctic’s exceptional environment demonstrates that collaboration is inherently positive. It is this “exceptional environment” that makes certain Arctic endeavors—such as search and rescue efforts, scientific research, and marine pollution response—transnational, and consequently encourages collective responses. Further, the economic development of the Arctic—a transnational region with major emerging market opportunities—is a key strategic objective of Russia. President Putin, for example, recognizes that “The Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery will rival traditional trade lanes.” Businesses require certainty and regulatory stability in order both to minimize their risks and to pursue investing in the Arctic. Uncertainties associated with an unstable political environment can lead to a reduction in investment and diminished economic interest in the Arctic—a situation both Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders are determined to avoid.

Although the placement on August 3, 2007 of a titanium flag on the seabed grabbed headlines, this was not the first time a flag was planted in the vicinity of the North Pole. On his third polar expedition, and his eighth and final journey to the circumpolar north—later investigated and approved by the National Geographic Society—US Commander R. E. Peary placed an American flag at a point on the ice-covered Arctic Sea, somewhere nearby the earth’s north geographical pole. To commemorate this event, Peary claims to have written a note, placed it in a glass bottle, and then hid it in an ice crevice:

I have this day hoisted the national ensign of the United States of America at this place, which my observations indicate to be the North Polar axis of the earth, and have formally taken possession of the entire region, and adjacent, for and in the name of the President of the United States of America.

When Peary reached Indian Harbor, Newfoundland in early September 1909, he sent President Taft a telegram:

William H. Taft, President of the United States, Washington, D. C: Have honor of placing North Pole at your disposal. R. E. Peary, U. S. N.

In contrast to the media headlines generated by Artur Chilingarov’s titanium flag-planting, Peary’s attempt to do precisely what Foreign Minister MacKay was so against produced at least one attention-grabbing headline in the September 9, 1909 edition of the San Francisco Call: “Taft Does not Want Pole.” Indeed, in partial response to Peary’s generous offer, President Taft replied, “Thanks for your interesting and generous offer. I do not know exactly what I could do with it.” Of course, there is an even more recent example of the United States flirting with the possibility of buying US sovereignty further into the Arctic. Not only in 1946 did the US propose to pay Denmark $100 million to buy Greenland, but according to National Public Radio, “No Joke: Trump Really Does Want to Buy Greenland” (NPR, August 19, 2019).

Although Greenland and Denmark made it clear to President Trump that Greenland was not an empty lot with a “For sale” sign, Trump’s fumbled attempt at a real estate deal did further highlight that the Arctic is increasingly viewed by some observers as an arena for geopolitical competition. It further drew attention to the fact that the Trump Administration has been slow to turn its attention to the Arctic region. Consequently, the Department of Defense and the Navy each recently issued Arctic strategy documents. And not only did the Coast Guard produce its own Arctic strategy document, but to augment its two operational polar icebreakers, the US Senate finally approved in summer 2019—after a two-decade delay—the Coast Guard’s request for funding to acquire the first of three planned new polar icebreakers. Although the acquisition of new icebreakers is clearly intended to defend and protect US interests in the Arctic, it is critical to note that the Coast Guard’s icebreakers are deliberately called “polar” because they operate in both the Arctic and Antarctic. Further, a significant proportion of icebreaker activities are conducted in support of the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) research activities in both polar regions. Thus, it is problematic to distinguish actual new White House policies from existing nor to identify statements made by President Trump concerning the Arctic. Perhaps the clearest—if unrevealing—statement offered by Trump on the Arctic was delivered after his meeting with the Finnish president on April 23, 2018: “Both leaders affirmed that it is essential to increase security in the Arctic.”

Although the Arctic has not been a high priority for the current president, as in other international policy domains his administration has nonetheless applied an uncooperative “America First” approach to interactions with both allies and competitors. Such an unnuanced strategy to international relations has led to uneven results and has even caused uneasiness between the United States and Canada, its principal Arctic partner. Although former Vice President Biden, Trump’s democratic rival in the approaching November 2020 presidential election, has offered sharp criticism of President Trump’s “America First” approach, he has not yet clearly outlined how his administration would work with Arctic state and non-state stakeholders. What is known, however, is that the major global challenge of climate change can only be solved if countries cooperate with each other and reject isolationism. What is also clear is that should Biden’s bid to become America’s 46th president be successful, his foreign policy priorities would include re-building trust and unity among US partners while pursuing cooperation with its perceived rivals on issues where interests converge, which notably includes climate change. Indeed, Biden was among the first US politicians to propose a climate change bill in the Senate: More than three decades ago, Biden introduced the Global Climate Protection Act of 1986. More recently, Biden spoke in January 2020 on the importance of protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from oil and gas drilling and development—a clear contrast with Trump’s attempts to encourage more fossil fuel production in Alaska.

The increasing economic and strategic importance of the circumpolar north requires more attention from US federal policymakers. The Trump administration’s neglect of Arctic policy has implications beyond—but obviously including—the extended Arctic region. As provocatively expressed in the Valdai Discussion Club’s June 10, 2020 concept paper, “The ‘Arctic triangle’ is emerging, consisting of the USA, Russia and China, whose capabilities, ambitions and diplomatic potential will determine the future development of the Arctic region.” Strengthening “Arctic Triangle” relations—and relations among all Arctic, near-Arctic, and non-Arctic stakeholders more generally—requires promoting possibilities where mutual interests can be developed; ensuring international laws and institutions will continue to be respected; and maintaining a peaceful and stable environment that is attractive to investors and protects indigenous communities. Despite disagreements over NATO’s potential role in the Arctic, the inclusion of non-Arctic states in Arctic governance, and the place of indigenous peoples in circumpolar decision making, both Russia and China maintain respect for regional governance structures and international institutions, in particular the Arctic Council. Whether through Trump’s benign neglect, or President Biden’s application of Obama era Arctic policies—and despite the National Geographic and other news media’s continued call for an “Arctic Cold War”—the United States will also continue to respect regional governance structures and international institutions, and to pursue cooperation in the Arctic.